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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical conceptualisation of children and childhood in the social sciences has 
traditionally been aligned to developmentalism and socialisation theory.  It is essentially 
this theoretical orientation that has spawned contemporary social discourses on children 
and childhood.  Within this framework, children are typically perceived as immature, 
irrational, incompetent, asocial and acultural and have consequently contributed to the 
social and political marginalisation of children.  Recent theorists have shown, through a 
process of deconstructing dominant scientific discourses on childhood, how the concept 
functions ideologically to establish taken-for-granted meanings about children.  The 
present study is attempting to explore the ways in which children themselves construct 
and mobilise meanings of childhood.  Using the social constructionist theoretical 
framework as a point of departure, the primary aim of the study is to explore the extent to 
which the meanings that children assign to ‘childhood’ are ideologically configured.  
More specifically, using the concept of well-being as a hermeneutic key, the study 
examines how children use specific discursive resources and repertoires to assign 
meaning to ‘childhood’.  It is essentially offering an ideological analysis through an 
elucidation of the existing power relations between children and society and how these 
relations are perpetuated and manifested in children’s discourses.  At the methodological 
level, the study is premised on working from the perspectives of children, thereby 
advancing a child participation framework.  Key epistemological and methodological 
questions are explored with specific reference to the role of the child participation model 
as the methodological point of departure.  A qualitative methodological approach is 
followed using focus groups as the data collection method.  A series of focus groups was 
conducted with 56 thirteen year old children, from urban and rural geographical locations 
in the Western Cape.  Thompson’s (1990) depth hermeneutics, which provides a critical 
and systematic interpretive framework for the analysis of ideological constructions, was 
utilised within a discourse analysis framework to analyze and interpret the findings.  The 
key finding of the study was that the meanings that children assign to childhood are 
ideologically configured.  The essence of this configuration is adult society’s 
mobilization and control of the meanings of childhood, which functions to maintain 
relations of domination.  The outcome of this on children’s meaning assignation and 
constructions of childhood is characterized by a consensus/contestation dichotomy as 
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children appear to both accept and resist the ideology.  This emerges at the intrapersonal 
level (within the consciousness of children), the interpersonal level (between children) 
and societal level (between children and adult society).  The study concludes by 
advancing the notion that childhood should be conceived of as an ideological configured 
construction, and not merely as a discursive construction, functioning within various 
social contexts.  Thus, the meanings of childhood, whether constructed by, or present in 
discourses, cannot be independent from the ideologically configured social, historical and 
material structures.  It is believed that this theoretical maneuver will bring theories of 
childhood into better alignment with practical actions resulting in opportunities for 
intervention, services, monitoring and research initiatives, as well as policy development 
and implementation, aimed at improving child and youth wellness.   
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CHAPTER ONE: PROLOGUE 
1.1 Background  
The decades following the International Year of the Child in 1979, gave rise to 
considerable progress towards the improvement of children’s lives.  Ethical energy 
culminated into political commitment with the advancement of the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1989.  The near universal 
ratification of the UNCRC is testimony to the prevailing political will.  National 
Plans of Action for children, developed by signatory countries, has advanced 
strategies for improved budgetary allocations, policy formulation and services for 
children.  Internationally, some progress has also been made in the fields of child 
health, nutrition, education and social services.  These developments have been 
advanced by an intensification of advocacy for children, most notably from civic 
organisations and the academic sector who aggrandised the political and social 
debate on children and childhood (Knutsson, 1997; September, 2002).  
 
Despite these positive trends, the effects on the dominant discourses in disciplines 
such as the social sciences, economics and politics have been largely 
inconsequential (Knutsson, 1997; September, 2002).  In addition, children remain 
socially and politically marginalised, a feature that is especially common in 
developing countries.  Appended with poverty as the universal socio-economic 
reality, the well-being of children in these environments have been steadily 
declining.  Commentators attribute these shortcomings to the dearth of relevant data 
on children (see e.g. Dawes, Bray & van der Merwe, 2007; Qvortrup, 1994, 1997; 
September, 2002) as well as the pervasive theoretical weaknesses that characterise 
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research on children and childhood (see e.g. James & Prout, 1997; James, Jenks & 
Prout, 1998; Jenks, 2005; Knutsson, 1997; Qvortrup, 1994).   
 
Qvortrup (1997) contends that children have been conceptually and numerically 
marginalised.  He bases his contention on the absence of children both in 
conventional social statistics as well as other forms of social accounting.  This lack 
of systematic approaches to understand childhood as a factor of social analysis, has 
led Qvortrup (1997) to sanction for providing children a voice at the aggregate level.  
This, he believes, will advance the elucidation of the life conditions of children as a 
population group.  Commenting from a South African perspective, September 
(2002) believes that it is the lack of child1
 
 specific data that has been a significant 
variable in the exclusion of children in political, social and economic discourse.  She 
contends that data and research that exists is relatively fragmented and largely 
obtained through secondary processes.  Subsequently, the generation of knowledge 
on children’s rights and well-being is under-resourced which impacts negatively on 
the development and implementation of effective policies and services for children 
(September, 2002).  September’s (2002) comments are apposite if one considers 
South Africa’s Children in 2001 report to the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) which reveals huge gaps in national and regional data on children. 
However, there has been some improvement.  In South Africa, regular General 
Household Surveys (Statistics South Africa), the Demographic and Health Survey 
(Department of Health) and the Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (Medical Research 
                                                 
1 In the context of this study, a ‘child’ will refer to any person between the ages of 0 – 18 as defined 
in the South African Constitution (1996), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) and the Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005). 
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Council) amongst other national surveys, have made aggregate data on children and 
youth available.  The Children’s Institute at the University of Cape Town produces 
an annual publication, the South African Child Gauge, that collates available data on 
children and provides a good indication of the state of South Africa’s children. 
 
Theoretical weakness, as the second point of reference, contributed to what Qvortrup 
(1997) has termed the “invisibility of children”.  The traditional theoretical 
conceptualisation of children and childhood in the social sciences, has been aligned 
to developmentalism, i.e. natural maturation and socialisation theory (Jenks, 2005; 
Shildkrout, as cited in Prout & James, 1997) and has subsequently been the key 
elements in mainstream theories on children and childhood.  Some researchers have 
adopted the practice of integrating the two approaches.  Guelen (as cited in Alanen, 
1988) and Alanen (1988) have demonstrated the inadequacy of this.  Prout and 
James (1997) further argue that these theories were largely the result of uncritical 
absorption of positivist developmental psychology, constructed around the dual 
assumptions of naturalness and universality.  The outcome of these dominant 
theories perpetuates everyday and scientific discourses of children and childhood.  
Walkerdine (1984) laments that this has created a conceptual framework outside 
which, society in general, cannot think.  Similar sentiments are espoused by 
Qvortrup (2007) who points to the resulting ‘conceptual homelessness’ of childhood 
and more radically by Ingleby (1985) who coins the term ‘psy complex’ to explain 
the state’s hegemonic use of psychological technology to mediate children’s 
induction of culture and to guide their thinking, behaviour and development.  From 
within this framework, set in place by scientific psychological and socialisation 
theory, children are typically perceived as immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial, 
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acultural (Lull, 1991; Mackay, 1973, as cited in Prout & James, 1997) as well as 
passive objects (Alanen, 1988), ‘not yets’ and ‘human becomings’ (Qvortrup, 1994).   
 
It is essentially this traditional theoretical orientation that has spawned contemporary 
social discourses on children.  Recent theorists (see e.g. James & James, 2004; 
James & Prout, 1997; Jenks, 2005) have shown, through a process of deconstruction, 
how scientific discourses have contributed to the establishment of taken-for-granted 
meanings about childhood.  The present study, working from the perspectives of 
children, is essentially attempting to contribute to its reconstruction.  Key 
epistemological and methodological questions are explored with specific reference 
to the role of social constructionism and the child participation framework. 
Consequently, the study envisages engaging at the epistemological level (social 
constructionism), with an underlying aim of deconstructing childhood (theoretical 
level), whilst advocating for the perspectives of children at the methodological level 
(reconstruction).   
 
1.2 The Socio-Political Landscape of Children 
1.2.1 Overview of the International Status  
While there has been active public and political interest in the state and well-being 
of children since the early decades of the previous century, it only formally emerged 
in the political arena in 1979, spearheaded by UNICEF in its publication of the State 
of the World’s Children Report.  These reports were characterised by an analysis of 
basic indicators measuring the well-being and development of children.  Ben-Arieh 
(1996) believes that these annual reviews were instrumental in creating an 
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international awareness of the need for the effective monitoring of children.  Global 
interest in children’s well-being increased immensely throughout the eighties 
culminating in the World Summit on Children in 1990.  It was at this international 
gathering that countries formally committed to the development and protection of 
the world’s children. The Summit was guided by the principle of a ‘First Call for 
Children’ declaring the highest political commitment to ensure that the essential 
needs of children are given priority.   
 
The Summit is regarded as the first step in the global implementation of the 
UNCRC.  The UNCRC, which was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on the 20 November 1989, and came into force on the 2nd
 
 September 
1990, “contains a comprehensive set of international legal norms for the protection 
and well-being of children” (UNICEF: First Call for Children, 1990, p. 13).  A ten-
point plan of action was adopted focussing specific commitments on various critical 
domains of well-being.   
The implementation of this plan of action required specific States to adopt national 
plans of action.  States were urged to encourage all government structures, NGOs 
and civil society to take responsibility for preparing the national plan of action.  This 
would require the re-evaluation and prioritization of programmes, policies and 
budgets to comply with the national and universal action plan (UNICEF, First Call 
for Children, 1990). 
 
The success of the World Summit for Children can be measured by the significant 
political priority afforded to children demonstrated by 192 countries ratifying, 
 
 
 
 
 6 
acceding to, or signing the Convention and 155 countries preparing national 
programmes of action (UNICEF, A World Fit for Children, 2002).  In September 
2001, the General Assembly on Children convened a Special Session on Children 
wherein participating States reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration and 
plan of action of the World Summit for Children.  While many tangible results were 
reported over the past decade, critical challenges still remain which include 
malnutrition, AIDS, poverty, child labour, child trafficking, childhood disease and 
lack of education. 
 
1.2.2 Overview of the status of South Africa’s children 
Under the Apartheid regime, the children of South Africa have a long history of 
political violence, oppression, abuse and suffering.  With the advent of democracy 
in 1994 came a series of commitments to redress the atrocities that children had 
experienced in the past. 
 
Former President Mandela made the first of these commitments, when he pledged 
that the plight of children would be prioritised.  This was followed by a commitment 
to the implementation of the goals of the World Summit for children.  A year later, 
on the 16th of June 1995, a significant landmark was reached for children’s rights in 
South Africa, when the president ratified the UNCRC.  This step placed the needs of 
children as paramount within all development strategies of the government.  This is 
clearly reflected in Section 28 of the Bill of Rights of South Africa’s Constitution 
which guarantees children’s socio-economic rights as well as protection from abuse, 
exploitation and neglect.  Also, in 2000, South Africa ratified the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
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The National Programme of Action (NPA), co-ordinated by the Office on the Rights 
of the Child, was put in place to carry out the above commitments.  According to the 
Office on the Rights of the Child, the National Programme of Action “provides a 
holistic framework in which all government departments put children’s issues on 
their agendas.  It provides a vehicle for co-ordinated action between NGOs, 
government and child related structures” (2001, p. 21).  The ratification and 
legislative advancement of child specific instruments culminated in the development 
of the Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005), the associated Children’s Amendment Act 
(No. 41 of 2007) as well as the recently promulgated Child Justice Act (2008). 
 
However, while the will and commitment of civic and government institutions have 
advanced social transformation and legislative frameworks, the benefits have not 
reached all children and their state and well-being remains adverse (Barbarin, 2003).  
Even though the South African government has initiated a number of programmes to 
alleviate the legacy of social inequality and deprivation for children, recent statistics 
posit a grave situation with regard to poverty, access to primary health care services, 
safety and education.   
 
The General Household Survey (2007) indicates that there are 18.3 million children 
in South Africa which constitutes nearly 40% of the population (Statistics South 
Africa, 2008, as cited in Pendlebury, Lake & Smith, 2009).  According to the World 
Health Organisation the infant mortality rate and the under-five mortality rate are 
key indicators of the level of child health in a country, and refer to the number of 
children per thousand live births who die before the age of one and five respectively.  
In South Africa the infant mortality rate is an alarming 59 deaths per 1000 live births 
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while the under-five mortality rate is even worse, at 95 deaths per 1000 live births 
(Bradshaw et al., 2004).   A high proportion of children grow up in poverty with a 
lack of basic necessities such as proper housing, food and water.  The General 
Household Survey (2007) indicates that 67.7% of children are living in households 
characterised by income poverty, i.e. households with a per monthly capita income 
of less than R350 (Statistics South Africa, 2008, as cited in Pendlebury et al., 2009).  
Approximately 40% of children are living without basic sanitation, only 37.3% have 
access to drinking water at their site of residence and 31.7% are living in informal 
housing (Statistics South Africa, 2008 as cited in Pendlebury et al., 2009).  Access to 
health services is poor and children are enduring the brunt of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  AIDS accounts for 40% of deaths for children under the age of five years 
while the 30% is accounted for by preventable diseases of poverty (Bradshaw et al., 
2004).   Along with these economic and material hardships, children are 
significantly affected by various forms of violence and crime (Barbarin, 2003). 
 
Practitioners locate the genesis of the problem in the roll-out and implementation of 
services for children.  In other words, the practical realisation of the legislative 
frameworks needs to be concretised in implementation and service delivery 
initiatives.  However, one cannot deliberate on the state of children independently 
from the cultural, political and pervasive socio-economic conditions of the broader 
society of which the children are part.  Therefore, the state of children in South 
Africa is to a large extent consistent with the general socio-economic conditions.  Of 
course, in South Africa, huge disparities exist with regard to these socio-economic 
conditions based to a large extent on past political race and class classifications.  
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This resonates with Coles (1986) who believes that the prevailing political reality is 
a child’s everyday psychology. 
 
This prevailing diversity adds a considerable level of complexity to understanding 
the well-being and quality of life of children but also has profound effects on how 
childhood is theoretically conceptualised.  Therefore, regardless of whether one 
subscribes to the traditional notion of childhood as a generational period in life, a set 
of practices, a relational category, a social construction or a permanent structural 
feature of society, the diverse nature of childhood affects the way childhood is 
conceptualised and theorised.  Noting the diversity, theorists such as Jenks (2004) 
and Frønes (1993) argue that research should focus on ‘childhoods’ rather than the 
unitary ‘childhood’.  However, while there is consensus that childhood is constituted 
by the prevailing socio-economic, political and cultural factors (Qvortrup, 2007), 
there is less agreement about what childhood actually is.  Indeed it is to a large 
extent because of the proliferation of ‘childhoods’ that a consensual definition or an 
agreement about the meanings of childhood is not forthcoming.  
 
Generally the law defines childhood as a period between the ages of 0 and 18 years, 
ostensibly taking its cue from the tendency of the social sciences to naturalise 
childhood.  This naturalisation is especially deeply rooted in psychology, where 
childhood is conceptualised in terms of biological or cognitive growth epitomised by 
the use of concepts such as ‘development’ and ‘maturity’, and related to the 
attainment of competencies through a range of discipline-defined stages or phases 
(James & James, 2004).  Some theorists question the nature of this relationship (see 
e.g. Hockney & James, as cited in James & James, 2004; Jenks, 2005) suggesting 
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that the period of childhood with its competency driven and linear staged-based 
progression towards the eventual attainment of adulthood at 18 years, has more to do 
with the social practices of the time and the ultimate manifestation in law, rather 
than biologically based ‘maturity’ and ‘development’.  The chronologisation of 
childhood is somewhat arbitrary and not determined by the level of children’s 
physical or mental attributes, but somewhat artificially assigned through social 
practices and customs, and ultimately in law (James & James, 2004).  This has in 
many ways further confounded the theoretical conceptualisation of childhood. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Considerations 
Within the last three decades there has been increasing consternation regarding the 
way in which the social sciences have traditionally conceptualised and dealt with 
children and childhood.  Children and childhood are usually studied in terms of 
psychology (developmental) or socialisation theory (adult-child relations).  Central 
to these approaches are children’s ‘incomplete’ or biologically immature status as 
defined by powerlessness and dependence (Lull, 1991) and perceptions of childhood 
as a “moratorium and preparatory phase” (Qvortrup, 1994, p. 2).  Children’s 
‘competence’ is not recognised simply because ‘competence’ is defined in terms of 
adults’ praxis (Qvortrup, 1994).  Qvortrup (1994) argues that it is precisely the 
presence of these descriptions in media and scientific discourse that chronically 
confirms constructions of children as naturally incompetent.  Furthermore, Prout and 
James (1997) argue that: 
Within these discourses subject positions (such as ‘the child’) are created.  
Seen from this point of view, then different discourses on children 
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constitute childhood (and children) in different ways – not only as sets of 
academic knowledge but also in social practices and institutions. (p. 24) 
 
Developmental psychology’s contribution to the conceptualisation and 
understanding of children and childhood can be linearly perceived from the 
traditional theories of development, through social contexts approaches towards the 
more critical treatises of the social constructionist and critical theory approaches.  
Generally considered positivist, naturalistic and functionalist (Burman, 1994, Morss, 
1996), the traditional theory of development, aims to identify a set of universal laws 
and processes which could explain infants’ evolution into adulthood (Morss, 1996).  
Stage theories of development such as those espoused by Freud, Erikson and Piaget 
typify this approach and remain the mainstream theoretical strands in developmental 
psychology (Louw & Louw, 2007). 
 
Emerging as a result of discontent towards traditional developmental accounts, the 
social context approach sanctioned social revisions to traditional accounts and as 
such, foregrounded social and interpersonal contexts.  However, the biological 
influence is still seen as central, with the social environment perceived as providing 
a significant but secondary influence.  Vygotsky is the key proponent of this 
approach (Morss, 1996). 
 
Based on the social constructionist movement espoused by Harre, Shotter and 
Gergen, the social constructionist trend in developmental psychology views the 
social context approach to be theoretically inadequate (Morss, 1996).  In particular, 
they were critical of its inherent cognitive focus arguing that development is a 
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product of these negotiated social processes.  Furthermore, they argue for the 
historically relative status of childhood and development change.   
 
The critical psychology of development is an emerging and significant trend in the 
human development discourse.  Key contributions to this approach were put forward 
in the edited publications by Henriques, Holloway, Unwin, Ven and Walkerdine 
(1984), Broughton (1987) as well as individual contributions made by Burman 
(1994) and most notably by Morss (1996).  This approach disputes the traditional 
approaches as well as more contemporary movements of social constructionism, 
essentially claiming that these approaches generate a hegemonic influence over 
society.  The primary task of this approach is to provide alternative explanations for 
orthodox developmental accounts, with a specific focus on reconstructing 
knowledge about human development in terms of its historical, social and political 
manifestation. 
 
The essence of socialisation theory, as the other point of departure, is that childhood 
is a preparatory phase where the child needs to gradually be equipped with the skills 
and competencies required for adult existence.  Socialisation, therefore, ensures the 
sustainability of cultures through time.  In this sense, children are then the key 
recipients of the process albeit not as active participants “but as beings who have the 
potentials for being slowly brought into contact with human beings” (Ritchie & 
Kollar, 1964, p. 117).  This is the functionalist model of socialisation of which 
Parsons (1951) is the key proponent.  With regard to childhood, this simply equates 
to the transmission of culture, essentially rendering the ‘child’ ontologically mute, 
with childhood existing merely as a residual social category (Jenks, 2005).  The 
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model has no interest in how children are integrated into society, as long as they are 
sufficiently appropriated to fit in and no longer be a threat to society.  In as much as 
the functionalist model is ‘forward looking’ (Inkeles, as cited in Corsaro, 2005), 
children are perceived as a threat to the functioning of society that is only overcome 
once they have, through training and preparation, internalised the elements of the 
system and are successfully functioning in it (Corsaro, 2005). 
  
With developmental psychology and socialisation theory providing the ‘scientific’ 
basis, discursive constructions of children as incomplete persons in need of robust 
protection and guidance, have infiltrated common-sense perceptions of childhood 
and have thus become part of the everyday psychology of childhood.  Ingleby 
(1985), however, is highly suspicious of this process and questions the identities and 
motives of the beneficiaries.  He believes that the process is controlled by the State 
who has a vested interest in controlling the development of children.  Whether this 
interest is aimed at protection or control is, however, debatable.  Referring to the 
aforementioned ‘psy complex’, Ingleby (1985) asks: 
What, then, are the values promoted by the ‘psy complex’?...to guide the 
construction of the child’s psyche itself... No longer can the formation of 
the infant self be left to the unknowing parents, there is too much danger 
that this crucial and sensitive process will go awry, resulting in a “failure 
of socialization.”... Whereas in the late nineteenth century the danger to 
social order was seen as coming from criminals, mental defectives and 
vagabonds, the “dangerous classes” now seem to be the babies (pp. 103-
104).   
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For Ingleby (1985) the ‘psy complex’ represents a major paradox in as much as 
parental values and family relations are sanctified, yet mediated and controlled by 
the State (John, 1995).  In his highlighting of this paradox, Ingleby (1985) is 
essentially calling attention to issues of power and control and how the meaning 
and nature of childhood are configured through ideological agents and processes.  
This study is premised on the notion that these meanings are discursively 
constructed and mobilised.  An epistemological and theoretical framework is 
therefore required that could accommodate this ontological position and foster a 
discursive examination of how the meanings of childhood are constructed. 
 
1.3.1 Social Constructionism  
Noting the diverse theoretical positions of childhood, it is important to point out that 
this study is framed within the broad social constructionist epistemological 
framework.  It subsequently takes the social constructionist theoretical position of 
childhood as its point of departure, envisaging a notion of childhood that is 
divergent from the traditional stage based approaches.  A social constructionist 
framework promotes the conception of children as valid social actors, as culture 
constructing and not culture receiving and asks one to suspend belief in traditional 
taken-for-granted assumptions and knowledge systems (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1999; 
James, Jenks & Prout, 1998).  It places emphasis on diverse perceptions and 
locations of childhood foregrounding the social, cultural and historical variability of 
childhood and subsequently disputes traditional approaches that focus on the child’s 
progression through developmental stages and phases.  Childhood is thus regarded 
as “an actively negotiated set of social relationships within which the early years of 
human life are constituted” (Prout & James, 1997, p. 7), and not as a life phase 
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characterised by the linear progression from infancy through early and middle 
childhood to adolescence.  A key premise of the present study is therefore that 
childhood does not exist in a finite and identifiable form (James et al., 1998). 
While this new approach to understanding childhood has its genesis in dissenting but 
isolated and fragmented voices in the fields of sociology, developmental and social 
psychology, anthropology and interactionism (see, e.g. Stainton-Rogers 1989; 
Wartofsky, 1981), it formally arrived in James and Prout’s (1990) landmark edited 
publication Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood and is often referred to as 
‘the new social studies, or sociology of childhood’ (Thorne, 2007).   The key 
features of the new approach are as follows: 
i) Childhood is perceived as a social construction, i.e. providing an interpretive 
framework for contexualising the early years of human life. 
ii) Childhood is a construct of social analysis. 
iii) Children should be the object of study in their own right. 
iv) Children should be seen as active social actors, responsible for the 
construction of their own lives. 
 
James and Prout (1990) do not present these points as a comprehensive thesis, but 
rather as a rough outline.  It does, however, offer a point of departure and presents 
possibilities to move forward conjecturally.  They believe that at the heart of the 
deliberations lies the question ‘what does it mean to be a child’.  In keeping with a 
constructionist ethos, September’s (2001): “what does it mean to be a child in a 
world like this” (p. 7, emphasis added) is perhaps more appropriate. 
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To add to the theoretical development, some of the key features need elaboration.  
The social constructionism component, for example, invites inquiry into the search 
for meaning.  Applied to the constructs of children and childhood, constructionism 
however requires revision.  The critical focus is not simply how children function in 
an adult constructed world, i.e. how children negotiate the institution of childhood, 
but rather how they construct their own reality and assign meaning to their lives.  
The concern is therefore not children as constructed by adults but rather the roles 
that children play and the meanings they themselves attach to their lives (Prout & 
James, 1997).  In this respect a social constructionist position advocates the 
following:  
Children are and must be seen as active in the construction and 
determination of their own social lives, the lives of those around them and 
the societies they live in.  Children are not just passive subjects of social 
structures and processes. (Prout & James, 1997, p. 8) 
 
This assignation of agency to children, can to a large extent, be seen as the manifesto 
of the ‘new social studies of childhood’.  Jenks (2004) however, warns of the 
inherent paradox and contradictions that emerges from this burgeoning sense of 
agency.  Childhood can no longer be used as mitigation against irresponsible, 
precocious or improper conduct.  A delicate balance needs to be achieved between 
agency and the logical limits of maturation and vulnerability. 
 
A further point of deliberation is that within contemporary South Africa, the social, 
cultural and historical specificities demand primary recognition.  As previously 
discussed, it is important to take cognisance of the diversity of childhood in terms of 
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class, gender, ethnicity and culture especially if one appends the historical-political, 
along with the associated construct of race, to the equation.  The diversity of 
childhood is further demonstrated by Jenks (2005) whose claim of ‘childhoods’ 
rather than ‘childhood’ and Frønes (1993) who contends that there is not one but 
many childhoods, formed at the intersection of different cultural, social and 
economic systems.  This resonates with Aries’s (1962) thesis that childhood is a 
historical construction, Stephens (1995) and Dawes’s (1999) notion that childhood is 
a cultural construction and Coles (1986) who sees childhood as a being constructed 
by the prevailing political context.   
 
A closer reading of Prout and James’s (1990) ‘social’ in their ‘childhood as a social 
construction’ thesis is formed by diverse cultural, political, historical and economic 
systems.  Like Woodhead (1997), they acknowledge the universality of children in 
terms of the biological facts of maturation, but argue that it is embedded in social 
and cultural systems and can only be made sense of, and interpreted by 
consideration of these systems within a particular social and cultural system.  James 
and James (2004) encapsulate the position poignantly: 
...childhood is a developmental stage of the life course, common to all 
children and characterised by basic physical and developmental patterns.  
However, the way that this is interpreted, understood and socially 
institutionalised for children by adults varies considerably across and 
between cultures. (p. 13) 
 
The idea is that different realities of constructions and experiences of childhood 
exist in a dialectical relationship, framed by the historical, cultural and social on the 
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one hand, and biological maturation on the other.  Dawes (1999) similarly contends 
that a complex dialectic exists between physical and psychological maturation and 
the socio-cultural contexts within which children are immersed.  A further critical 
point raised by James and James (2004) relates to the variation of childhood with 
regard to the means of how the concepts of ‘needs’, ‘rights’ and ‘competencies’ are 
articulated in law, social policy and everyday discursive realities.  This study is 
arguing that these realities, whilst framed by the historical, political, cultural and 
social (as argued by others), are tempered and mediated by ideological imbrications 
and motivates.  What is at stake here is not only the process of the social 
construction of childhood, but that the reality of the child is entrenched in an 
emphasis on the historical, political, cultural, and ideological specific instruments 
through which it is registered. 
 
These and other theoretical conceptualisations are the focus of Chapter Two.  Here 
the author uses an ideological analyst’s lens to examine how childhood has been 
conceptualised from various theoretical perspectives.  This chapter also constitutes 
the bulk of the literature review, and considering the nature of the topic under 
investigation, follows the format of a theoretical literature review.  While no specific 
chapter was dedicated to the review of empirical literature, empirical findings were 
reported where relevant. 
 
Since social constructionsm’s central focus would be the way children negotiate 
meanings within a particular social environment, it essentially makes possible an 
opportunity to engage at the level of discourse.  The focus then shifts to the 
functional role of language in the constructions of meanings (see Durrheim, 1997; 
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Wittgenstein, 1978).  If one examines the behaviour and actions of children, it is the 
shared social language of their behaviour that effectively determines the 
interpretation.  The argument is therefore that much depends on society’s discourse 
on children and the broad descriptions, explanations and representations of 
childhood.  Gergen (1999) argues that these discourses contribute to the social or 
public reputation.  He further argues that, as these reputations become shared, they 
invariably become taken-for-granted realities.  It is these realities that ultimately 
inform social policy, intervention and educational practices and other public action.  
However, these external depictions are also internalised and inform those depicted.  
Here children learn what it is to be a child, or as Gergen (1999) states, “a mutually 
sustaining symmetry exists between self-knowledge and others knowledge of you” 
(p. 43).  What this hegemonic process elucidates is the power2 relationship between 
children and society.  While the current study endeavours to examine the meanings 
of childhood, it ultimately aims to achieve this through an examination and 
deconstruction of discourses which sanction and maintain inequitable power 
relations.  The study is thus working from the premise that this relationship between 
child and adult society is imbued with ideology and that emerging discourses and 
meanings of childhood would be ideologically configured. The study is, therefore, 
inextricably an exercise in ideological analysis3
The relationship between meaning and power is a critical factor of the present study.  
What ideological analysis generally offers is an elucidation of the power relations 
, with ideology conceptualised as the 
ways in which meaning is constructed and mobilised (through language) in the 
social world to establish and sustain relations of power (Thompson, 1990).   
                                                 
2 See Foucault (1980) for a more comprehensive discussion. 
3 The method of analysis of the present study is consistent. 
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and how these relations are perpetuated and manifested in public discourse.  This 
study is, however, not aimed at an analysis of public discourse, but rather at the 
children’s own common-sense constructions and meaning assignation of these 
power relations.   
 
Alanen (1988) contends that the notion of ‘power’ is enmeshed within the traditional 
conceptualisation of the socialisation process.  Speier (1976) has referred to this 
power that adults exert over children within the socialisation process, as the ‘adult 
ideological viewpoint’ while Alanen (1988) has coined the term ‘elitist perspective’.  
These viewpoints and perspectives often act in indiscriminate ways in that it “helps 
to model children as passive objects and victims of influences external to them, 
unable and unwilling to resist” (Alanen, 1988, p. 58). Institutional processes, 
advanced by adult society, act in a similar way in that they define children as a 
separate group, in opposition and often inferior to adulthood (James & James, 2004).  
This has led Mayall to conclude that “the study of children’s lives...is essentially the 
study of adult child relations” (2002, p. 21). In the final analysis, the study places a 
question mark over how the interests of society select certain representation of 
children as opposed to others.  What accounts are being suppressed?  How is this 
silencing, exploiting and contributing to the current state of children?  However, and 
even more importantly, given the focus of the current study, how is it manifested 
within children themselves? More specifically, the study aims to elucidate the extent 
to which children’s discourses are imbued by ideology?  In Chapter Three these 
epistemological variants are engaged with.  The chapter opens with a consideration 
of the dynamics of ideology and the various historical conceptualisations and 
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contemporary notions of ideology.  Thereafter, social constructionism as the key 
epistemological position of the current study is engaged with. 
 
1.4 Child Participation 
Along with the philosophical and epistemological changes in how children are 
conceived, a developing methodological trend in child research is the realisation of 
children’s agency in research (Pole, Mizen & Bolton, 1999).  This trend is based on 
the acknowledgement of children as valid informants and participants in the research 
process, and the subsequent shift towards soliciting their knowledge, opinions, 
attitudes and perceptions on matters that affect them.  When applied to a 
developmental context or research strategy, this ‘agency’ is often referred to as child 
participation.  Chapter Four details these and other methodological issues of the 
current study.  Along with detailing the child participation protocol, the chapter also 
engages with the design, selection of participants, data collection techniques, 
procedure followed, and the analysis configurations.  It is axiomatic that the aims 
and objectives of the current study demand a qualitative endeavour.  Subsequently, 
the researcher has refrained from providing a discussion on what qualitative research 
is or the rationale behind its selection.  The chapter concludes with an engagement 
with the concept of validity in qualitative research as well as a consideration of 
ethical principles in childhood research. 
 
1.5 Discourse Analysis 
The past few years have witnessed a huge growth in the use of discourse analysis as 
a method of research (see e.g. Duncan, 1993; Kjørholt, 2002; Potter & Wetherell, 
1992; Stevens, 1996; van Dijk, 1988).  Discourse and discursive approaches in the 
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field of childhood studies have proliferated since the advent of the new social 
studies of childhood that have advanced the conception of childhood as a social and 
cultural construction.  Alanen (1999) contends that it allows for the meanings of 
cultural images and practices of childhood to be deconstructed (as cited in Kjørholt, 
2002).  Discourse analysis, in particular, appears to be suited to the study of 
childhood for two reasons.  Firstly, the transdisciplinary nature of discourse analysis 
engenders a comprehensive method that is more attune to the complex, multifaceted 
concept of childhood.  The ‘new social studies of childhood’ with its genesis in 
history, sociology, psychology, politics and cultural studies demands a method that 
allows for flexibility both at the theoretical and methodological level.  It is therefore 
argued that childhood cannot be examined from the confines of one specific 
discipline and that discourse analysis facilitates this transdisciplinary process.  
Secondly, as will be argued in the study, ideological conceptions of childhood are 
reproduced through discourse.  Thus, it is axiomatic that it be analysed at the level 
of discourse itself.  However, it must be pointed out that the discourses of the 
current study do not form the primary focus of scrutiny.  Rather, it is the underlying 
ideological content and process manifested within the discourses that is the primary 
focus of the study. 
 
In accordance with Thompson (1984, 1990) the study adopts a depth hermeneutic 
approach as the broad analytical framework.  This approach provides a broad based 
opportunity to engage with symbolic forms and advances a discourse analytic 
strategy that includes both a focus on discursive practices as well as the imbrications 
of power and subjectivity in discourse.  Chapter Five outlines the findings of the 
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discursive analysis and puts forward a range of key discourses that emerged from 
the discussions with the participants. 
 
Following the discursive analysis, Chapter Six is aimed at theoretically 
contexualising the findings by providing a theoretical underpinning of the 
relationship between discourse and ideology.  Thereafter, Chapter Seven is 
concerned with elucidating the various meanings of childhood that emerging 
discourses construct.   More importantly, the chapter also explores the relationship 
between discursive constructions of childhood and the meanings assigned to 
childhood, with a specific focus on elucidating the extent to which these meanings 
are ideologically configured. 
 
Chapter Eight departs from the traditional manner that studies of this nature are 
concluded.  Operationalising the key qualitative research concept of reflexivity, the 
author details how key theoretical and methodological dilemmas that emerged were 
negotiated within the course of the study.  The chapter concludes by considering 
indications for future research and limitations of the study. 
 
1.6 The Aims and Objectives of the Study  
As per the above discussion, the primary aim of the study is to explore the extent to 
which the meanings that children assign to ‘childhood’4
                                                 
4 In this study these meanings will be limited to the psychological, social and political-historical 
dimensions of childhood.  These dimensions were identified, in a previous study, by child 
participants as being the most pertinent (See Willenberg, September & Savahl, 2006) 
 are ideologically 
configured.  Within this process, the concept of well-being is used as a hermeneutic 
key to access the meanings that children assign to childhood.  The concept of 
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hermeneutic key, put forward by Gadamer (1995), refers to a conceptual trigger that 
allows access to deeper embedded meanings or ‘horizon’s of understanding’.  It is 
important to note that well-being is merely used as a hermeneutic key to access the 
meanings of childhood and is not the focus of the study. 
The key objectives of the study are to: 
(i) examine how children use specific discursive resources and repertoires to 
construct childhood well-being 
(ii) examine how these constructions are manifested in their discourses 
(iii) examine how these discourses construct various meanings of childhood 
(iv) examine the extent to which these meanings are ideologically configured  
 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
The study is located within the ‘new social studies of childhood’ and endeavours to 
engage with the current theoretical debates within this tradition.  Using social 
constructionism as the point of departure, the study argues for an ideological 
orientation of social constructionism.  It is hoped that this engagement will stimulate 
more fruitful dialogue between traditional approaches to childhood studies and the 
‘new social studies of childhood’ through engendering an approach to understanding 
childhood that ascribes meaningful attention to the complex relationship between 
culture, social structure, history, policy development, law, biology and development.  
However, it is not intended as a historical treatise, or an examination of child 
development or childhoods in South Africa. 
 
While it is firmly entrenched within the post-modern tradition, it envisages 
reconstituting some of the modernist virtues that could advance the study of 
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childhood.  The constructionist vehicle makes this possible, allowing one to move 
beyond deconstruction, essentially endeavouring to offer reconstituted perceptions 
of vulnerable groups such as children and youth.  Combined with child participation 
as the methodological base, opportunities are created that allow for the examination 
of various dimensions of childhood that are historical, political and practical in 
implication.  Hence, the move from deconstruction to reconstruction.  The impact of 
this on the theoretical advancement of childhood as well as lay and scientific 
discourses on children and youth is relevant especially if one appends the practical 
opportunities in terms of intervention, monitoring and research initiatives as well as 
policy development and implementation, aimed at improving child and youth 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORISING CHILDHOOD 
2.1 Introduction 
It is at this point in an orthodox academic treatise that one would be compelled to 
offer the definitions or conceptual understanding of the concepts, constructs or 
phenomenon under investigation.  Some of these phenomena, by their very nature, 
would be contentious with a range of definitions, some complementary and others 
quite contradictory and contentious.  Indeed the more contentious, the more exciting 
for the student when entering the foray.  Some would argue that it is in fact the 
student’s duty to participate actively in the debate, sometimes offering critical 
commentary, while at other times advocating for one approach over the other, and 
endeavouring to generate new knowledge or a unique perspective.  With the concept 
of ‘childhood’ under investigation this task becomes a sisyphean endeavour.  To put 
this in perspective it may be useful to revisit Jenks’s (2005) oft quoted postulation 
on the central paradox of childhood. 
...the child is familiar to us and yet strange; he or she inhabits our world 
and yet seems to answer to another; he or she is essentially of ourselves 
and yet appears to display a systematically different order of being. (p. 2-
3) 
 
Strangely, the multitude of theoretical positions which have over the years 
endeavoured to provide a consistent theoretical framework of childhood, have 
merely contributed to advancing this paradox.  Thus, after years of debate and 
engagement, “we have still not achieved any consensus over the issue of childhood” 
(Jenks, 2005, p. 2).  Further complexity is presented by James et al. (1998) who 
aptly allude to a new wave of theoretical engagement with contemporary childhood.  
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Once childhood was a feature of parental (or maybe just maternal) 
discourse, the currency of educators and the sole theoretical property of 
developmental psychology.  Now with an intensity perhaps 
unprecedented, childhood has become popularised, politicised, scrutinised 
and analysed in a series of interlocking spaces in which the traditional 
confidence and certainty about childhood and children’s social status are 
being radically undermined. (p. 3) 
 
While the author has, in the previous chapter, alluded to the recentness of this 
preoccupation, one of the first and most radical dissenting voices was that of Aries 
(1962) who presented the concept of childhood as a historical construction.  
Traditional theories of developmental psychology have also come under critical 
scrutiny with an increasing notion that social aspects should be regarded as critical 
determinants of human development.  Sociological approaches have similarly 
experienced radical transformation, with functionalist socialisation theories 
becoming less fashionable than constructionist, structural, class and cultural theories 
(see James et al., 1998).  This collection of theories is often referred to as the ‘new 
social studies of childhood’. 
 
The influence of political discourse on contemporary theories of childhood is a 
significant one.  The proliferation of political discourse, most notably in the 
ratification of political instruments, increased recognition of children in statistical 
processes and dedicated institutional arrangements have made significant inroads 
into combating the invisibility of childhood. 
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In this chapter the author intends to outline the various theoretical conceptualisations 
of childhood, starting with more traditional understandings and progressing towards 
the more contemporary theses.  As the common theme throughout the dissertation is 
to provide an ideological exploration, in this chapter the author will use the lens of 
an ideological analyst to explore the various conceptualisations.  The underlying 
goal of this chapter would be to examine its historical development with a strong 
focus on the theories that constitute the new social science of childhood.  It is, 
however, important to take cognisance that these approaches do not function within 
an intellectual vacuum or in isolation from one another.  It is also not entirely 
accurate to present the theories as existing on a continuum as there exists a delicate 
boundary between them and often a cross pollination of elements and ideas 
transpires. 
 
2.2 The Historical Child 
An historical analysis of childhood is an exceptionally difficult task, fraught with 
theoretical and methodological obstacles which confound the development of a 
chronological thesis.  While neither children nor childhood has been specifically 
ignored by history, the discipline lacks a methodological understanding of childhood 
(Hendrick, 2000).  This has resulted in a number of accounts characterised by 
oversimplified generalisations, often remiss of social, cultural and economic 
diversities.  This methodological impediment can be attributed to a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, there is a lack of empirical source material on past childhoods.  As 
Cunningham (2003) aptly states: 
The historical study of childhood in any period except the very recent past 
suffers from the irreversible difficulty that you cannot ask questions of 
 
 
 
 
 29 
people who are dead – you are dependent on what they may have 
happened to have left behind. (p. 83) 
 
Similarly Heywood (2001) contends: 
Children themselves leave few records, and even artefacts designed for 
them, such as books and toys, have a poor survival rate.  Historians have 
displayed considerable ingenuity in their use of sources, turning to official 
reports such as those produced by factory and schools inspectors, 
polemical works generated by debates concerning childhood, literary 
accounts in novels and poetry, ‘ego documents’ in the form of diaries, 
autobiographies and oral testimony, folklore collections, advice manuals 
for parents, visual evidence from portraits and photographs, not to 
mention toys, games furniture and the like. (p. 6)   
 
However, ingenuity does not necessarily translate into empirical accuracy and the 
methods cited as source material by historians involved in a historical analysis of 
childhood, are at best, secondary or even partial.  In relation, the historical 
invisibility of children and the subsequent lack of acknowledgement as historical 
actors mean that it will be difficult for researchers to find reference to children in 
records (Hendrick, 2000).  Hendrick (2000) then correctly questions the viability of 
evaluating sources, considering the general invisibility of children.  He highlights 
this as an important consideration since “the questions asked not only help to 
determine the choices of sources, but also affect the way in which they are 
interpreted” (p. 43).   
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
This leads to the second reason, that of children’s silence, or as Hendrick (2000) 
contends, that children are without an authorial voice and have no power to contest 
adult accounts.  Herein exists the power of the ideological machine as children are 
perceived by historians to have no voice and are seen only as passive actors in the 
social community.  The outcome is that historians fail to pose relevant questions 
regarding children’s human identity and role in society and hence their exclusion 
from history (Hendrick, 2000).  It would then be true to contend that children’s 
visibility in historical record is contingent, to some degree, on the ideological 
position of the historian.  This means that at any instance in history there existed a 
certain dominant or overarching perception of childhood and children that both 
defined and determined the relations of adult society’s power over children.   
 
Subsequently, the third reason is that of the politics of age relations, or adultism 
(Alanen, 1988), where children’s accounts are seldom valued and their life course is 
documented through adult conversations instead of an interpretation of their 
perspectives.  In close relation, Qvortrup (1994) highlights the problem of 
objectivity and interpretation.  He argues that objectivity in the interpretation of 
childhood is not possible, since the group doing the analysis (adults) often have 
disparate and incongruent interests to that of children.  Besides the ideological 
obfuscation in historical method, an historical analysis of childhood is crucial, both 
in itself, as well as a conceptual base for the development of contemporary theories 
of childhood.  The following section details the historical theories of childhood that 
have had the most considerable impact on contemporary notions of children and 
childhood. 
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2.2.1 Aries’s Centuries of Childhood 
“And in the beginning there was Aries” (Heywood, 2001, p. 11).  The allure of 
Aries’s postulation was its timing.  It came at a time when childhood was owned by 
the universal-biological child and provided a provocative alternative to those who 
doubted the appropriateness of the traditional paradigm.  He essentially asserted that 
the concept of childhood is a recent construction and that medieval society had no 
awareness of the ‘concept’ of childhood. 
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to 
suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised.  The idea of 
childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds 
to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular 
nature that distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult.  
In medieval society this awareness was lacking. (Aries, 1962, p. 128) 
 
Aries did not claim that there was no awareness or acknowledgement of children.  
Rather, the essence of his thesis is that there was a lack of awareness (or sentiment 
de l’enfance5
 
) of the nature of childhood i.e. an awareness of the features that 
distinguish adults from children (Corsaro, 2005; Heywood, 2001).   
Aries (1962) further contended that in medieval society no intermediate phase 
between adulthood and infancy existed.  So as soon as children possessed basic 
functions that allowed them to negotiate basic aspects of life, they were cast into 
general society. 
 
                                                 
5 A phrase which conveys both an awareness of and feeling for childhood. 
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He predominantly used iconographic sources as his empirical evidence on which he 
based his inferences.  His use and interpretation of this data was the major source of 
criticism against Aries.  Based on an analysis of the iconographic data, Aries 
postulated that since there was a conspicuous absence of the portrayal of childhood, 
recognition of childhood did not exist.  When children were evident, they were 
portrayed with adult characteristics.  In various forms of artwork, children were 
portrayed as miniature adults with no representative acknowledgment of the 
differences in physical attributes between adults and children (Archard, 2004).   In 
these historical periods, they were miniature adults.  
 
Aries’s thesis enjoyed a mixed reception in the academic community.  While some, 
especially sociologists and (to some extent) psychologists enthusiastically embraced 
his postulations, others were openly hostile in their criticism claiming gross 
methodological flaws and naïve interpretation (Heywood, 2001). 
 
The first obvious methodological flaw was the limitations of his sources of empirical 
data i.e. almost the exclusive use of iconographic sources.  His analysis of the data 
has also been questioned.  Heywood (2001), for example, contends that Aries’s 
assertion, that the artists created what everyone else observed, was naïve and 
misleading and ignored the complexity of artists’ portrayal of reality.  Furthermore, 
as Burton (1972) notes, medieval art had a distinct bias towards religious themes, 
with a notable lack of depictions of secular life (as cited in Heywood, 2001).  What 
one can deduce, is that children were most likely not regarded very highly, as artists 
generally had an upper class bias.  This, along with the lack of written records, 
suggests the probability of a low status in society rather than a complete lack of 
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awareness.  The fact that the concept childhood was present in early Graeco-Roman 
discourse6 is even more damaging to Aries’s claim (Heywood, 2001).  Medieval 
Latin, for example, followed the Hippocratic tradition in the recognition of three 
distinct periods of childhood7
I have a concept of childhood if, in my behaviour towards children and 
the way I talk about them, I display a clear recognition that they are at a 
distinct and interestingly different stage of their lives from adults.  I have 
a particular conception of childhood in so far as my treatment of children 
and discourse concerning them reveals a particular view of what 
specifically distinguishes adults from children. (p. 28) 
.  Commenting on the work of Aries, Archard (2004) 
claims that it is important to distinguish between the concept of childhood and 
conceptions of children.  He argues that while previous societies had a concept of 
childhood, they were unable to distinguish in certain ways between adults and 
children.  In other words, they had different conceptions of childhood which refers 
to the actual ways of distinguishing between the two.  Archard (2004) explains: 
 
One could extend, or confuse, the argument even further and suggest that previous 
societies could have been aware of children, but had no linguistic mechanism, or 
term to construct the concept.   
 
Beyond the systematic criticism, Aries’s contribution to a historical analysis of 
childhood was paramount as it elucidated two key themes, that of the variability of 
childhood and the experiences of childhood.  With regard to an ideological 
                                                 
6 Evidence has been found in records of sermons, moral treatises, encyclopaedias and medical 
handbooks (Heywood, 2001). 
7 Infantia from birth to age 7; pueritia from 7 to 12 -14; and adolescentia from 12-14 to 21.  
 
 
 
 
 34 
understanding of childhood, Aries’s contribution is similarly significant and can be 
linked to two key propositions, as outlined by James and James (2004).  Firstly, it is 
incorrect to consider childhood as a mere descriptor of a natural biological phase.  
“Rather the idea of childhood must be seen as a particular cultural phrasing of the 
early part of the life course, historically and politically contingent and subject to 
change” (James & James, 2004, p. 13).  Secondly, the perception and subsequent 
nature of adults’ treatment of children in fact determines children’s experience of 
childhood as well as their response and engagement with the adult world.  
Considering the above, Aries’s most critical contribution to an ideological 
understanding of childhood is his elucidation of how the schooling system, as an 
age-dependent institution, acts to polarise the life-worlds of adults and children 
whilst simultaneously subjecting them to a new and profound form of social control. 
 
2.2.2 The Epigenic Theory of de Mause 
The most disparaging criticism against Aries is presented in the work of de Mause 
(1973).  de Mause proffered a grand-stage theory on the historical development of 
the child.  Influenced to some degree by psychodynamic theory, de Mause argued 
that the “history of humanity is founded upon the abuse of children” (1988, p. 1) and 
that childhood was characterised as consisting of endless physical and sexual abuse.  
He argued that the further back one goes in history, the worse the abuse and 
treatment of children.  This treatment of children was a direct result of adults 
attempting to overcome certain psychological problems and obtaining psychological 
integrity.  As he famously asserted:  
…the routine assault of children has been society's most effective way of 
maintaining its collective emotional homeostasis…The main psychological 
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mechanism that operates in all child abuse involves using children as what 
I have termed poison containers-receptacles into which adults project 
disowned parts of their psyches, so they can control these feelings in 
another body without danger to themselves. (de Mause, 1973, p. 1) 
 
de Mause’s spectacular thesis, first published in the edited book The history of 
childhood (1973), evoked severe criticism from the majority of the academic 
community.  Criticism was even evident from the other authors who published in the 
same book, with some refusing to appear in the same volume as him.  A cursory 
look at the initial criticism, however, revealed that it appears to be based exclusively 
on sentiment rather than historical evidence or a systematic and rigorous scientific 
inquiry.  Over the following years, de Mause’s theory endured a range of systematic 
studies, e.g. Davis, Langer, Trexler, Kellum, Helmholz, Lorenee, Puhar, Nyssen, 
Ende, Scheck, Byman, Taylor, Finkelstein, Masters, Pleck, Thompson, Illick, Ebel, 
Petschauer, Kutschky, Miller and Pollack (as cited in de Mause, 1988), primarily 
aimed at testing the tenets of his theory.  It seems that his theory successfully 
endured these assessments, with the only serious evidence-based criticism emerging 
ten years later in the work of Pollock (1983)8
 
.   
2.2.3 Pollock’s Theory 
Pollock directed most of her criticism towards the indirect sources of evidence used 
by de Mause9
                                                 
8 See also Shahar (1990) and Hannawalt (1993). 
.  She argues that a history of childhood should be based on the use of 
9 She was similarly critical of Aries. 
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more direct sources of data such as diaries, newspaper reports and court cases and 
autobiographies. 
 
During her systematic and rigorous investigation of over 500 direct sources, Pollock 
(1983) found little evidence supporting the contentions of Aries or de Mause.  She 
reported emotional attachment of parents to children, interest in the developmental 
stages of children and concern for their well-being.  She further noted that her 
inquiry revealed that the abuse and maltreatment of children was not widespread.  In 
conclusion of her work, Pollock posed the following challenges to historians: 
“instead of trying to explain the supposed changes in the parent child relationship, 
historians would do well to ponder just why parental care as a variable is so 
curiously resistant to change” (1983, p. 271).  
 
Even though Pollock’s theory was well received, prompting reviews that claimed 
that it was the “turning point in the study of the history of childhood”, a closer look 
at her method revealed critical methodological flaws.  As previously pointed out, she 
argued that only diaries and autobiographies constituted valid data sources.  
However, only 27 of the 500 sources she examined can be classified as 
autobiographies.  This implies that she based the majority of her conclusions on 
parents’ diaries.  Furthermore, her sources are limited to the members of the literate 
upper class who could have an underlying agenda of presenting themselves 
favourably.  As it is axiomatic that perpetrators are unlikely to document their 
indiscretions, her results are more than likely compromised.  As de Mause contends 
concerning Pollock’s theory: “A similar methodology would construct a statistical 
history of crime by ignoring all police reports and relying solely on the diaries of 
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criminals to establish crime rate statistics” (1988, p. 17).  Even more damaging to 
Pollock’s theory, was her practice of deducing (and counting) positive affect by the 
absence of any mention of child maltreatment and abuse.  In other words, where 
parents refrained from mentioning the treatment of children, she counted these 
omissions as evidence of no abuse.  Pollock’s use of the argumentum ex silenito 
(argument from silence) is a typical practice of childhood historians and one that is 
routinely criticised by de Mause (1988) who insisted that historical theories of 
childhood be empirically based.  As previously intimated, this task is extremely 
complex.  For as de Mause aptly contends: “both our sources and our personal 
resistances work against us” (1988, p. 18).  To a large extent this contention holds 
true, creating methodological flaws for the most rigorous attempts and subsequently 
rendering any historical theory of childhood subject to some form of criticism. 
  
2.3 The Political/Legal Child 
Enter into the foray, the political child.  One might be initially tempted to include 
the political child as a subsidiary of the social and indeed many theorists might 
argue for this practice on pragmatic grounds.  However, in an ideological analysis, 
the political child becomes paramount and warrants a dedicated category of its own.  
The following section examines the merits of the political child. 
 
The political child, by its very nature, implies an explication of policy, and 
essentially elucidates the ideological means by which political instruments, such as 
legislation and policy, impacts on the nature of childhood.  A cursory look at 
political instruments that govern children in South Africa denotes three major 
instruments: the Constitution, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
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Child and the Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005).  However, before we review these 
instruments, it might be prudent to outline important theoretical concepts that govern 
these instruments. 
 
In an ideological analysis of childhood, the ‘political’ is key.  However, in the 
political arena, the issue of children has historically been marginalised, often 
relegated to discussions around family or education.  Similarly, the idea of 
childhood as a structural feature in society was largely ignored.  Even though some 
voices have engendered childhood and children as constituting valid and permanent 
social categories and valid citizens, the pervading discourses in contemporary 
societies have advanced the perception of childhood as apolitical.  The most obvious 
reason for children’s apolitical status is that they do not posses the voting privilege 
and are subsequently considered to have no political rights of citizenship.  Another 
reason is that children are not generally perceived to be current economic entities, in 
the sense that they are not economically active participants of society.  The author 
will engage with this notion later in the chapter.  It is for these reasons that children 
find themselves politically marginalised.  However, initial commentary by Coles 
(1986) and the influential volume by Stephens (1995) together with social 
constructionist theses (see e.g. James & James, 2004; James & Prout, 1990; James et 
al 1998, Stainton-Rogers & Stainton Rogers, 1992) appears to have rescued 
childhood from its political exclusion by arguing that children both experience and 
impact on the political process.  This is consistent with a key feature of Qvortrup’s 
(1994) structural approach (discussed in the following section), wherein he argues 
that children are fully integrated members of society in as much that they, like 
adults, are active co-constructors of social, economic, historical and political 
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processes and consequently both affect and are affected by these forces.  The 
influence of children in the political arena is best understood in conjunction with 
James and James’s (2004) notion of cultural politics.  This theoretical explication is 
now considered in an attempt to elucidate the viability of children in the political 
arena. 
 
James and James’s cultural politics of childhood “aims to explore the links between 
theories, policies and practices through which childhood unfolds for children” 
(2004, p. 60).  The approach is characterised by three key features.  Firstly, it 
attempts to identify and understand the cultural determinants of childhood which 
entails an analysis of the social status assigned to children, which includes an 
examination of children as social agents, i.e., the possible influences that children 
themselves may exert over their position in society.  These will include social 
factors, such as family structure, nature of kin, gender relations, structure and 
conceptions of the education system, religious discourses, common sense 
perceptions of childhood, etc, in various combinations that are unique to different 
cultural contexts. 
 
The second feature is the explication of the processes and mechanisms that 
determine how these cultural determinants and pervading discourses are applied in 
society.  Here, James and James (2004) claim that the key mechanism is the law, 
which they conceive as the process of social ordering, ranging from compliance to 
custom and tradition through to social policies and other formal legal systems.  Of 
particular interest is an explication of the way in which social policy regulates the 
relations between the cultural determinants and discourses.  James and James (2004) 
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regard this as the small “p” which they contrast with the large “P” representing 
national politics10
 
. 
The third feature is an examination of how children experience childhood, i.e. an 
examination of the ways in which they experience these cultural determinants, and 
the social control of who they are.  Of importance here, is a determination of the 
extent to which children can themselves influence their experience.  Of further 
significance, is the recognition that their cultural realities will ultimately determine 
the extent of their influence.  As James and James (2004) contend: 
That this will occur differentially amongst children, and be 
experienced variously by children in different cultural contexts as 
well as within a single setting, underlines the extent to which 
‘childhood’ is both united by a set of common and shared 
experiences and yet, at the same time, is fragmented by the 
diversities of children’s everyday lives. (p. 7-8) 
 
A closer look at this feature, in fact depicts similarities with the aims of the current 
study.  Using cultural politics to reiterate the aim of the current study, one could 
argue that it is attempting to reveal how the ideological nature of the cultural 
determinants of childhood influences children’s experience of childhood and how it 
emerges within children’s discursive construction of childhood. 
 
For the current explication of the political child, the discussion will centre around 
the second element, viz. the role of the law in the regulation and production of 
                                                 
10 Representing the particular persuasions and vested interests of political parties 
 
 
 
 
 41 
childhood.  It would be prudent to take cognisance from the outset of the ways in 
which social policy could function to produce and maintain certain depictions of 
childhood and children’s position in society, by controlling the space and time of 
children.  As James and James (2004) state: “Once incorporated into a formal and 
explicit system of rules and regulatory mechanisms, the law therefore represents a 
highly specialised system of thinking about social realities and their regulation” (p. 
64).  Similarly Freeman (1998) has postulated on the capacity of the law to act as a 
symbol of legitimacy, with the power of determining the standards of what is right 
and wrong.  In this way the law creates, maintains and indeed sanctions certain 
discourses of childhood; discourses that in fact serve the interests of those in power, 
or James and James’s (2004) large ‘P’.  These contentions outlined above are 
significant as it provides baseline knowledge on a powerful ideological agent (the 
law) that could potentially determine the nature and experience of childhood.   An 
obvious example, is the authority that the law has in determining individuals’ 
progression from childhood to adulthood.  In South Africa, and other countries, for 
example, it is the law that formally affirms an individuals’ advancement from 
childhood into adulthood and the subsequent attainment of citizenship.   
The citizenship status of children is an integral component of the current thinking 
around childhood which in effect assigns permanent and full membership to a 
specific society.  Citizenship implies the existence of three types of rights: viz. 
political, civil and social (Marshall, 1950).  It might be useful to evaluate the extent 
that children conform to the above.  With regard to political rights, children do not 
have the right to vote, enjoy any political affiliation or strike.  Civil rights, generally 
referring to the right to free speech, personal freedom, property ownership etc, and 
social rights, including the rights to education, welfare and other basic services are 
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to a large extent a limited experience for children.  In fact, the partial recognition of 
children’s social and civil rights can be attributed to the UNCRC, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section.  It follows then that the 
citizenship status of children is at best tenuous, with a lack of evidential proof of 
tangible benefits for children. 
 
2.3.1 Children’s Rights 
The discourse on children’s rights can be traced back to as early as 1852 with the 
publication of the article entitled The Rights of Children (Freeman, 1992).  
Thereafter, other significant milestones were the adoption of the Geneva Declaration 
by the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924, followed by the United 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959.  From 1959 onwards there was a 
proliferation of child rights discourse culminating in the year of the child in 1979 
and significantly in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1989 
(Freeman, 1992).  The UNCRC essentially “concretised the moral obligations 
enshrined in the 1924 Geneva Declaration and the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child, in so-called ‘hard law’.  The children’s rights movement of the 1960’s 
focussed on two key concerns, viz. the rights of children with respect to the exercise 
of state power, and rights of children with respect to the exercise of parental 
authority. (Guggenheim, 2005).  The UNCRC appeared to be the turning point in 
how children were officially regarded in the law, whilst simultaneously engendering 
a formal acknowledgement of the role of parents and family in the development of 
the child.  The protection rights for example, were presented in much more practical 
terms and children were generally referred to as subjects and not as objects.  A more 
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in-depth discussion on the UNCRC follows shortly.  Firstly, however, it would be 
useful to elucidate the nature and key constituents of children’s rights. 
 
A requisite for engaging in any rhetoric concerning children’s rights is to take 
special cognisance of the fundamental distinction between children’s moral rights 
and legal rights.  Archard (2004) points out that the distinction is not between two 
different sets of rights but rather in how rights are understood.  In other words, that 
children are morally entitled to certain rights does not necessarily translate into a 
legally granted entitlement.  Similarly the converse is also true, i.e. what is 
recognised as a right according to the law need not be a moral right.  Hence, 
contemplating whether children have rights, needs to be considered from both a 
moral and legal perspective – either by pointing to the facts of the law or 
considering the moral foundation.  Commenting on the distinction between the two, 
Archard (2004) points out: 
It is, normally, a matter of fact whether or not a right is legally 
recognised… Determining whether or not there is a moral right is not a 
factual matter.  Rather, it is a question of moral argument as to whether 
or not individuals ought to have the right in question.  (p. 54) 
 
While the significance of children’s rights finds its starting point in the moral 
discourse, it is the legal ramifications of rights that impart a telling contribution on 
the lives of children.  Therefore, independent of what the moral discourse stipulates, 
the law provides enforceable entitlements.  It is axiomatic that the prevailing legal 
discourse on children’s rights would then impact on the ideological relationship 
between children and adult society.  Archard (2004) points out that it “is hard to see 
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children as moral incompetents if our laws, consistently and persistently, do not” (p. 
56 – 57).  To ponder the truth or falsity of Archard’s (2004) contention makes for a 
thought provoking exercise.  On the one hand the contention is a logical one, in the 
sense that persistent discourses invariably construct truths.  However, on the other 
hand, the question is whether the discourse created by law can overcome the 
common sense understandings of childhood as a period of incompetence, a discourse 
that has been a common feature of society for centuries.   
 
Controversy still exists between children’s competence to exercise these rights 
independently.  The competence debate is based on the argument that children are 
not sufficiently physically, emotionally and intellectually equipped to effect rational 
decisions in their best interest.  Verhellen (1992) outlines the three key trends or 
ensuing positions.  The first, the reformist trend, supports the notion of children as 
incompetent but does acknowledge that children’s capacities are grossly 
underestimated by general society.  They favour a position of the gradual acquisition 
of rights by children.  Secondly, the radical trend, considers discrimination based on 
age as morally wrong and subsequently insists that all children should be granted 
full human rights and the agency to exercise these rights.  Thirdly, supporters of the 
radical trend believe that children should be granted autonomy to exercise all rights 
unless they are proven to be incompetent.  This increasingly popular view then 
places the burden of proof with the adults and not the children. 
 
Another key dichotomy in children’s rights discourse is that of “liberation or 
protection”, colloquially referred to as the ‘kiddie libbers’ and the ‘child savers’.  
The children’s liberation movement, encapsulated in the works of Farson (1974) and 
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Holt (1974), was generally aligned to the movement for human emancipation and 
more specifically to the women’s liberation movement of the 1960’s and 1970’s.  
The movement was primarily concerned with the attainment and recognition of 
children’s rights to self-determination and self expression (Melton, 2000).  
Essentially, the movement argued that: 
the modern separation of child’s and adult’s world is an unwanted an 
oppressive discrimination; that this segregation is accompanied and 
reinforced by a false ideology of ‘childishness’; and that children are 
entitled to all the rights and privileges possessed by adults. (Archard, 
2004, p. 70) 
 
Archard (2004) points out the ensuing irony in that the liberation movement 
identified both the nuclear family and the school as key institutions of oppression, 
yet it was the emergence of these two institutions that created an awareness of 
childhood in the first place (see e.g. Aries, 1962). 
 
It is important to distinguish between rights that guarantee children basic levels of 
treatment and protection, and rights that grant children self-determination and 
freedom.  The concept of self determination is critical to the liberation argument.  
Farson states that “the issue of self-determination is at the heart of the children’s 
liberation… The acceptance of the child’s right to self-determination is fundamental 
to all the rights to which children are entitled” (1974, p. 27).  While the protection 
rights are afforded to children, the self-determination notion requires that children 
consciously exercise them.  Possessing self-determination rights then means that 
children themselves determine how to live their lives.  Of course, subscribing to the 
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‘self-determination thesis’ means contesting the ‘incompetence thesis’ and the 
‘arbitrariness of age thesis’.  In fact, the proponents of the self-determination thesis 
argue that the concept of incompetence has an ideological motive in the modern 
depiction of childhood.  In other words, the characteristics of children as frail, 
helpless, dependent, etc are not natural but rather ideological constructions which 
function to maintain the domination of children by adults.  Archard explains: “We 
want children to be helpless so that we can help them, we need them to be dependent 
so that we can exercise authority over them…it is a self-confirming ideology” 
(2004, p. 74). 
 
The caretaker or the protection thesis states that children need protection and should 
not be granted self-determination rights.  It works from the premise that self-
determination rights stunt development and that children who are granted too much 
liberties will develop into unproductive adults.  In practical application, the caretaker 
thesis espouses that children’s rights should be vested to an adult member of society, 
usually the parents.  This essentially implies that the adult member acts as a trustee 
to the child until such time that the child comes of age (turns 18).   
 
The concept of children’s rights is often touted as the panacea of children’s social 
problems.  Guggenheim (2005) cautions against this assertion, arguing that the 
concept has essentially been hijacked to provide rhetorical advantage and 
propaganda to a number of adult interests in a variety of contexts. Guggenheim 
(2005) further claims that concept only presents with significant standing because it 
serves adults’ interests too.  He cogently argues: 
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Children’s rights is often more deeper and more shallow than is often 
recognised…adults gain in a number of ways by presenting themselves as 
caring about children… Sometimes it serves as a useful subterfuge for the 
adult’s actual motive…it can be an effective diverter of attention, shifting 
the focus to a more sympathetic party than the adult… it is used to 
assuage guilt for the adult’s bad behaviour or intentions… Children’s 
rights can be useful for masking selfishness by invoking a language of 
altruism… it can also provide a legal basis to achieve a result that would 
be difficult to achieve otherwise.  (Guggenheim, 2005, p. xii – xiii) 
 
For this study, it is therefore important to be cognisant of the meanings and 
functions of children’s rights, and to candidly appraise, both its historical genesis 
as well as its ideological role in the construction of childhood.  
 
2.3.2 Children’s Rights in South Africa 
The rights of children in South Africa are enshrined in the South African 
Constitution, the Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005) and two child specific human 
rights treaties that have been ratified by the government of South Africa viz., the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child11
 
. 
2.3.2.1 The South African Constitution 
Streak and Wehner (2003) believe that it is essential to take cognisance of the 
historical context of the development of the Constitution.  That is, it needs to be 
                                                 
11 These instruments define a child as a person between the ages of 0 to 18. 
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understood in relation to the racially based political regime that propagated socio-
economic exclusion, human rights abuses and severe and chronic poverty.  Taking 
this into consideration, the Constitution was specifically drafted to address the 
legacy of poverty by providing everyone (including children) with a comprehensive 
set of socio-economic rights with regard to education, nutrition, housing, social 
services and healthcare.  Within the Constitution, Section 28 and 29 deals 
specifically with children’s rights.  Section 28 refers to four basic socio-economic 
rights viz., nutrition, shelter, health care, and social services, while Section 29 refers 
to the right to basic education. 
 
It is important to note that these rights are justiciable, i.e. the state is legally liable to 
effect these rights as they are enforceable through the court system.  The socio-
economic rights are hence linked to state obligations in terms of the realisation of 
those rights.  Of even greater importance, is the fact that the state has a higher level 
delivery obligation when effecting children’s socio-economic rights than other 
members of the population.  This is so since the Constitution allows for the 
progressive realisation of rights based on available resources, whilst no such 
limitations are placed on the realisation of children’s socio-economic rights (Streak 
& Wehner, 2003). 
 
While most commentators regard the Constitution as making positive strides 
towards uplifting the quality of life of all South African children, especially the poor 
and disadvantaged, some commentators engender a more cautious approach.  
September (2002), for example, questions if the rights afforded to children only need 
to be met to a very basic level, since the Constitution fails to specify the exact scope 
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of the rights of children (Streak & Wehner, 2003).  Similarly, others such as 
Proudlock (2002) (as cited in Streak & Wehner, 2003), have highlighted the 
importance of clarifying the nature and scope of the state obligations.  As Streak and 
Wehner (2003) aptly state: 
A lack of clarity around the level of entitlements implied by the rights is 
dangerous: it leaves room for government to arbitrarily decide on what 
level of services to provide to children in order to give effect to their 
rights. (p. 54) 
 
2.3.2.2 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The historical progression of nearly a century of child rights discourse culminated in 
the development of an international treaty to provide children with a holistic set of 
social, economic, political, civil and environmental rights.  The UNCRC was 
adopted without a vote in November 1989 by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations.  The UNCRC can be regarded as a historical milestone, formally granting 
children fundamental human rights and representing the plight of improving 
children’s condition in society, ushering in a new way of dealing with children and a 
new paradigm of children’s position in society.  This also initiated a new way of 
perceiving children in society which has effectively changed the image of the child 
in society (Lopatka, 1992; Verhellen, 1992).  While a strong moral imperative is 
implicit in the content of the UNCRC, its strength lies in the legal nature that it now 
certifies to children.  This point is cogently conveyed by Lopatka (1992): 
The rights of the child specified in the Convention are not merely an 
expression of a moral belief.  They express first and foremost the 
legislative will of the States-parties to the Convention. (p. 51) 
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With children as right-holders and eligible to certain entitlements, the ideological 
nature of the relationship between children and adults has now changed. 
Children were now regarded, in law, as being entitled to human rights but also 
increasingly regarded as valid competent citizens.  The UNCRC then essentially 
allows the redistribution of social power (James & James, 2004) with a potential 
inverse effect on ideological control.  As Roche (1996) points out: 
Once we genuinely allow children to exercise their right to speak and be 
heard, we might have to participate in different conversations… any 
commitment to children’s rights… is part of a larger project regarding 
citizenship. (p. 33)  
 
The importance of the Convention can be seen as it essentially enshrined moral 
obligations of governments in hard law (Verhellen, 1992).  Governments who 
ratified the Convention were bound by legal obligation to develop and execute 
legislative, administrative and delivery measures to ensure the implementation of the 
UNCRC.  Article 4 of the Convention states: 
State Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative 
and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the 
present Convention.  With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, 
State Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of 
their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international co-operation. (UNICEF, 1990, p. 46) 
 
The variability of childhood and the fact that childhood is often constructed 
differently in various social, economic and cultural contexts complicates the 
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execution of the above obligation.  Both Dawes (1999) and James and James (2004) 
therefore believe that, even though the UNCRC makes significant contributions to 
the advancement of children’s rights, it may not transcend cultural boundaries, or be 
able to be implemented in a non-western context, hindering its implementation to a 
significant degree.  In that sense it may not hold up against common sense 
constructions of children’s role in society.  Stated differently, the cultural and 
ideological constructions of childhood, and the subsequent prevailing discourses, 
may hinder the efficacy of the UNCRC.  
 
2.3.2.3 Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005) 
With the onset of the democratically elected government in 1994, many new laws 
have been drafted, and old laws amended, to address the challenges and social 
realities of South Africa’s population.  The Child Care Act (1983) was one of the 
few policies still in force and provided an inadequate legislative framework to effect 
the new policies and address the needs of children.  The key shortcoming, according 
to Proudlock and Jamieson (2008), was that it failed to make provision for 
preventative and intervention strategies in the care for children and only addressed 
these issues once abuse and maltreatment had already taken place.  This, together 
with the concern that no legislative obligation was placed on the State to ensure 
services for children, necessitated the need for new legislation.  Subsequently, the 
new Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005) and the associated Children’s Amendment Act 
(No. 41 of 2007) were drafted.  It endured a tumultuous progression through ten 
years of extensive consultation with civil societies, Parliament, and the various 
provincial legislatures and government departments.  
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The Children’s Act provides the primary legislative framework for formalising a 
range of social services that are essentially aimed at promoting the protection, 
development, care and well-being of children, as well as providing support to 
families and communities to facilitate and ensure the achievement thereof.  Using 
the baseline principles of the ‘best interests of the child’ and acknowledging 
children’s right to participation, the Act was developed to be in line with the 
UNCRC and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.  Proudlock and Jamieson (2008) 
believe that the Act “shifts the country from a charity model to an approach that 
recognises that children have a constitutional right to social services and that the 
State bears the primary duty to ensure that these services are delivered” (p. 36-37).  
The implication is not necessarily that the State is obligated to ensure delivery of all 
the services itself, but rather to facilitate and ensure that the services are actually 
provided and accessible to all children. 
 
2.4 The Social Child 
The attempts by James et al. (1998) and James and Prout (1997) to outline 
sociology’s engagement with childhood are rather comprehensive.  James et al’s. 
(1998) account in particular, is impressive, as it not only provides a historical 
treatise on the pre-sociological theories, but also shows how the conceptualisation 
process has progressed from pre-sociological theories through the transitional phase 
to contemporary understandings.  Their identification of four approaches is helpful 
to delineate the discussions of this section.  These approaches constitute the 
typology of the contemporary theories of childhood and are referred to as the 
socially constructed child, the tribal child, the minority group child and the social 
structural child (James et al., 1998).  In keeping with the ideological preoccupation 
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of the current dissertation, the author has, albeit cautiously, endeavoured to combine 
the tenets of the tribal and minority child and add to that the dimension of class.  
This approach will be referred to as the ideological child.  The following section 
provides an analytical taxonomy of the three approaches, with particular attention on 
the socially constructed and ideological child.    
 
In keeping with the epistemological strand of this study, the reader will note that the 
author is intent on discussion that falls within the overlap of the socially constructed 
and ideological child.  Firstly, however, it might be prudent to outline the traditional 
conceptualisation of childhood and demonstrate the genesis of the theoretical 
position adopted in this paper.  The author will also attempt, as far as possible, to 
locate the exposition within the historical progression of the social sciences. 
 
2.4.1 The Traditional Conceptualisation of Childhood 
Socialisation is a concept that generally refers to the process through which human 
beings acquire social skills to understand and navigate the social world.  It is 
through this process that they learn to conform to social norms.  As this involves the 
generational transmission of cultures, James et al. (1998) believe that the motive 
behind socialisation theory is to ensure the sustainability of cultures through time.  
In this sense, children are then the key recipients of the process albeit not as active 
participants “but as beings who have the potentials for being slowly brought into 
contact with human beings” (Ritchie & Kollar, 1964, p. 117) or “something apart 
from society that must be shaped and guided by external forces in order to become a 
fully functioning member” (Corsaro, 2005, p. 7).  Child culture is thus seen as a 
precursory phase of personhood (Shildkrout, as cited in Prout & James, 1997) with 
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socialisation as the vehicle or instrument of transition from child to adult through the 
assimilation of, and conformity to, social and cultural norms.  This is the 
functionalist view of socialisation. 
 
Corsaro (2005) identified two models of socialisation viz. constructivism and 
determinism.  Constructivism, which refers to Piagetian and Vygotskian theories are 
outlined in the “psychological child”.  The deterministic model consists of two 
subsidiary models viz. the functionalist and the reproductive.  The functionalist 
model, with Talcot Parsons (1951) as its key proponent, is primarily concerned with 
the child’s internalisation of social aspects, a process enforced and regulated by 
parental training.  The model has no interest in how children are integrated into 
society as long as they are sufficiently appropriated to fit in and no longer be a threat 
to society.  In as much as the functionalist model is ‘forward looking’ (Inkeles, as 
cited in Corsaro, 2005), children are perceived as a threat to the functioning of 
society that is only overcome once they have, through training and preparation, 
internalised the elements of the system and are successfully functioning in it 
(Corsaro, 2005). 
 
Critical of the functionalist model as advancing as a form of ideological control, 
reproduction theorists (see e.g. Bernstein, 1981, as cited in Corsaro, 2005; Bourdieu 
& Passeron, 1977) focussed on the unequal class systems where certain social 
classes benefit from greater access to resources and enjoy privileges due to their 
status within the class system (Corsaro, 2005). 
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James et al. (1998) contend that the socialisation process has been conceived in two 
ways, which they refer to as the “hard” and the “soft” variations.  The ‘hard’ way, 
which is consistent with Cosaro’s (2005) understanding of the functionalist model, is 
perceived as “the internalisation of social constraints, a process occurring through 
external regulation” (James et al., 1998).  The child’s personality is thus shaped by 
the endeavour to attain the goals as prescribed by society.  Furthermore, this needs 
to be achieved by adhering to, and operating within, the framework of society’s 
given rules and regulations.  The soft way is essentially related to the dynamics of 
inter and intra group relations or as James et al. (1998) argue “a transactional 
negotiation that occurs when individuals strive to become group members” (p. 25). 
 
Both these methods are key tenets in what James et al. (1998) refer to as the socially 
developing child.  However, while this approach should ideally foreground the 
social aspects of personhood, or more specifically, how individuals acquire 
personhood, it fails to do so.  The key reason is that the psychological model, with 
its key tenets of irrationality, universality and naturalness has been uncritically 
assimilated into theories of socialisation in the 1950’s (James et al., 1998; Jenks, 
2005; Mackay, 1973; Prout & James, 1997).  With strong roots in the epistemology 
of positivism, these theories functioned to maintain a functionalist world view.  The 
result is a failure of socialisation theory to adequately explain how children acquire 
knowledge of their social roles.  Tonkin (1982, as cited in Prout & James, 1997) 
demonstrates the genesis and mechanics of this failure.  The essence of her argument 
is that the confluence of the psychological and social accounts of personhood is 
engendered without apparent consideration of the fundamental differences that are 
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inherent to each.  But it is not only the dichotomous notions of each 
conceptualisation that has resulted in the mismatch between theory and practice.   
 
The conceptualisations have in fact created a cyclical outcome, with perceptions of 
children as passive future members of society, fuelling and being fuelled by the 
juxtaposition of developmental and socialisation theory.  The impact on everyday 
life and societal norms is astronomical, with a range of practices and institutions set-
up and itself maintaining the status quo.  These institutions function to ideologically 
justify the relegated role of children in society.  Again, the relationship is mutually 
influencing or crudely dialectical.  Adherence to scientific theory and 
conceptualisation of childhood sets up the scope and nature of the institution.  These 
institutions then function to both create and support the common sense 
understandings, whilst simultaneously propagating the notions of the scientific 
theory.  This contributes to everyday and common sense understandings of the 
nature of childhood.  It is the role of the ideological state apparatuses to sustain these 
conceptualisations.   
 
The concept of ideological state apparatuses was put forward by Althusser (1971) to 
explain how the state used various institutions to maintain ideological control over 
the population.  These institutions included the church, school, the media, etc.  If 
one takes it a step further it is not inaccurate to perceive these institutions as agents 
of socialisation and thus socialisation as an instrument to perpetuate ideology.  
 
Socialisation theory, however, omitted enquiry into the nature of these institutions 
and the meaning in shaping children’s lives.  In fact, no mainstream theoretical 
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interest existed in addressing these issues because due to their now ‘universal’ 
relegated role in society, children as a social category did not warrant research 
consideration. 
  
2.4.2 Challenge to Orthodoxy: The Socially Constructed Child 
It goes without saying that the intellectual trend that characterised the studies of 
childhood, as outlined above, followed the contemporary (philosophical) paradigm 
of the time.  Located in a context operating within the structuralist-functionalist 
tradition and gripped by positivism, alternate conceptualisations of childhood 
emerged more or less simultaneously with the emergence of a new alternative 
paradigm in the social sciences.  Social constructionism has a diverse genetic 
evolution and shows hereditary links to the symbolic interactionism of Mead (see 
Reck, 1981 for a selection of Mead’s essays) and Blumer (1969), Berger and 
Luckman’s (1966) theory of reality and Wittgenstein’s (1978) theory of language.  It 
emerged as a result of general displeasure to the dominant paradigm at the time.  A 
similar displeasure was present in the field of childhood studies and with the 
emergence of social constructionism as a new paradigm for childhood studies was 
put forward.  While the new paradigm, informally referred to as the new sociology 
(or social studies) of childhood, has its genesis in dissenting but isolated and 
fragmented voices in the fields of sociology, social psychology, anthropology and 
interactionism (see e.g. Stainton-Rogers, 1989; Wartofsky, 1981), it formally arrived 
in James and Prout’s (1990) landmark publication Constructing and Reconstructing 
Childhood.   
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James and Prout’s (1990) radical contention was that childhood should be perceived 
as a social construction.  By this they mean that childhood does not exist in a finite 
and identifiable form and that an emphasis should be placed on diverse perceptions 
and locations of childhood (James et al., 1998; James & Prout, 1990).  In this way 
the social, cultural and historical variability of childhood is foregrounded.  
Childhood is thus regarded as “an actively negotiated set of social relationships 
within which the early years of human life are constituted” (James & Prout, 1997, p. 
7). 
Following is a synopsis of the key features of the ‘new social studies of childhood’: 
i. Childhood is perceived as a social construction, i.e. providing an interpretive 
framework for contexualising the early years of human life. 
ii. Childhood is a construct of social analysis. 
iii. Children should be the object of study in their own right. 
iv. Children should be seen as active social actors, responsible for the 
construction of their own lives. 
 
Based on the tenets of the epistemological tradition of social constructionism, the 
socially constructed child refers to the cessation or termination of taken-for-granted 
meanings (Gergen, 1985) of childhood (James et al., 1998).  Thus, social 
constructionism brings into question conventional understandings of childhood, 
sanctioning an understanding of childhood that is based on the specific social 
context.  An ideal starting point for the socially constructed child will be an 
explication of how the social context influences the creation of meaning.  With a 
divergent number of social contexts, multiple realities of childhood, or many 
childhoods (Frønes, 1993, 1994) are created.  As Frønes (1993) argues: 
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There is not one childhood, but many formed at the intersection of 
different cultural, social and economic systems, natural and man-made 
physical environments.  Different positions in society produce different 
experiences. (p. 18) 
 
With the social constructionist approach, the initial thrust is to campaign for the 
inclusion of the search for meaning in social inquiry about childhood, and an 
ultimate understanding of the ways children both create and negotiate existing 
meanings in their life.   Shotter (1998) however, argues that the meanings 
constructionism sanctions are not those that are explicit, predictive, cognitive and 
representational, but rather meanings that are implicit in people’s unique 
interpretative experiences and responsive reaction to their social environment.  The 
reality of childhood is embedded in an emphasis on the historical, cultural and 
politically specific instruments through which it is registered.   This emphasis on 
culture, politics and history is a fundamental feature of contemporary 
constructionism.   Gergen (1985), for example, states that the “terms in which the 
world is understood are social artefacts, products of historically situated 
interchanges among people” (p. 267).   Similarly Bayer (1998) claims that social 
constructionism “cannot claim any special residency outside of culture, history, 
movements, technology or politics” (p. 3).   The historical account together with the 
political and the ideological, in the context of this study, make up the social.    
 
The critical thrust of social constructionism is not how children function in an adult 
constructed world, i.e. how children negotiate the institution of childhood, but rather 
how they construct their own reality and assign meaning to their lives.  The concern 
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is, therefore, not children as constructed by adults, but rather the roles that children 
play and the meanings they themselves attach to their lives (Prout & James, 1997).  
In this respect a social constructionist position advocates the following:  
Children are and must be seen as active in the construction and 
determination of their own social lives, the lives of those around them and 
the societies they live in.  Children are not just passive subjects of social 
structures and processes. (Prout & James, 1997, p. 8) 
 
This assignation of agency to children can to a large extent be seen as the manifesto 
of the ‘new social studies of childhood’.  Jenks (2004) however, warns of the 
inherent paradox and contradictions that emerges from this burgeoning sense of 
agency.  Childhood can no longer be used as mitigation against irresponsible, 
precocious or improper conduct.  A delicate balance needs to be struck between 
agency and the logical limits of maturation and vulnerability. 
 
A further point of deliberation is that within contemporary South Africa, the social, 
cultural and historical specificities demand primary recognition.  As previously 
discussed, it is important to take cognisance of the diversity of childhood in terms of 
class, gender, ethnicity and culture especially if one appends the historical-political, 
along with the associated construct of race, to the equation.  This resonates with 
Aries’s (1962) thesis that childhood is a historical construction, Stephens (1995) and 
Dawes’s (1999) notion that childhood is a cultural construction and Coles (1986) 
who sees childhood as a being constructed by the prevailing political context.   
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A closer reading of Prout and James’s (1990) ‘social’ in their ‘childhood as a social 
construction’ thesis is formed by diverse cultural, political, historical and economic 
systems.  Like Woodhead (1997) they acknowledge the universality of children in 
terms of the biological facts of maturation, but argue that it is embedded in social 
and cultural systems and can only be made sense of, and interpreted by 
consideration of these systems within a particular social and cultural system.   
 
The idea is that different realities of constructions and experiences of childhood 
exist in a dialectical relationship, framed by the historical, cultural and social on the 
one hand, and biological maturation on the other.  Thus social constructionism is 
interested in how these realities of childhood are discursively articulated in law, 
social policy and everyday activities.   
 
2.5 The Ideological Child 
The ideological child refers to the amalgamation of the tribal, minority, social class 
and social structural (James et al., 1998).  The essence of the ideological child is that 
it elucidates conceptions of childhood where the relations between childhood and 
the adult society is characterised by domination and exploitation. 
 
The tribal child is premised on the notion that children’s social worlds are legitimate 
places and spheres of meaning (James et al., 1998) in their own right.  This approach 
essentially provides an explication of the child’s negotiation of the social space, i.e. 
how ideological forces external to the child impact on the actual physical space.  
Simultaneously, there is a profound acknowledgement of children as valid social 
actors and a subsequent respect for their social worlds as real locations.  The role of 
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the researcher is a difficult one, as an outsider attempting entry into a social sphere 
and not meeting the criteria for entry.  Working from the premise that children’s 
social action is structured and operating within a social sphere the aim of research in 
this tradition is then to elucidate the actions, rules, regulation and traditions of the 
system.  The Opies (1969, 1977) are the key proponents of this theoretical strand. 
 
Likened to Alanen’s (1988) feminisation of childhood, the minority child ascribes to 
childhood a politicised social category based on the assumption of an “unequal and 
discriminatory society” (James et al., 1998, p. 30).  The discourse of minority child 
challenges the power relations between children and adults that is inherent in 
contemporary society.  The approach advances notions of powerlessness and 
helplessness and expounds the role of dominant ideology in creating and 
maintaining unequal relations of power.  Empirical support can be found in the work 
of Savahl et al. (2006) who identified helplessness and powerlessness as key 
discursive themes present in children’s discourses.   
 
A theoretical slant to the minority child approach is the contention of 
conceptualising childhood as a social class (see e.g. Oldman, 1994).  This approach 
perceives children as constituting classes, which “exist principally by their economic 
opposition to each other and in the ability of the dominant class (adults) to 
economically exploit the activities of the subordinate class (children)” (Oldman, 
1994, p. 44).  Economic exploitation, however, entails and even necessitates 
ideological dominance through both ideological apparatuses as well as the discursive 
construction of children as unsocialised and therefore incomplete beings.  The two 
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in fact exist in a dialectical relationship that maintains the hegemonic nature of the 
relationship.   
 
A feature of this approach is the institutionalisation of childhood, i.e. the creation 
and control of social spaces that children inhabit.  When we engage in class analysis, 
we are by implication talking about economic exploitation.  It is therefore incumbent 
to prove two things.  Firstly, it would be necessary to demonstrate how children 
actually contribute to the economy.  This will be addressed later in this chapter.  
And secondly, that the exploited (children) would be better off and the exploiters 
(adults) worse off, if the children were to withdraw their productive assets from the 
relationship. The irony is that, in this instance, it is children themselves, their mere 
existence and being that is the productive asset.  Indeed Oldman (1994) claims all 
‘normal’ children’s activities are in the short term economic interests of adults who 
supervise them.  An approach to childhood that is based on a class analysis would 
therefore need to focus on the exploitative nature of adult-child relations, working 
from the premise that children’s activities are structured so as to ameliorate the 
economic interests of adults (Oldman, 1994).  This essentially means that the quality 
of adults’ lives is enhanced and that of children’s lives diminished due to the nature 
of the relationship (Oldman, 1994).  While Oldman (1994) acknowledges the 
difficulty of proving this quantitatively, he nonetheless offers a treatise based on 
three empirical features of adult-child relations.   
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Firstly, children are the objects of childwork12
 
 with no due regard afforded to the 
relevance of their activities.  This claim is premised on the observation that there is 
no significant impact (gain or loss) on children’s attainment of human capital with 
any related increase in childwork.  Secondly, a claim by childworkers to higher 
income or status is based on the results of a selected group of children who are often 
members of a superior social class that in fact assures self-capitalisation, and 
actually require less childwork.  The final feature relates to the observation that the 
dynamics of parental employment is becoming increasingly contingent on the self-
maintaining domestic labour of children, which has modest, if any, self-capitalising 
value for the children. 
The social structural child put forward by Qvotrup (1994) is based on three key 
tenets.  Firstly, childhood constitutes a structural form, i.e. childhood constitutes a 
permanent, normative and constant structure in society and therefore warrants 
consideration as such.  Secondly, childhood and adulthood are exposed to and 
affected by the same societal forces.  The approach specifically notes the 
interrelationship of societal structures on childhood and further acknowledges that 
childhood is determined by the specific characteristics of the particular society that 
they are in.  Childhood is thus instanced as a social phenomenon dependent on the 
institutional structure of society (James et al., 1998).  Qvortrup (1994) in fact argues 
for the axiom ‘the childhood’, claiming the following: 
…children who live within a defined area – whether in terms of time, 
space, economics or other relevant criteria – have a number of 
                                                 
12 Childwork refers to the work done by adults ‘on’ children, while children’s work refers to the 
actual work done by children. 
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characteristics in common.  This preference (the childhood) enables us to 
characterise not only childhood, but also the society in which this 
childhood is situated as mutually both independent and indispensable 
constructions; … (p. 5) 
 
Thirdly, children are regarded as active co-constructors (Qvortrup, 1994) of 
childhood and complementary participants (Corsaro, 2005) in society.  The activities 
that they engage in, as well as their specific structural location, all play a specific 
role in the functioning of society.  Thus, children both impact on and are impacted 
on by society.  While the emotional benefit afforded by children is axiomatic, it is 
important to elucidate the role that children play as an economic entity in society.  
More of this anon. 
 
The four subsidiaries of the ideological child have a number of common threads.  
Firstly, these approaches acknowledge children as valid social actors and citizens.  
Secondly, their views are considered valuable and an essential starting point for any 
research or intervention strategy.  Thirdly, childhood constitutes a legitimate social 
category and derives its meaning from membership to that specific social category.  
Finally, there is an absolute dedication to children’s interests and purposes, or as 
James et al. (1998) argue “a sociology for, rather than of children” (p. 31). 
The essence of the ideological child is that children are valid, active and their 
contributions and activities in the school, family, workplace and other institutions 
are requisite for the effective functioning of the social system.  The process of 
proving the above contention is particularly complex, just as the notion of proving 
that children’s activities constitute valid work is especially contentious – most likely 
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emerging from traditional socialisation theories of children.  The above, together 
with the notion that children are bona fide economic entities requires elaboration.  
Following is a brief explication of children’s economic contribution. 
 
Schoolwork 
Qvortrup (2004) claims that schooling is essentially an investment in the economic 
well-being of society.  Qvortrup and Kjørholt (2000) question the blasé perception 
of children’s school attendance.  They suggest that school attendance “represents a 
considerable effort, without which the society would not be able to continue 
economically and culturally” (p. 7).  It should be perceived as work, the product of 
which is human capital.  He further argues that traditional constructions of schools 
solely as accrediting institutions are a result of the ideological and bureaucratic 
nature of the controlling bodies (Corsaro, 2005). 
 
Contrary to Qvortrup’s contention, Oldman (1994) believes that the value of 
schooling is based on the fact that children’s scholastic labour necessitates 
childwork by the teachers, support staff, educational administrators etc.  It further 
advances commercial enterprise in the retail sector, as books, stationary, educational 
and sporting equipment, and uniforms need to be purchased; in the construction 
industry as schools need to be built and maintained; and in the information and 
telecommunications industry as schools move further into the information age.  The 
point is that for the institution of schooling to exist, children’s presence is needed.  
Moreover, children and indeed the parents need to buy into the system.  The 
‘clever’, the ‘hardworking’ and the ‘disciplined’ child along with the ‘concerned’ 
parent maintains the system, while some ‘naughty’ children work against it.  The 
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former, which more often than not belongs to the middle class, is then important in 
attracting other similar children to the school with the attainment of good grades.  
These new recruits bring along their ‘concerned’ middle class parents and their 
money.  This sequence of events is ultimately dependent on children’s labour within 
the school.  Children’s labour participation in schools therefore has both short-term 
(childwork) and long-term (human capital gain) benefits (Oldman, 1994). 
 
 The question then arises: should the educational institution be perceived as an 
ideological ‘state’ apparatus (Althusser, 1971), or rather ideological ‘social’ 
apparatus, as it does not only serve state interests but more importantly the social 
sequencing of the life course. 
 
Domestic Housework 
Oldman (1994) commenting on the national reports of the Childhood as Social 
Phenomenon Project, notes that children’s domestic labour is primarily located 
around their own maintenance and not the general maintenance of the household.  
His argument is based on the contention that adults’ increased economic interest and 
the subsequent time investment are “polarising the child’s experience into formally 
supervised time and unsupervised time”, resulting in the latter containing a 
considerable degree of self-maintaining labour (Oldman, 1994, p. 52).  Contrasting 
the current observation with children’s domestic labour in earlier historical periods, 
Oldman (1994) notes that children’s labour was characterised by servant-type 
labour, with older girls primarily responsible for childcare and domestic chores.  
This reflection of the child labour experience of early industrial periods, in fact 
mirrors the current realities of childhood in South Africa, and indeed it would not be 
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inaccurate to extend this experience to children in other developing countries as 
well.   
 
Clacherty and Budlender (2004), reporting on their qualitative work with children in 
various locations in South Africa, found that children were involved in excessive 
housework both in their own homes as well as a source of paid labour in other 
households.  The participants claimed that excessive housework limited the amount 
of time that they could dedicate to schoolwork and perpetuated feelings of anxiety.  
They attributed this to parents’ erroneous belief that excessive work would prepare 
them for the future and emphasized the need to educate parents on the potential 
harmful effects of excessive housework.  The main concern arising from these 
claims is that children are not allowed any free time, as the following extract from 
Clacherty and Budlender (2004) aptly demonstrates:  
To me working is sometimes not fun. Sometimes when I come back from 
school the house is still dirty it still needs to be cleaned. Sometimes I clean 
until it is late. Then I have to cook immediately after finishing. By the 
time I finish it is after six and I am not able to go and play. My heart 
becomes so sore because I have not played. (p. 39) 
 
The impact of the responsibility of housework is evident in the above quotation, 
especially the impact on children’s activities in general.  It is worth noting that the 
diversity of locations or socio-economic environments gives rise to diverse or 
disparate experiences of housework.  This is aptly demonstrated by Bray (2003) who 
reported that children displayed a positive sentiment towards household chores 
perceiving it as an integral part of life.  Furthermore, Bray (2003), in contrast to 
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Oldman (1994), noted that children’s domestic housework was geared towards the 
general maintenance of the household and appeared to evoke a sentiment of 
responsibility from the children. She does however point out that children may be 
burdened with too much responsibility.  Bray (2003) further noted the impact of the 
family structure on household chores: 
Children’s participation in domestic chores occurs within 
broader patterns of role division within households, and we can 
therefore expect the nature and extent of their participation to be 
affected by both household structure and internal relationships. 
(p. 112) 
 
This specifically refers to the presence of economically active and physically able 
family members and household type (in terms of the household head).  For example 
the presence of young adults (often female) between the ages of 18 – 25 will 
probably reduce the amount of work done by the younger children.  Furthermore in 
a female headed household where the mother is the sole breadwinner, the domestic 
responsibilities, including care of the younger siblings will fall to the older children.  
Whatever the social context or circumstance, it is apparent that children make an 
integral contribution towards the household economy in the sense that their domestic 
activities13
                                                 
13 Budlender introduced the term “reproductive work” to capture children’s role in the household 
economy (as cited in Bray, 2003)  
 provide a support structure for the well-being of the income generators in 
a family.  In this instance children’s domestic roles can be likened to the support 
staff of any commercial enterprise who do not directly acquire revenue but still play 
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an integral role in the successful functioning of the system in terms of the 
administrative support and back-up that they provide.   
 
Part of the problem of acknowledging children’s economic role is that even when 
children are engaged in work activities, they are relabelled as play, chores, learning, 
or taking responsibility (Woodhead, 1997).  This relabelling then essentially acts as 
an ideological mechanism by reconstructing the significance of children’s economic 
contribution and presenting it as standard tasks that are important for development.  
 
Other activities 
Children’s extra-curricular activities are increasingly expending free-time.  
Engaging in sporting and cultural activities outside school hours are typical of 
pursuits of the urban child.  These activities are usually formalised and represents a 
considerable amount of childwork (Oldman, 1994).  Oldman particularly notes the 
commercial potential of these formal activities for the leisure industry, as sports 
coaches, music and dance instructors, youth club leaders etc draw an income from 
their participation.  It appears then that children’s predilection for ‘extra-mural’ 
activities subjects them to economic exploitation albeit a rather passive form of 
exploitation.    
 
2.6 The Psychological Child 
 Psychology’s contribution is developmental psychology or developmentalism.  
Generally, developmentalism refers to a set of assumptions that emerged in the 
nineteenth century (Morss, 1996) that advanced the notion of biological determinism 
as the key factor in human development.   More specifically, it refers to regulated 
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and natural change (Walkerdine, 1993) typically following a set series of sequential 
stages or phases through which humans progress during their lifetime (Frønes, 
2005). 
 
Arguing from an anti-developmental perspective Morss (1996) claims that the 
problem with developmentalism is that it has become the prime constructor of 
common-sense knowledge and understanding of children and their behaviour, often 
rendering other accounts and explanations unconsidered.  As Walkerdine (1993) 
cogently argues: 
The very idea of development is not natural and universal, but extremely 
specific, and in its specificity, occludes other marginalised stories, 
subsumed as they are within the bigger story. (p. 455) 
 
Similarly, Burman (1994) postulates that developmental psychology has generally 
portrayed development as an inevitable and natural progression or regulation, and in 
fact uses the ‘natural’ argument as a kind of explanation.   
  
The explanations it offers for child behaviour is then internalised into lay 
understandings and discourses which transcend generations.  These discourses are 
the essential constituents of our cultural narratives that define our identity and status 
in society.  It may even be construed as hegemonic.  Morss (1996) sees the creation 
of credible explanations of human development as being the essence of 
developmentalism.  He argues that developmentalism “consists of the production of, 
and reliance on, explanatory statements concerning general natural regulation of 
changes in the human life-span” (1996, p. 51). 
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He, however, points out that these explanations are not always negative, but rather 
effected to serve a purpose within varied social and moral contexts.  In other words, 
if developmental accounts are treated as discourses, then it becomes imperative to 
consider the functional use of the account.  One conspicuous function, is that it can 
be used to perpetuate ideological control of children, further adults’ gain (see 
Guggenheim, 2005) or protect children from abuse or prosecution.  This, in essence, 
is developmental psychology’s contribution to the production and maintenance of 
the ideology of childhood. 
 
However, developmentalism, even in its hegemony, failed to suppress a number of 
dissenting voices; voices that emerged in the distant past and have continued to 
steadily increase both in volume as well as substance.  This theoretical strand is 
currently referred to as the critical psychology of development, or anti-
developmentalism.  Morss (1996) delineates four broad approaches to development. 
The key tenets of the four broad approaches to development will now be briefly 
considered.  This exercise will be useful as it would elucidate the changing nature of 
developmental discourse and the varying potency of its ideological influence. 
 
2.6.1 Traditional Psychology of Development 
Embedded within the positivistic epistemological framework, the traditional 
psychology of development espouses three key principles.  Firstly, it maintains a 
commitment to the experimental method whereby methods of generating knowledge 
were modelled on the physical sciences.  Secondly, it advances the notion of physis 
of development, i.e. naturalism and biology.  Thirdly, it is aligned to the 
functionalist arguments that perceive children as a constituent of society.  Here 
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development is seen as goal directed (i.e. becoming a functioning adult and hence 
maintaining the system) and the activity of children seen as an adaptation to a stable 
and functioning environment to ultimately advance the child’s integration into 
society.  This orthodox theory of development can essentially be considered to be 
positivist, naturalist and functionalist (Burman, 1994; Morss, 1996).  Morss (1996) 
further contends that traditional developmental psychology “sets itself the task of 
uncovering the universal and natural processes by which human infants are 
transformed into fully adapted adults” (p. 5). 
 
This theoretical strand is most clearly represented by stage theories of development, 
such as Freud and Erikson.  The greatest impact on contemporary notions of 
development is however typified in the work of Jean Piaget.  Piaget’s cognitive 
theory of child development is widely considered to be the most influential theory of 
development psychology, profoundly affecting contemporary understandings of 
child development.  Based on empirical work spanning six decades, his theory is 
essentially an integration of his two primary interests, that of biology and genetic 
epistemology, hence he specifically aimed his work at developing a theory of 
knowledge about cognitive development (Sternberg, 1999).   
 
2.6.2 The Social Context Approach 
The social context approach essentially emerged as a result of a measure of 
discontent towards traditional developmental accounts.  This progressive trend 
(Rogoff, 1990) advances social revisions to traditional accounts and as such 
acknowledges social and interpersonal contexts.  However, the developing 
biological child is still seen as central, with the social environment perceived as 
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providing a significant but secondary influence.  In other words, “the social nature 
of childhood is based on biological foundations” (Morss, 1996, p. 5).  The social 
context approach is exemplified in the work of the soviet psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky (Morss, 1996). 
 
2.6.3 The Social Construction Approach 
The author has previously outlined the social constructionist approach in the 
discussion of the ‘social child’.  With regard to the psychology of development, 
those from a social constructionist persuasion, held the social context approach to be 
theoretically inadequate (Morss, 1996).  They were especially critical of its inherent 
cognitive focus.  The social constructionist approach to development essentially 
foregrounded the interpersonal process through which meaning is negotiated, 
arguing that development is a product of these negotiated social processes.  
Furthermore, they argue for the historically relative status of childhood and 
development change.  Various works by Harre, Shotter and Gergen typify this 
approach (Morss, 1996).  As discussed earlier, the recent collection of theories 
referred to as the ‘new social science of childhood’ has made significant 
developments based on the social constructionist approach.   
 
2.6.4 Critical Psychology of Development 
The critical psychology of development is an emerging and significant trend in the 
human development discourse.  Key contributions to this approach were put forward 
in the edited publications by Henriques et al. (1984) and Broughton (1987) as well 
as individual contributions made by Burman (1994) and most notably by Morss 
(1996).  The critical psychology of development positions itself as a critical voice of 
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orthodox developmental explanation, essentially providing alternative explanations 
for orthodox developmental accounts. 
 
Henriques et al. (1984) initially set out to challenge the individual-society 
dichotomy.  They argued that such a dualistic analysis is unsatisfactory and that 
traditional psychology neglected society in favour of individualism.  The social 
context approach was also dismissed as inadequate since even their focus on the 
social context failed to challenge individualism.  The social construction approach 
experienced similar criticism, as they, even foregrounding negotiated interpersonal 
constructions still privileged the individual over society.  They were, however, 
cautious in adopting an approach that over invests in the direction of society.  
Henriques et al. (1984) essentially aspired to redefine the relations between 
individual and society.  To this end they advocate for a Marxist take on human 
development, a theoretical manoeuvre fully supported by Morss (1996).  
 
Broughton’s (1987) edited volume, Critical theories of psychological development, 
provides a systematic critique of the traditional developmental psychology based on 
the Marxist, psychoanalytic and post-stucturalist arguments.  In the opening chapter 
of the volume, Broughton (1987) herself launches a scathing attack against 
traditional development psychology and makes a strong case for the need for critical 
developmental psychology.  Like Burman (1994), Broughton contends that 
development is more than an academic discipline and has a hegemonic effect over 
society.  Key to her argument, is that she sees developmental psychology as a self-
confirming ideology devoid of any tradition of self-critique or critical self-
awareness.  She argues that critical developmental psychology strives to address the 
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unreflective world view of what constitutes development, with the primary task of 
reconstructing knowledge about human development in terms of its historical, social 
and political manifestation. 
It is not so much that developmental psychology is apolitical, asocial, or 
ahistorical, but rather that it is a discipline that has traditionally been 
political, social and historical in a presumptuous, self-deceptive, and 
oppressive way. (Broughton, 1987, p. 11) 
 
Morss’s (1996) contribution to the discussion is iconic.  His seminal publication, 
Growing Critical, examines contemporary development psychology from the 
vantage point of a critical analyst.  His treatise elucidates a number of 
epistemological dilemmas and theoretical inadequacies of both orthodox 
development accounts and contemporary alternatives such a social constructionism.  
Like Henriques et al., Morss (1996) suggests a turn to Marx, Foucault and Lacan as 
viable considerations for addressing the challenges precipitated by orthodox 
developmental psychology.  While Morss’s focus was initially on critical 
alternatives to developmental psychology, he inadvertently engages with, and 
elucidates critical issues in the theory of childhood and childhood studies in general.  
Epistemologically, his contentions, applied broadly, make a profound impact on 
contemporary notions of childhood.   
 
2.7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlined the various theoretical conceptualisations of childhood starting 
with more traditional understandings and progressing towards the more 
contemporary theses.  Presented more or less as a historical treatise the chapter 
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tracked the conceptualisation of children from incomplete and invalid citizens to 
active co-constructors of society.  Key to the initiation of this progression was the 
dissatisfaction among theorists regarding the uncritical absorption of traditional 
developmental theory into classic socialisation understandings of childhood.  An 
interesting conceptual move by Corsaro (2005), was to replace the troubled concept 
of socialisation with that of ‘interpretive reproduction’.  Interpretive reproduction 
explains children’s participation in society as active and innovative.  He argues that 
“children are not simply internalising society and culture, but are actively 
contributing to cultural production and change” (2005, p. 19, emphasis in original).  
This conceptual move is typical of the new direction of childhood studies and is 
epitomised in Prout and James’s (1997) radical contention that childhood should be 
perceived as a social construction.  Adopting a social constructionist position meant 
that childhood was no longer perceived in a finite form but rather as a set of actively 
negotiated social relationships determined by social, historical and cultural forces.  
These conceptual adjustments favour an understanding that move beyond 
constructions of children as passive recipients of socialisation and sets the 
epistemological tone and participatory methodological agenda moving forward.  
This is considered in Chapter Three and Chapter Four respectively.  
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CHAPTER THREE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two detailed the available literature relevant to the current study.  
Throughout the chapter a number of epistemological dilemmas emerged, initially 
implicitly, and thereafter rather explicitly.  It is not without prior design and 
contemplation that this chapter is a critical extension of the previous chapter, 
engaging with the various emerging epistemological dilemmas and considering 
appropriate epistemological vantage points.  Therefore, in this chapter, the 
epistemological positioning of the study is considered. 
 
Critical to this task, is engaging with the concept of ideology, which serves as the 
focal point of the epistemological positioning.  This chapter therefore proceeds with 
the theoretical consideration of the concept of ideology.  This will be followed by an 
engagement with appropriate epistemologies.  Whilst this chapter plots the route, 
and details the navigational protocol of the epistemological position, it is essentially 
a chapter on method and although philosophical tenets are engaged with, it is written 
with an ethos of pragmatism. 
 
3.2 Theorising Ideology 
Cognisant of the essence and ethos of this chapter, this section will not be an 
exercise in concept deconstruction, definition generation or a historical treatise.  It is 
important to note that the current study is premised on the bold supposition that the 
constructions of childhood are configured by ideology.  
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Even though there are a number of different views on the constituents and nature of 
ideology it is, however, necessary to theorise on which conception best helps us 
elucidate the ideological nature of childhood.  To this end, it is necessary to briefly 
review the most popular viewpoints.  The author is resisting the challenging 
temptation of attempting an integration of various viewpoints with the aim of 
producing a synthesis. 
 
The term ideology can be traced back to 1796 when Destutt de Tracy coined the 
term to refer literally to the science of ideas.  Since then, the term has enjoyed a 
somewhat circuitous journey, characterised by a vast array of interpretations and 
misinterpretations, to emerge in contemporary society with a multitude of meanings, 
undoubtedly inspired by its historical past. 
 
Therefore, when it comes to ideology, it is customary to offer a word of warning and 
to suggest a certain degree of caution.  McLellan (1986), for example warns that: 
“Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social science…it is an 
essentially contested concept, that is, a concept about the very definition (and 
therefore application) of which is acute controversy” (p. 1).  Similarly, Abercrombie, 
Hill and Turner (1980) contend that the concept of ideology “has given rise to more 
analytical and conceptual difficulties than almost any other in the social sciences” 
(1980, p. 187).  The inherent complexity of the concept is further outlined by Billig 
et al. (1988): 
Most social scientific concepts lack clear and precise definitions which are 
accepted by all theorists, and the concept of ideology has been 
particularly troublesome in this respect.  Different theorists have used this 
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concept in very different ways, whilst disputing each other’s intellectual 
right to do so; moreover the same theorists have often found themselves 
slipping into different meanings as they talk about ideology. (p. 25) 
 
Thompson (1990) further comments on the inherently ambiguous nature of ideology 
claiming that its multiplicity of meaning is related to its historical heritage as well as 
function.  The latter point refers to whether it is used descriptively (to describe a 
state of affairs) or prescriptively (to evaluate a state of affairs).  Recent attempts to 
reduce the ambiguity have seen the cessation of the prescriptive function.  This 
essentially means that the critical nature of the concept has been sacrificed.  
Thompson (1990) argues for the retention of the critical edge claiming that this 
serves to sustain focused attention on “clusters of problems” which ideology initially 
aims to elucidate. 
 
3.2.1 Billig 
Unlike Thompson (1990) Billig (see Billig, 1982; Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988) 
advocates for the disposal of the negative connotation of ideology.  They argue 
instead, that in order to reduce the complexity and ambiguity, it would be useful to 
elucidate the relationship between formal ideological systems and common sense.  
They make the distinction between ‘lived ideology’ and ‘intellectual ideology’.  
‘Lived ideology’ refers to the common sense representations incorporating the 
common-sense beliefs, values and social and cultural practices typical of society.  
‘Intellectual ideology’, refers to the formalised philosophical, political and religious 
systems which is the product of intellectuals.  Following Moscovici’s theory of how 
scientific discourse diffuses into common-sense social representations, Billig et al. 
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(1988) suggest that ‘intellectual’ ideology can in fact diffuse into ‘lived’ ideology.  
As the current study is merely interested in providing a commentary on the nature of 
ideology, documenting the entire path from ‘intellectual’ to ‘lived’ is beyond the 
scope of this study.  It is however prudent to consider, at a rudimentary level, how it 
is achieved.  Billig et al. (1988) put forward the dilemmatic conception of ideology 
which they distinguish from the ‘internal consistency’ conception.  It is the internal 
consistency theory which is typically subscribed to, with ideology conceived of as a 
mould which shapes the thoughts of its bearers.  As Billig et al. (1988) explains: 
Ideology is often seen to provide an internally consistent pattern so that 
thoughts, beliefs, values and so on fit together into the total mental 
structure.  There is a similarity between this conception of ideology and 
the psychological notion of cognitive schema… Accordingly, ideology is 
conceived to be some sort of giant, socially shared schema, through which 
the world is experienced. (p. 29) 
 
The dilemmatic conception, by contrast, foregrounds the contrary themes within and 
between ‘lived’ and ‘intellectual’ ideology. 
By assuming that there are contrary themes, a different image of the 
thinker can emerge.  The person is not necessarily pushed into unthinking 
obedience, in which conformity to ritual has replaced deliberation.  
Ideology may produce such conformity, but it can also provide the 
dilemmatic elements which enable deliberation to occur. (Billig et al., 
1988, p. 31). 
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Epitomised in the Marxist tradition of ideology, the internal consistency thesis has 
proved a popular conceptual point of departure.  Following is a brief explication of 
the Marxist take on ideology. 
 
3.2.2 Marx 
It is rather peculiar that even though Marx’s influence on ideology is profound, there 
is no widely accepted Marxist definition of ideology.  Throughout Marxist writings 
one could identify diverse, and sometimes contradictory, conceptualisations14
 
.  A 
starting point would be to elucidate Marx’s conceptualisation of society.  Marx 
proposed a base-superstructure model of society, with the base referring to the 
means of production and the superstructure, which is formed above the base, 
comprising the legal system, political system and religion.  The superstructure also 
houses the ideology.  Marx theorised that the base determines the superstructure.  
This effectively means that since the base is controlled by the ruling class, the 
superstructure including the ideology is controlled by the ruling class. As Marx 
argues, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”.  Ideology 
in this sense is used as an instrument to maintain social production by acting as a 
mechanism to legitimise society’s rules.   
It serves to obfuscate the exploitation of the disempowered groups, by advocating a 
common-sense belief that the ruling class’s interest is in everyone’s best interest, as 
well as by presenting the social relationships between classes and the production 
process as a natural state of affairs.  It is critical when reading ideology from a 
Marxist perspective to be acutely and continually aware of the base-superstructure 
                                                 
14 For example, see Barret (1991) who has identified six. 
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model of society.  In this sense, we are reminded that it is the materiality of human 
production that determines ideology, or as the now famous quote contends 
“consciousness can never be anything else but conscious existence, and the 
existence of men is their actual life process…Life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life”.   
 
Another way of reading the concept of ideology in Marxism is to perceive it as 
concealing the contradictions between the essence and appearance of society (see 
e.g. James, 2006).  Marx uses the concept of commodity fetishism to explain that 
there is a marked difference between the appearance and the essence of society.  
Marx argues thus: 
A commodity is a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character 
stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the 
producers to the sum total of their labour is presented to them as a social 
relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of 
their labour. (as cited in Mclellan, 1996, p. 14) 
 
What Marx is postulating, is that the cause of the fetishism is the nature of the 
production process.  What this means is that the actual value of the employees is 
worth more than the wage that they receive, as the employer is able to extract a 
surplus when the commodity is sold.  Thus in this instance, ideology is seen as 
“deriving from the (real) surface relations of capitalist society which served to 
conceal the fundamental relations of production” (Mclellan, 1996, p. 13).  Marx 
argues: 
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Everything appears reverse in competition.  The final pattern of economic 
relations as seen on the surface, in their real existence and consequently in 
the conceptions by which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to 
understand them, is very much different from, and indeed quite the 
reverse of their inner but concealed essential pattern and the conception 
corresponding to it. (as cited in Mclellan, 1996, p. 15) 
 
There is general, if not popular, consensus that Marx’s materialist conception of 
history is difficult to explicate.  It is subsequently axiomatic that Marx’s treatment of 
ideology that is concealed inside his materialist treatise is difficult to define 
precisely (Mclellan, 1996).  Furthermore, his notion of the concept was born within 
a number of crude manuscripts that outlined his broader social views.  It is therefore 
not entirely surprising that his treatment of the concept is not well-rounded and 
synthesised.  In that sense, Mclellelan makes the very salient point that “Marx’s 
treatment of ideology amounts much more to a cluster of brilliant insights than to a 
fully worked out theory” (1996, p. 17). 
 
The legacy of Marx’s influence on ideology is further outlined by the revision and 
additions to his conceptualisation effected by a range of other theorists who used his 
basic premises as their conceptual point of departure.   
 
3.2.3 Engels 
After Marx it was Engels that took up the mantle of further developing the 
materialist conception of history.  It was during this process that he advanced the 
concept of ideology.  It is in fact Engels who equated ideology with false 
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consciousness and not Marx as is commonly thought (Mclellan, 1996).  Engels 
wrote: 
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it 
is true, but with a false consciousness.  The real motive forces compelling 
him remain unknown to him; otherwise it would not be an ideological 
process.  Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces.  Because it is a 
process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure 
thought, either his own or that of his predecessors.  He works with mere 
thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product of 
thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source 
independent of thought; indeed this is matter of course to him because, as 
all action is mediated by thought, it appears to him to be ultimately based 
upon thought. (as cited in Mcllellan, 1996, p. 16) 
 
As Engels quite obviously related thought as detached from reality, he retained the 
negative conception of ideology inspired by Marx.  He further expanded on Marx’s 
base-superstructure notion of society by constructing a hierarchy of ideologies.  
Mclellan (1996) states that Engels considered ideologies such as religion and 
philosophy to operate at a much higher realm than, for example, politics and the law.  
In fact it appeared that the more removed they were from the base and the more they 
approached the superstructure, the more Engels considered them to be ideological 
(Mclellan, 1996). 
 
Marx’s popularisation of the concept of ideology spurned a great interest, both 
within Marxism as well as within the social sciences in general.  However, while 
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Marx’s conception of ideology favoured the critical, negative thrust of the concept, 
some theorists subsequent to Marx favoured a neutral conception of ideology. 
 
3.2.4 Gramsci 
Marx’s theory of ideology was further advanced through the work of Gramsci 
(1971).  Gramsci essentially accepted Marx’s analysis of capitalism, focussing on 
the ideological relations between the working and ruling class.  Gramsci’s 
theoretical contributions can be seen to operate at Marx’s level of the superstructure 
which he divided into two categories, which he referred to as coercive institutions 
and non-coercive institutions.  The former consists of the government, legal system 
etc, whilst the latter consists of the education system and schools, religious 
institutions, trade unions, cultural groups, political parties, the family, etc. 
 
Having considered and subsequently rejected Marx’s negative view of ideology, 
Gramsci’s conception of ideology can best be described as neutral.  He was 
specifically interested in expounding the nature of the differential power 
relationship, i.e. how it was formed, maintained and justified.  Gramsci was 
unconvinced about the Marxist conception of how the ruling class ruled.  He 
believed that no regime could sustain itself through coercive forces and that an 
understanding of subtle and pervasive forms of ideological control and manipulation 
served to perpetuate the dominant ideas (Burke, 1999).  In reaction, he put forward 
the notion of ‘hegemony’ which he used to explain how a system of values, attitudes 
and beliefs becomes shared and accepted within a society and justifies the status quo 
in power relations.  Burke (1999), citing (Boggs, 1976), subsequently defines 
hegemony as: 
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an organising principle that is diffused by the process of socialisation into 
every area of daily life.  To the extent that his prevailing consciousness is 
internalised by the population it becomes part of what is generally called 
common sense so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling 
elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (p. 3) 
 
The concept of hegemony therefore explains the ideological relationship between 
the ruling class and the working class masses in terms of generating a sense of 
socially shared understanding of how society should work.  Gramsci (1971) was 
however cognisant of the effort required in maintaining the ideologies.  He wrote: 
“The problem is that of preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc 
which that ideology serves to cement and unify” (1971, p. 328).  Thus, Gramsci’s 
theory also suggested a struggle and conflict over ideologies.  He argued that 
ideological domination was mediated by the fact that the working class had a dual 
consciousness reflecting both the ideas of the ruling class as well as common sense 
knowledge about the workers lived experience (Thompson, 1992).  This dual 
consciousness is the genesis of the hegemonic wars, where it now becomes possible 
for the working class to put forward their own ideologies.  It was essentially the 
roles of intellectuals within each class structure to do battle and build the ideologies.  
As Gramsci states: 
The intellectuals of the historically progressive class, in the given 
conditions, exercise such a power of attraction that, in the last analysis, 
they end up by subjugating the intellectuals of the other social groups; 
they thereby create a system of solidarity between all the intellectuals, 
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with the bonds of a psychological nature and often of a cast character 
(1971, p. 60). 
 
With Gramsci, Marx’s conception of ideology reaches its pinnacle, and an answer is 
provided to the conundrum of how capitalism has been able to rule and survive 
(Mclellan, 1996). 
 
3.2.5 Althusser  
With the work of the French philosopher, Althusser, the Marxist concept of ideology 
once again returns to its negative or critical roots15
In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between themselves 
and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation 
between them and their conditions of existence.  This supposes both a real 
relation and an imaginary lived relation (1969, p. 233) 
.  Using Marx, Althusser (1969, 
1971) located ideology within the Marxist base-superstructure model.  He however, 
proposed a conception of ideology as a set of dynamic practices wherein all classes 
actively contribute and participate (Gray, 2005).  Subsequently, Althusser rejected 
the notion of ideology as false consciousness, as well as any concept of ideology as 
a product of consciousness rather opting to foreground its function in society.  The 
essence of his approach is then functionally linking ideology to institutional contexts 
and everyday practices.  Ideology therefore, according to Althusser, is not an 
illusionary representation of reality but rather the means through which people relate 
to reality (Mclellan, 1996).  As Althusser argues: 
                                                 
15 Generally speaking this point is true.  However, Lorraine (1983) has shown how Althusser 
oscillates between a negative and positive conception. 
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He proposes that ideology has a material existence, located in material practices and 
apparatuses (Larraine, 1983). 
 
A key feature of Althusser’s (1971) approach is his concept of ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs) which he uses to explain how domination is developed, 
perpetuated and sustained in society.  The ISAs which include institutions such as 
the church, education system, political parties, legal system and the media, function 
to secure hegemony by assimilating the various classes in society within a dominant 
ideology (Thompson, 1992).  They function through a process called interpellation 
which is a functional term used to describe how people are addressed in society and 
given a particular identity, subjectivity or position in society (Thompson, 1992).  
Althusser believed that people are born into a particular ideology.  The individuals 
born within a particular ideology are, through the process of interpellation (in 
particular hailing), recruited as subjects of that ideology.  As Althusser cogently 
states “Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” (1971, p. 299).  It is through 
interpellation that people are hailed into participating in a form of ideology.  In the 
final analysis one can identify Althusser’s contribution to the theory of ideology as 
critical in exposing how hegemonic discourses, institutions and social practices 
function in a complex way to perpetuate consent and ultimately maintain 
domination.  As Fiske (1988) explains: 
For Althusser ideology is not a static set of ideas imposed upon the 
subordinate by the dominant classes, but rather a set of dynamic 
processes constantly reproduced and reconstituted in practice (p. 306) 
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3.2.6 Lenin 
From the outset, Lenin’s conceptualisation of ideology was decidedly neutral.  His 
conceptualisation was rooted in the dynamic between class interests and ideologies.  
In his analysis of the polarised political struggle in Russia, Lenin distinguished 
between the socialist ideology and the bourgeois ideology.  It was Lenin’s view that 
the critique of the dominant ideology of the ruling class appears as ideology too.  
Lenin focused on the ideology generated by the dominated.  He made further 
distinctions within the socialist ideology, identifying the working class 
consciousness on one level and the socio-democratic class consciousness of 
intellectuals on the other.  Lenin believed that the working class on its own are 
unable to develop an authentic socialist ideology and would remain trapped within 
the ideologies of the dominant group.  Following this logic, it is inaccurate to 
speculate that the ideas produced by the class are in the interest of the class.  Taking 
it a step further, the spontaneous consciousness of the working class does not 
necessary serve the interests of the working class.  Lenin argues that the spontaneous 
development of the working class movement leads to its becoming subordinated to 
the bourgeois ideology.  This is the classic definition of ideology emphasized in 
Marx’s epiphenomenal model.  However, the key distinction is that the ideologies 
are generated by competing classes.  Ideology, then refers to the ideas which 
delineate and advance the interests of the major classes engaged in conflict.  
 
3.2.7 Mannheim 
In Karl Mannheim we have the first systematic attempt, outside the Marxist tradition 
to advance a neutral conception of ideology.  Mannheim’s (1936) focus was not on 
theoretical Marxism, but rather on the interplay between social conditions and 
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knowledge production.  Mannheim acknowledges the multitude of meanings 
associated with ideology but suggests that if one peels away the layers two distinct 
forms of ideology emerge.  He distinguished between the particular and total 
conception of ideology.  The particular conception of ideology conceives of it as a 
concept that operates at the level of conscious disguises16
At first in the course of ever deepening disintegration naïve distrust 
becomes transformed into a systematic particular notion of ideology… the 
rising bourgeoisie which brought with it a new set of values was not 
content with merely being a circumscribed place within the old feudal 
order. (pp. 57 – 58) 
, deception and lies, 
whereas the total conception is concerned with collective thought systems which are 
related to social contexts. Longhurst (1989) further points out, that with the 
particular conception, only certain aspects of what the other is saying is doubted, 
depending in part on their social position, whilst with the total conception, the 
‘other’s’ entire conceptual framework is cast in doubt.  The total conception 
develops over time from the particular conception.  Mannheim believed that Marxist 
theory was critical in the transformation from the particular to the total conception of 
ideology.  The influence of the bourgeoisie is crucial (Longhurst, 1989).  As 
Mannheim (1936) contends: 
 
However, Mannheim believed that Marx’ total conception still retained some 
elements of the particular conception in as much as he focused on exposing and 
                                                 
16 Mannheim (1936) refers to the disguises existing on a continuum between conscious and what he 
refers to as half-conscious disguises.  While it is unclear if Mannheim is actually referring to the 
unconscious, the point is made that the particular conception is closely related to the common sense 
conception of a lie. 
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discrediting bourgeois expression.  Furthermore, Marx failed to subject his own 
theory to the critical process that he used for others.  Mannheim subsequently draws 
a further distinction within the total conception which he refers to as the special 
formulation and the general formulation.  Marx’s approach epitomises the special 
formulation in as much as he “does not call his own position into question but 
regards it as absolute, while interpreting his opponents ideas as a mere function of 
the social positions they occupy” (Mannheim, 1936, p. 68).  In contrast, “the general 
form of the total conception of ideology is being used by the analyst when he has the 
courage to subject not just the adversary’s point of view but all points of view, 
including his own, to the ideological analysis” (Mannheim, 1936, pp. 68-69).  Once 
the transition to the general formulation is achieved ideological analysis will no 
longer be viewed as an intellectual weapon but rather as method for social research 
which will allow for the indiscriminate analysis of all forms of thought.  Mannheim 
(1936) called this the sociology of knowledge. 
 
3.2.8 The Turn to Thompson:  Towards the Critical and the Discursive  
It is at this point in the academic exercise that the researcher is faced with a 
theoretical dilemma.  It would appear prudent not to conceptualise and 
operationalise the concept too narrowly, as one could then draw on various 
conceptualisations which subsequently allow for greater range and depth of 
theoretical explanations of the empirical data.   
 
A cursory reading of the above conceptualisations of ideology, lends support to the 
opening statement regarding the highly contested nature of the concept of ideology.  
Also, if one considers that the various conceptualisations are rooted in opposing 
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epistemological positions, it is axiomatic that attempting to provide an all 
encompassing definition of ideology would be an exercise in futility.  Even 
attempting to synthesise various conceptualisations may be construed as 
theoretically improbable.  Foster (1991) however, attempts an integration of the 
various conceptualisations.  Unfortunately his integration reads more like a list of 
key premises of the various theorists than theoretical integration.  As intimated 
previously, this can be expected.  Foster (1991) does, however, manage to provide a 
taxonomy of the theoretical commonalities.  He states that: 
Ideology is not merely a system of beliefs, values or ideas…is not merely a 
form of false consciousness of the real…is relatively autonomous 
terrain…involves or is closely interlinked with practice…and has a 
powerful emotional component. (p. 362) 
 
While integration will not be attempted in the current study, it is, however, 
necessary to operationalise the concept.  As an initial step, it would be useful to 
revisit typical delineations of the concept.  From the literature, it seems that ideology 
usually follows one of the following delineations.  The distinction could be made 
between Marxist and non-Marxist traditions.  This delineation includes various 
revisions of Marx’s original thesis, including but not restricted to Engels, Lukacs, 
Gramsci and Althusser and non-Marxist approaches as put forward by, for example, 
Mannheim.   
 
Alternatively, the distinction could be made according to whether the concept is 
conceived as positive, negative or neutral.  Whilst Marx was the key proponent of 
the negative or critical conceptualisation, the neutral conception was put forward by 
 
 
 
 
 94 
Mannheim (1936), while Billig et al. (1988), Gramsci (1971) van Dijk (1990), and 
others, further conceived ideology in a positive sense in as much as it could be 
functionally positive.  Billig et al. (1988) strongly favour a positive notion of 
ideology.  As previously intimated they argue for the dilemmatic approach, in 
contrast to an internal consistency approach, wherein a number of contrary themes 
create the possibility of ideology producing dilemmatic elements which induces 
deliberation. 
 
It is abundantly clear that the inherent complexity of the concept of ideology and the 
varied conceptualisations demands that one follows a particular theoretical strand, or 
risk losing the way.  The essence of the dilemma is that each version poses pertinent 
questions regarding the ideological status of childhood.  The decision ultimately 
determines how childhood is conceptualised.  If, for example, the inner consistency 
thesis is adopted, then childhood can be conceptualised as a structural category 
wherein the social actors of that category, i.e. children, helplessly conform to the 
dictates of that structure.  From a schema theory perspective, it would then be the 
child’s mental structure that is systematically biased to achieve this conformity.   
 
Following Althusser (1971), this conformity will be enhanced by the ideological 
state apparatuses which ensure that the social actors abide by the socially accepted 
values and belief systems.  However, it is not merely the act of acceptance that is 
significant.  If one looks at childhood for example, the child is not only the carrier of 
the belief system etc, but also acquires a set of associated behaviours, such as how to 
act in public, in school, with strangers etc.  The obvious result is a mutually 
influencing system between cognition and behaviours.  Important questions then 
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arise regarding whether these beliefs are socially shared or have they been actually 
socially constructed.  If they are found to be socially constructed, then what role 
does ideology play in its construction?  How is it internalised, or how does it 
become part of the cognitive structure? 
 
For the purpose of the current study and considering the broader epistemological 
framework of social constructionism, it was decided to adopt Thompson’s (1984; 
1990) formulation of the concept.  Thompson’s reformulation not only finds 
congruence with social constructionism but also with the methodological slant that 
the study works from.   
 
Thompson (1984) initially distinguishes between neutral and critical conceptions of 
ideology, which he then uses as a point of departure for the development of his 
view.  As previously stipulated, the neutral conception is characterised as merely 
one aspect of social life, not necessarily illusionary or associated with furthering the 
interests of one group at the expense of another.  By contrast, the critical conception 
conveys a critical or negative ethos typically associated with Marxist versions of 
ideology. 
 
Thompson (1984, 1990) is a strong proponent of the critical thrust, favouring an 
approach that foregrounds the negativity of ideology.  Subsequently, his 
conceptualisation of ideology draws strongly from the critical treatises.  He rejects 
the notions of ideology as a form of social cement and false consciousness, and 
subsequently puts forward the idea that ideology operates through language.  
Thompson’s focus is on how symbolic forms intersect with relations of power.  In 
 
 
 
 
 96 
other words, he is concerned with how meaning is constructed and mobilised in the 
social world to establish and sustain relations of domination (for both individuals 
and groups).  Thompson (1990) contends: 
…the concept of ideology can be used to refer to the ways in which 
meaning serves, in particular circumstances, to establish and sustain 
relations of power which are symmetrically asymmetrical… ideology 
broadly speaking, is meaning in the service of power (p. 7)    
 
In order to understand Thompson’s reformulation of ideology, four aspects require 
elaboration: the notion of meaning, the notion of symbolic forms, the concept of 
domination, and the interplay of meaning and power in the establishment and 
maintenance of domination.   
 
Meaning is concerned with the meaning of symbolic forms which are entrenched in 
a diverse range of social-historical contexts.  Symbolic forms refer to:  
a broad range of actions and utterances, images and texts, which are 
produced by subjects and recognised by them and others as meaningful 
constructs.  Linguistic utterances and expressions, whether spoken or 
inscribed, are crucial in this regard, but symbolic forms can also be non-
linguistic or quasi-linguistic in nature (e.g. a visual image, or a construct 
which combines images and words). (Thompson, 1990, p. 59) 
 
For Thompson, symbolic phenomena can be perceived as ideological phenomena.  
However, two conditions need to be met.  Firstly, they need to function to maintain 
relations of domination, and secondly, they need to operate within particular social-
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historical circumstances.  Thompson’s (1990) conceptualisation of domination refers 
to: 
when established relations of power are symmetrically asymmetrical, that 
is, when particular agents or groups of agents are endowed with power in 
a durable way which excludes, and to some significant degree remains 
inaccessible to, other agents or groups of agents, irrespective of the basis 
upon which such exclusion is carried out (p. 59). 
 
In an important diversion from classic Marxist conception of ideology, Thompson 
(1990) rejects the notion that domination exclusively refers to class relations.  He 
argues that while domination could refer to the inequality and exploitation between 
classes, it is paramount to also consider the inequality between sexes, cultures, 
ethnic groups, individuals and the state, and competing states. 
 
The fourth aspect, how does meaning function to establish and maintain relations of 
domination, is an important aspect of the current study.  Thompson proposes five 
strategies or ‘modes’ through which meaning functions, viz. legitimation, 
dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and reification.  In the context of the 
current study, it is paramount to detail each of these modes as well as provide an 
account of the strategies of symbolic construction that encompass these strategies.  
This task is embarked on below. 
 
Drawing extensively from the work of Max Weber, ‘legitimation’ refers to the 
representation of relations of domination as being inherently just and subsequently 
worthy of support.  Thompson’s (1984) focus is on how the symbolic forms lay 
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claim to legitimacy of these relations.  Thompson (1984), further citing Weber 
distinguished between three types of grounds on which these claims to legitimacy 
may be based: rational grounds (appealing to the legality of societal rules), 
traditional grounds (appealing to the sanctity of cultural traditions), and charismatic 
grounds (appealing to the character of the individual who exercises power and 
authority).  Claims based on the latter may be expressed in symbolic forms by using 
a range of symbolic strategies (Thompson, 1990).  One such strategy is referred to as 
‘rationalisation’, whereby social actors construct a symbolic form which follows a 
line of reasoning that ultimately legitimates and rationalises the nature of social 
relations.  Another strategy, ‘legitimisation’, suggests that institutional arrangements 
which serve the interests of certain individuals or groups are presented as serving the 
interests of all groups and individuals.  Finally, in narrativisation, claims are 
embedded in stories as well as cultural and historical narratives which serve to 
justify and legitimise the use of power by those who own and wield it and confirm 
subservience by those who do not (Thompson, 1990). 
 
The second method through which ideology operates is ‘dissimulation’, which refers 
to the way relations of domination are hidden, repudiated or obscured.  In this 
instance, ideology functions to avert the focus away from relations of domination.  
Dissimulation is achieved through three strategies viz. displacement, euphemization 
and trope.  Displacement refers to the strategy when a characterisation of one object 
or individual is used to refer to another, thereby transferring the negative or positive 
connotation of the one to the other.  In euphemization, actions, social actions and 
process, institutions or objects are redefined to elicit a positive sentiment.  Trope 
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refers to a cluster of terms that denotes the figurative use of language and symbolic 
forms (Thompson, 1990). 
 
The third unit of operation is ‘unification’ which refers to the symbolic construction 
of attributes, the foregrounding of common aspects and the denigration of differences 
with the aim of creating a collective identity amongst individuals.  Unification is 
achieved through the strategies of ‘standardisation’ and ‘symbolisation of unity’.  
‘Standardisation’ involves the adaptation of symbolic forms to a standard 
framework, which then become the socially accepted framework.  ‘Symbolisation of 
unity’ refers to the construction of symbols, which foster a sense of unity and 
collective identity (Thompson, 1990). 
 
The fourth modus operandi of ideology is ‘fragmentation’.  Contrary to unification, 
fragmentation involves fragmenting or dividing potential opposition or refocusing 
their gaze and energy towards a fabricated mutual enemy.  Here, the strategies of 
‘differentiation’ and ‘expurgation of the other’ are relevant.  ‘Differentiation’ implies 
foregrounding the distinctions and divisions between individuals and groups, 
perpetuating disunity and creating in-group and out-group symbolic forms.  
‘Expurgation of the other’ involves the creation of a false common enemy that 
requires collective resistance (Thompson, 1990). 
 
The fifth and final mode of operation of ideology is ‘reification’ which involves the 
representation of society as permanent and natural, but ahistorical.  Strategies of 
naturalisation, which involves representing social processes and characteristics as the 
outcome of natural progression, and eternalisation whereby phenomenon are relived 
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of the socio-historical essence and presented as permanent unchanging state of 
affairs, are pertinent (Thompson, 1990). 
 
3.3 Epistemological positioning 
It is axiomatic that this study lends itself rather closely to a social constructionist 
framework.  As a key position in contemporary (anti)developmental theory and the 
principal thrust within the sociological domain it would be appropriate to reiterate 
James and Prout’s (1997) contention that social constructionism has advanced into 
the most influential framework in contemporary studies of childhood. 
The social construction of childhood followed a trajectory similar to that of the 
general epistemological tradition of social constructionism, albeit at different times.  
However, it would not be inaccurate to lay claim that it received more widespread 
acceptance amongst theorists of childhood than it did in general circles of 
knowledge production.  In this section, the use of social constructionism as an 
overarching epistemological framework is considered. 
 
3.3.1 Social Constructionism: The obvious choice 
The term social constructionism, although a recent addition to the epistemological 
debate, with roots in postmodernism, has a myriad of theoretical sources, and can be 
traced back to Berger and Luckman’s (1966) “Social construction of reality” and 
Mead’s (see Reck, 1981) and Blumer’s symbolic interactionism.  In psychology, 
Gergen’s Social Psychology as History (1973) and the Social Constructionist 
Movement in Modern Psychology (1985) are usually credited as the initiation of the 
movement in the field.   
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Generally, social constructionism’s key concern was to provide an alternative to the 
positivist-empirical philosophy that characterised the knowledge production in the 
social sciences in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  In his seminal works, Gergen (1973, 1985) 
challenged that all knowledge, including psychological knowledge, are social and 
culturally situated, and that psychological inquiry should take social, historical, 
political and cultural life as its focus of investigation rather than the individual.  He 
argues that psychology should therefore cease its quest for ‘objective’ knowledge 
and its pursuit of elucidating the laws that determine experience and behaviour.  In 
lieu of the above, Gergen (1985) proposes that psychology should focus on the 
discursive practices that are used to construct the world.  While Gergen was leading 
the line in the US, others such as Harre, Secord and Shotter were initiating the 
European renaissance, similarly developing arguments that opposed positivistic and 
experimental based positions in social psychology (as cited in Burr, 2003). 
With its varied genesis, attempting to provide a single all encompassing definition is 
an extremely complex task.  While it is often referred to as a movement, others see it 
as a theory, a position, a theoretical orientation, an epistemology or a general 
movement (Stam, 2001).  Stam (2001) contends that at best it can be referred to as a 
general label denoting a series of positions with a diverse influence.  As there is 
clearly no single constructionist position, social constructionism is a difficult target 
for its critics, while simultaneously being a difficult movement for its followers and 
enthusiasts.  Hibberd (2005) probably provides the most general formulation of the 
function of social constructionism. 
…social constructionism emphasises the historicity, the context-
dependence, and the socio-linguistically constituted character of all 
matters involving human activity.  The psychological process of human 
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beings are…essentially social, and are acquired through public practice of 
conversation. (p. viii)  
 
Contemporary notions of social constructionism have often been simplified and 
differentiated into two broad dichotomous versions or schools of thought, often 
referred to as light/dark (Danzinger, 1997), weak/strong (Schwandt, 2003) or 
micro/macro (Burr, 2003) social constructionism.   
 
On the one end of the spectrum light, weak or micro-social constructionism, 
characterised by the work of Gergen, Harre, Shotter, Potter, Wetherell and Billig, 
focuses on the micro-structures of language use and favour a multiple reality version 
of the world where the constructive and situated function of language and discourse 
is foregrounded (Burr, 2003).  In this version, power is seen merely as an effect of 
discourse (Burr, 2003; Danzinger, 1997).  However, even within the micro-social 
constructionists, there are subtle and more profound differences between the 
proponents with some, most notably Gergen, favouring a more relativistic position 
than others.  Relativism asserts that there is no external reality outside of 
representations of it.  As multiple versions of the world and reality exist, no one 
account is ‘more’ true or real than the other.  This alignment to relativism has been 
the Achilles heel of social constructionism.  One of the most important reasons for 
this has been, according to Burr (2003): 
…the problematic nature of morality and political action that ensues from 
a relativist position…If all accounts of the worlds are equally valid then 
we appear deprived of defensible grounds for our moral choices and 
political allegiances. (p. 23) 
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Other trends within micro-social constructionism can be linked to discursive 
psychology.  Discursive psychology is concerned with the performative use of 
language with a particular focus on the use of discursive practices in the 
intersubjective creation of meaning.  While it favours an understanding of the 
constructive capability of language, its position is decidedly less relativistic than that 
of, for example Gergen, in that discursive psychologists do not deny the existence of 
internal mental states.  They in fact distance themselves from the ontological debate 
of what exists by ‘bracketing’ the issue.  As Potter (1996) states: 
I am certainly not trying to answer ontological questions about what sort 
of things exist.  The focus is upon the way people construct descriptions as 
factual, and how others undermine those constructions.  This does not 
require an answer to the philosophical question of what factuality is. (p. 6) 
 
The second version, the dark, strong or macro-social constructionism, while 
similarly focused on the constructive role of language, is concerned with the 
relations between power and social structures, social relations and institutionalised 
practices.  Largely influenced by the writings of Foucault, macro-social 
constructionists include proponents such as Hollway (1984), Parker (1992, 1999), 
Rose (1989, 1990) and Willig (1999).  As their focus is on issues relating to power, 
their research is often focused on elucidating how unequal power relations foster 
social inequality in society (Burr, 2003).  Foucault (1984) did, however, have a 
particular aversion towards the concept of ideology, especially the Marxist version.  
For Foucault, ideology is a mere effect of power and not the other way around.  In 
this sense, the concept of ideology would be inherently partial as it is tacitly 
assumed to be irreducible.  Foucault argues that ideology is always reducible to the 
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effects of a regulatory power (Thompson, 2010), and it is this function and 
productive capacity of power that he deems essential.  Foucault further believes that 
it is the relationship between power and discourse that constitutes knowledge and 
warrants our ontological pursuits and that ideology is a mere effect of the 
relationship.  This relegation of ideology to an effect or outcome variable is thus 
inappropriate for this project, wherein ideology is critically perceived as meaning in 
the service of power and which aims to reveal the ideological nature of childhood, 
i.e. how the meanings of childhood are constructed to establish and sustain relations 
of domination.  
 
Noting the above, in this study the author has opted to adopt a brand of social 
constructionism that is more in line with the discursive approach, favouring a micro-
social constructionism perspective, which is more concerned about the role of 
language and discourse in the construction of meaning. 
 
These two versions do, however, have a number of common themes to which they 
generally adhere.  Similarly Burr (2003) believes that the two versions should not be 
seen as mutually exclusive and points to the possibility of synthesising the two 
approaches, which have been attempted by Burkitt (1999), Burr and Butt (2000) and 
Davies and Harre (1990) (as cited in Burr, 2003).  Following is a synopsis of the 
commonalities between the two versions. 
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Anti-essentialism 
The first commonality that is typical to both approaches is that of anti-essentialism.  
Anti-essentialism is the notion that there are no essences that determine the nature of 
people or the world, i.e. there is no definable and discoverable nature that make 
people what they are (Burr, 2003). 
 
A critical stance toward taken-for-granted-knowledge 
A key tenet of all social constructionist approaches is its challenge to the notion that 
knowledge is based on objective observation of the world.  It therefore advances a 
critical stance towards taken-for-granted understandings of the world, which 
includes questioning how we perceive and categorise the social world (Burr, 2003; 
Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Gergen, 1985). 
 
Knowledge is the product of social processes 
Social constructionists contend that the world we experience is the product of social 
processes.  In other words, how we perceive things, how we understand the world is 
not derived from how the world really is but rather constructed by people during 
social interaction.  Cromby and Nightingale (1999) contend that, “it is the social 
reproduction and transformation of structures of meaning, conventions, morals and 
discursive practices that principally constitutes both our relationships and ourselves” 
(p. 4).  The role of language in constructing the world therefore becomes paramount. 
 
Knowledge and social action 
The claims that “knowledge and social action go together” (Burr, 2003, p. 5) and 
that “knowledge is inextricably linked to, and emerges as a product of, activity and 
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purpose” (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999, p. 5) point to the close relationship between 
knowledge and social action.  It is through negotiated social interaction that people 
construct the world around them.  However, not one perspective or truth but rather 
multiple truths are constructed, each with their own associated social action.  For 
example, the concept of childhood was previously constructed as a phase of 
development wherein children were characterised as incomplete human beings.  This 
construction of childhood was associated with various social actions that facilitated 
this construction which, notwithstanding the issue of power relations, included 
amongst others, the education system and child-rearing practises.  Another 
construction of childhood portrays children as innocents in need of protection.  In 
this instance, decisions regarding children were effected within the framework of 
children’s rights and child liberatory discourse and action.  Noting the above, it is a 
short step to concur with Burr (2003) who subsequently argues that constructions of 
the world are bound up within existing power relations.  It would then not be 
inaccurate to infer a dialectical relationship between power relations and common-
sense constructions.  
 
Historical and cultural specificity 
As Burr (2003) states, “the ways is which we commonly understand the world, the 
categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific” (pp. 3-4).  
This means that how we perceive and understand the world is contingent on where 
and when one lives.  Burr (2003) further argues that knowledge should therefore be 
seen as products or artefacts of that culture and history.  It follows then that it would 
be erroneous to place a premium on one type of knowledge, or understanding, over 
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the other, or even to presume that certain types of knowledge are closer to the truth 
than others. 
 
As stipulated, the above four premises are common to all forms of social 
constructionism.  A closer reading of these suggests that there are two key themes 
that implicitly emerge which most social constructionists, or various forms of social 
constructionism would subscribe to with disparate levels of intensity, gradation and 
enthusiasm.  These are considered thus. 
 
The first theme is that of multiple perspectives.  From an ontological position, social 
constructionism is concerned with the construction of meaning and not truth.  Social 
constructionism holds that there can be no one absolute truth and favours a view that 
there exists multiple truths.  Generally within social constructionism, this ‘truth 
nihilism’ has its roots in the often made claim that there is no relation between 
words and the world, referred to as external reference or referential (in its adjectival 
form)   (Hibberd, 2005).  The point is that language does not have a representational 
function, i.e. language does not represent or mirror reality.  The focus is therefore on 
the function of talk within particular contexts and traditions and not the truth or 
falsity of the statements.   
 
The second theme concerns the function of language.  Social constructionists hold 
that language is both a precondition for thought and a form of social action.  Within 
psychology there exists a polarised view of the relationship between thought and 
language.  While traditional psychology perceives language as an expression of 
thought (the aforementioned referential view), others, such as discursive psychology 
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and social constructionism in particular, hold a resolute view that language is in fact 
a precondition for it.  Burr (2003), for example, claims that our understanding of the 
world does not transpire from our perception of objective reality but from the 
conceptual frameworks and categories used by others within specific socio-cultural 
contexts.  In other words, humans are born into a pre-existing conceptual reality 
with pre-existing categories that provide a framework of meaning for them.  As 
access to this framework is provided by language, one can argue that language is a 
precondition for thought.  However, some constructionists extend the argument 
claiming that language is in fact a form of social action.  This focus on the 
performative use of language is based on the notion that language has practical 
consequences.  As Burr (2003) argues: 
When a judge says, ‘I sentence you to four years imprisonment’, or when 
a priest says, ‘I pronounce you man and wife’, certain practical 
consequences, restrictions and obligations ensue. (p. 8) 
 
The major implication of adopting this notion of language is that what we 
understand to be human, i.e. our personalities, emotions, motivations etc, are 
contingent on and structured by language.  Burr (2003) claims that the “way that 
language is structured therefore determines the way that experience and 
consciousness is structured” (p. 48).  However, social constructionists in general, 
and Gergen (1999) in particular, argue that it is important to remain cognisant of the 
fact that language is a social phenomenon.  The conceptual implications, especially 
with regard to the implication for meaning follow. 
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The conceptualisation of language as a social phenomenon, at a most basic level, 
points to the notion that the world is constructed during social interactions.  This 
essentially means that how we understand the world is dependent on human 
interchange concerning “agreements or rules of interpretation shared within 
particular communities” (Misra, as cited in Hibberd, 2005, p. 23).  Gergen (1999), 
drawing strongly on the work of Wittgenstein, similarly puts forward the relational 
account of meaning, claiming that meaning is located in relations between 
communities of interlocutors and not within the individual’s head or even within the 
actual utterance.  Furthermore, the meanings of words and concepts are never 
permanent but rather indeterminate and contingent on specific contexts wherein it is 
used.  The indeterminate thesis draws largely from the hermeneutic tradition of 
Gadamer (1994) whose central argument is that meaning is not fixed but is derived 
through interpretation from within a particular ‘horizon of understanding’.   
 
Closely linked to the indeterminate thesis is the question of context.  Social 
constructionists are generally in agreement that the meanings of words are context-
dependent and intricately tied up to the specific context wherein it is used.  With 
meaning being contestable, language becomes sites of variability, conflict and 
struggle where power relations are contested (Burr, 2003).  Applied to the concept of 
childhood, the meanings of childhood are constructed during social exchanges, are 
not universal, and are contingent on the specific context.  Following the above 
conceptualisation, a number of questions emerge.  For example, with regard to the 
social exchanges: who are the participants in these exchanges?  More specifically, 
are the exchanges between adults, between adults and children, between children 
themselves or between institutions?  What is the nature of these exchanges?  Are the 
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interlocutors equal contributors during the exchanges or are there distinct levels of 
status and power? 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlined the epistemological positioning of the current study.  The 
concept of ideology which is the focal point of the study and subsequently a key 
determinant of the position adopted is also considered.  Noting its tumultuous 
genesis, the concept of ideology has emerged in contemporary society with a 
multitude of definitions and meanings.  With this came an array of functions, some 
positive, while others are negative with critical intent.  Noting the diverse 
conceptualisations and theoretical positions of various proponents of ideology, it is 
clear that the concept is highly contested in the social sciences.  Reconciling this 
with the epistemology of social constructionism is an extremely complex task, 
specifically noting that social constructionism is itself highly contested and going 
through a renaissance of sorts.  Encapsulated in the work of Cromby and 
Nightingale (1999), Hibberd (2001a; 2005), Liebrucks (2001) and Willig (1999) 
amongst others, this debate with the relativism/realism dichotomy as its key point of 
contestation, culminated in a heated debate documented in a special edition of the 
Theory and Psychology, 11(3) in 2001.  In this study, the author has opted to adopt a 
brand of social constructionism that is more in line with the discursive approach, 
favouring a micro-social constructionism perspective, which is more concerned 
about the role of language and discourse in the construction of meaning and less 
concerned about the ontological debates about the nature and existence of reality. 
This is also consistent with Thompson’s (1984, 1990) conception of ideology i.e. 
how meaning is discursively constructed and mobilsed in the social world to 
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establish and sustain relations of domination.  To reconcile this position with 
Thompson’s concept of ideology, the author employed an ontological realist 
position, also referred to as critical realism.  An explanation of the constituents of 
this position as well as its implications is taken up in Chapter Six and Chapter 
Seven.  The next chapter details the method.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three outlined the key philosophical underpinnings of the current research 
study, delineating the specific epistemological framework of the study as well as 
deliberating on various epistemological dilemmas that emerged during the course of 
the study.  It clearly emerged that when researching children and childhood, one is 
inherently faced with a gamut of epistemological challenges.  As the epistemological 
position of a study is inherently linked to the method, these challenges have 
methodological implications.  This chapter presents the method and engages with 
these implications. 
 
4.2 Design 
In accordance with the aims, objectives and epistemological orientation of the study, 
a qualitative methodological framework will be followed17
 
.  Concordantly, the 
sampling, data collection methods and analysis will be consistent with this 
framework.  The study further advances the child participation model as the 
methodological point of departure.   
As intimated on various occasions in this study, a key theoretical constraint in 
childhood studies is the historical lack of genuine research interest in children and 
childhood. With children seen as incomplete adults, constituting a passive role in 
society, and childhood merely as a preparatory phase for adulthood, effectively 
                                                 
17 It is unnecessary to enter into a polemic regarding the two main research traditions.  However, the 
design does demonstrate conceptual synergy between the aims, theoretical perspective and 
methodology.  Furthermore the epistemological framework, which is clearly articulated in this 
document, warrants a qualitative approach. 
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translated into lack of empirical consideration.  The subsequent result is an area of 
study that lacks a methodological heritage.  
 
The notable exception to the above contention was the experimental method 
engendered by traditional developmental psychology.  Even then, developmental 
psychology was primarily focussed on the attainment of adulthood (see Chapter 
Two).  The way research relates to its subject is related to the way the concept under 
investigation is theorised.  The dominant conception of childhood was that of 
‘development’ (Woodhead & Faulkner, 2000), with methods imported directly from 
the positivistic disciplines.  Invariably it was these methods, based on controlled 
experimentation and the quest for universal laws that contributed to the 
objectification of the child.  It would then appear that the reverse is also true; the 
way a concept is theorised is related to the way the concept is researched. 
 
With the emerging interest in the role of children in society in the 1960’s, 
quantitative initiatives, grounded within the positivist tradition, were historically 
placed to get the methodological ball rolling.   
 
An examination of early initiatives in childhood research suggests that childhood 
and children’s lives have been exclusively explored via the knowledge and 
understanding of adults (Christensen & James, 2000).  In this sense one can identify 
two factors that stand out as most critical.  Firstly, the notion that children have not 
been made the unit of analysis, and secondly, that research has not taken children’s 
perspectives into consideration (Knuttson, 1997; Qvortrup, 1994; September, 2002). 
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Early research tended to locate children’s empirical position within structures such 
as the family, school and community.  Public statistics for example, generally tended 
to collect data on the state of families, school and community with child data having 
to be extrapolated from these units (Qvortrup, 1994).  This relegation of children to 
secondary units is a direct result of common sense construction and 
conceptualisation of children as incomplete social actors.  Qvotrup (1994) argues: 
The statistical treatment of children as well as their representation in 
other accounts from political bodies reflect the position children generally 
hold in both society and adult imagery – that of dependents. (p. 7) 
 
Qvortrup (1994) further argues that the central issue behind using children as the 
unit of analysis is to elucidate children’s position in society.  Thus, to reiterate what 
was mentioned previously, there seems to be a model of cyclical influence between 
children represented conceptually, empirically and their position in society.  
Essentially then, Qvortrup argues, that it is not only important to have information 
on e.g. the number of children in the family, but also the amount of siblings that the 
child has.  In other words, one needs to look at the context from the vantage point of 
the child.  The next logical step, methodologically speaking, is to grant children a 
valid voice in research (Flekkøy & Kaufman, 1997). 
 
This notion that children should be granted a valid voice in research is not an appeal 
for the exclusive implementation of qualitative methodologies, as is often thought.  
Rather, the argument is that children be repositioned as subjects rather than objects 
of research.  Christensen and James (2000) have postulated on the complexity of 
effecting this methodological shift.   Firstly, they argue it requires a paradigm shift 
 
 
 
 
 115 
in what constitutes valid knowledge.  This is an epistemological endeavour.  
Secondly, it requires a simultaneous conceptual shift in acknowledging children as 
valid social actors and informants and thus suspending alignment to traditional 
developmental theory.  This is a theoretical and conceptual endeavour and in effect, 
means subscribing to the new sociology of childhood as the conceptual and 
theoretical basis of childhood research.  From a methodological perspective, 
Hendrick (2000), commenting on the historical method, highlights three 
contingencies of effecting this conceptual shift.  He argues that children should be 
acknowledged as being capable of social action; the areas in which children are 
socially active should be identified and adults need to acknowledge being in a 
relationship with them.  Thirdly, Christensen and James (2000) argue that it requires 
a critical scrutiny and revision of traditional methods of research with children.  This 
is the methodological endeavour.    
 
The crucial question then arises: How do we translate the theory into practice?  Or 
put more specifically: How do we develop appropriate research methods based on 
the new theoretical understanding of childhood.  Roberts (2000) highlighting the 
important relationship between theory and practice, rightly cautions that the 
paradigmatic shift should ensure that the research process as well as the outcomes 
are of genuine value and benefit for children.  This raises another consideration that 
is intricately linked to research with children, that of research ethics.  This issue will 
be taken up later. 
 
A good starting point for the above questions is put forward by O’Kane (2000) who 
questions the appropriateness of using existing research methodologies and ethical 
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positions, initially designed for adults, on childhood research.  The initial treatise on 
the new sociology of childhood was not without a methodological arm, proffering 
the ethnographic method as being most appropriate.  Later, Christensen and James 
(2000), however, argued that research with children does not necessitate the use of 
particular child specific methods nor should it privilege one technique over another.   
They argue thus: 
As in all research, what is important is that the particular methods chosen 
for a piece of research should be appropriate for the people involved in 
the study, its social and cultural context and the kinds of research 
questions that have been posed. (Christensen & James, 2000, p. 2) 
 
In lieu of prescribing a dedicated method for conducting research with children the 
idea is then rather to foster working relationships, where children are considered a 
vital part of the research process and subsequently encouraged to participate.   
In research with children, forming relationships in which children feel 
that they want to participate throughout the research process is 
particularly important in order to keep up a continuing dialogue over 
which children, as well as researchers feel that they have control. 
(Christensen & James, 2000, p. 5) 
 
Their contention touches on a number of important considerations.  Firstly, it asks 
important questions about the role of children in the research process.  Should 
children be seen as objects, subjects or participants?  Secondly, it also elucidates the 
power relationship that is inherent between researcher and researched and how this 
relationship is exacerbated in childhood studies.  How to negotiate this power 
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imbalance and create space and opportunities for children to engage in a meaningful 
way is ultimately the most pressing methodological challenge in childhood studies 
(Morrow & Richards, 1996; O’ Kane, 2000).  At a methodological level, it is this 
relationship that further perpetuates the ideological construction of childhood.  So 
while it is logical to concur with Christensen and James (2000) regarding the 
application of a dedicated research method for childhood research, it is equally 
important to engage in a process of repositioning the subject.  How this 
repositioning takes place at the level of epistemology has been discussed in the 
previous chapter.  An option for the repositioning at the level of methodology is 
presented below. 
 
4.2.1 Child Participation: A new trend in research with children  
A developing trend in child research is the realization of children’s agency in 
research (Pole et al., 1999).  This contention is demonstrated by the following two 
extracts. 
We should make use of these different abilities rather than asking 
children to participate unpracticed in interviews or unmasked in 
surveilling gaze.  Talking to children about the meanings that they 
themselves attribute to their paintings or asking them to write a story… 
allows children to engage more productively with our research questions 
using their talents which they, as children, possess. (James, 1995, as cited 
in O’Kane, p. 140) 
 
In addition, O’Kane (2000) argues that: 
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In recognizing both the biological and structural conditions which 
structure children’s lives, we need to develop communication strategies 
which engage children, build upon their own abilities and capabilities, 
and allow their agenda to take precedence.  The use of participatory 
activities does precisely this. (p. 140) 
 
These extracts are specifically referring to both the acknowledgement of children as 
valid informants and participants in the research process, and the subsequent shift 
towards soliciting their knowledge, opinions, attitudes and perceptions on matters 
that affect them.  When applied to a developmental context or research strategy, this 
‘agency’ is often referred to as child participation  The advantages of adopting a 
child participation approach in the research environment is that it facilitates dialogue 
with children on a range of complex and abstract issues (O’Kane, 2000); addresses 
the power imbalance and subsequently increases the child’s confidence which in 
turn facilitates the collection of more in-depth data (Sapkota & Sharma, 1996); 
reduces the constraining influence of age as a determining construct of children’s 
ability (Solberg, 1996); facilitates enhanced engagement of children with the 
research process (James, 1995, as cited in O’Kane, 2000); and is less invasive and 
more transparent (O’Kane, 2000).  Ultimately these motivations all point to 
increasing the ecological validity of the research.   
 
Participation also has a number of potential developmental and educative benefits.  
Nagel (1987) for example, believes that the process of participation itself could lead 
to intrinsic benefits such as enhanced self-worth and a heightened level of 
community identity.  He further contends that participation could contribute to the 
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development of new values, knowledge, attitudes, skills and beliefs.  Flekkøy and 
Kaufman (1997), however, do not view these benefits within the role of children as 
future adults but rather as contemporary and valid social actors.  They therefore 
point to the potential of participation to ultimately contribute to democratic values 
within society. 
 
A further rationale is put forward by Alderson (1995) who postulates that 
participation techniques have the potential to resolve a number of ethical issues in 
research with children.  Generally, this resolution refers to the fact that participation 
techniques enable children’s voices, interests and needs to be articulated and given 
preference over adults’ research agenda (O’Kane, 2000), and specifically to the fact 
that children are permitted to set the research parameters and direct both discussions 
and interpretation. 
 
The trend towards child participation can be directly related to the increased 
acknowledgment that children are valid social actors in their own right.  This has 
been fuelled by the growing emphasis and subsequent social interest on children’s 
rights, especially with regard to affording children their participation rights as 
enshrined in Article 12 of the CRC (United Nations General Assembly, 1989).  
Article 12 (p. 50) provides children with the right to express their opinion on all 
matters which affect them: 
1. State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his 
or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the view of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child 
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2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with 
the procedural rules of national law. 
 
Similarly Article 13 (p. 50) provides the right to freedom of expression: 
1. The child shall have the right of freedom of expression; this right 
shall include the right to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s 
choice 
2. The exercise of this right might be subject to certain restrictions… 
 
Furthermore, the new Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005) makes similar claims of 
participation rights: 
Every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to 
be able to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to 
participate in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must 
be given due consideration. (p. 34) 
 
Even a cursory look at the above pieces of legislation confirms the changing 
conceptions and position of children in society.  However, while one can concur 
with regard to the influence exerted by legislation and human rights instruments in 
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advancing participation, this trend is also to some extent, the methodological 
outcome of the epistemological turn to social constructionism.   
 
Child participation is best defined as the process whereby children actively 
contribute to and share in all decisions that affect their lives as well as the 
communities they live in (UNICEF, 2003). In The State of the World’s Children 
2003, UNICEF underscores the obligation of states parties to ensure child 
participation and cautions that failure to do so will result in “a world of young adults 
who do not know how to express themselves, negotiate differences, engage in 
constructive dialogue, or assume responsibility for self, family, community and 
society” (p. 4). The report also emphasizes the need to help children develop the 
skills of participation and to create ‘opportunities for meaningful participation’ 
(Willenberg et al, 2006). 
 
Despite the near universal ratification of the UNCRC, there is still a predominant 
culture of non-participation by young people (Mathews, Limb & Taylor, 1999).  In 
South Africa, there are few structured opportunities and forums for young people to 
engage in discussions regarding their well-being.  Mathews et al. (1999) believe that 
there are three key factors that contribute to this culture of non-participation.  Firstly, 
the dominant, common-sense discourses question the appropriateness of children’s 
involvement.  Secondly, children are largely perceived to lack the relevant 
competence to provide any meaningful level of participation.  Thirdly, there still 
exists controversy about the form and desired outcomes of participation.  Lansdown 
(1995) similarly noticed a general reluctance in adult society in assenting to children 
meaningfully participating in society. 
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Some authors, such as Alderson (2000) believe that the right to express a view is the 
most important participation right for children.  Others, such as Melton (1999) and 
Smith (2000) argue that simply expressing a view may not be enough.  Melton 
(1999) argues that freedom of expression becomes a redundant exercise without 
access to information and the educational opportunities.  Smith (2000) on the other 
hand, questions adults’ perceptions and acknowledgment of children’s views and 
whether they would stimulate action from adults for the realization of the 
participation rights.   
 
Arguing for a children’s policy that promotes child participation, Melton (1999) 
makes two further important points.  Firstly, he puts forward the notion of shared 
decision making.  He argues that since matters affecting children usually involve the 
vested interest of multiple parties, structures and processes should be developed to 
promote shared decision making.  It is important, however, at this juncture to again 
point out that even these structures and processes themselves need to be developed 
in a participatory process.  Further, as was argued earlier, these structures become 
redundant enterprises if children are not acknowledged as valid and competent social 
actors.  Thomas (2000) in fact speaks of a ‘presumption of competence’ as the 
overarching factor when working with children.  Concordantly, when conducting 
research with children the idea would be to foreground children’s participation, 
especially in terms of methodological issues but also with regard to the actual 
empirical focus of the endeavour.   
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Melton’s (1999) second point is that children’s interests are best served by 
‘graduated decision making’18
 
.  What Melton is suggesting, is that children 
participate in a task or decision but only assume full autonomy or independence 
through a graduated process based on the acquisition of relevant experience.  This 
essentially bridges the gap between children and adult society and sets the scene for 
shared decision making.  Formalising this suggestion and ‘selling’ it to society is 
probably the primary concern.  Cultural influences would probably be a key factor 
to consider in this regard.  Hart (1997), in fact emphasises the importance of the 
notion culture in children’s participatory initiatives.  He believes that it is paramount 
to build a strong sense of cultural identity within children.  Projects with children, 
from disadvantaged (disenfranchised) areas, that work from this premise invariably 
end up elucidating the historical genesis of social realities.  This process could 
contribute in fundamental ways to the development of the child’s social identity. 
When used within a research context, it is important to point out that the author is 
not referring to children who merely participate as research subjects during the data 
collection process, but rather children who actively and meaningfully participate by 
making valid contributions at various stages of the research process.  Pretty (1995) 
similarly cautions against the mechanical application of participation as a technique 
or method.  This view is further enhanced by O’Kane’s (2000) contention that “the 
successful use of participatory techniques lies in the process, rather than simply the 
techniques used … the genuine use of participatory techniques requires commitment 
                                                 
18 Zimring (as cited in Smith, 2000) puts forward the idea of ‘learners permits’ that incrementally 
allows for full independence of children.  Similarly, Rogoff’s ‘apprenticeship’ and Wood, Bruner and 
Ross’s ‘scaffolding’ are concepts based on Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development that explicate 
graduated decision making (as cited in Smith, 2000).  
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to ongoing processes of information sharing, dialogue, reflection and action” (2000, 
p. 138, emphasis added). This means that child participation as a methodological 
strategy not only allows for the elucidation of children’s voices but sanctions, in a 
collaborative relationship, full access to children’s lived experiences of the real 
world. 
  
A cursory look at Hart’s (1992, 1997) metaphorical ladder of participation, which he 
uses to demonstrate eight different levels of participation, provides an explanation to 
the above arguments.  Adapting Arnstein’s (1969) model of citizen participation, 
Hart posits that the first three rungs of the ladder denote non-participation while the 
five upper levels denote genuine participation characterised by increasing degrees of 
child initiation and participation.   
 
Within the research environment, the above conceptualization of child participation 
as a methodological strategy, has gained a significant following over the past years, 
fuelled in part by the success of the realization of participation exercises in 
development initiatives.  For example, children have been actively involved in 
community development and environmental care (see e.g. Hart 1997, Swart-Kruger, 
2001); creating child-friendly environments (see e.g. Horelli, 1998), public decision 
making (see e.g. Partridge, 2005) and developing indicators of child well-being (see 
Savahl et al., 2006; September & Savahl, 2009; Willenberg et al, 2006).  
Furthermore, Horelli (1998) evaluated children’s participation in the creation of 
child friendly environments in three European cities.  Her findings lend support to 
the notion that children should be regarded as active citizens and ultimately indicate 
a progression towards a more ecological and socially supportive setting that fosters 
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intergroup involvement.  Horelli (1998) did however identify a discrepancy between 
children’s knowledge and expertise and the organizational and institutional capacity 
of local authorities to respond appropriately.  She therefore argues that the effective 
participation of children is contingent on a number of factors.  These include the 
institutionalization of appropriate tools for participation, as well as the support, both 
institutional and ideological, of schools, municipalities, local government and the 
state, which should advance the agency and space of children and young people.   
 
More recently, Partridge (2005) investigated the potential of children and young 
people’s participation in public decision making.  Whilst she concluded positively 
with regard to the creativity and depth of the children’s contribution, she similarly 
acknowledged the challenges in terms of addressing the existing power relations 
between adults and children, and deep seated notions of children’s role in society.   
Furthermore, the edited publication “Stepping Forward” (Johnson, Ivan-Smith, 
Gordon, Pridmore & Scott, 1998) has documented a number of initiatives that have 
implemented the child participation approach as the methodological point of 
departure.  The above mentioned efforts operate from the premise that children have 
a legislative right to express a view on matters that affect them (Chawla & Heft, 
2002) and that children are valid and competent social actors (Prout & James, 1997).   
 
Translating the above theoretical underpinnings of child participation into practice, 
the current project followed the ensuing key principles. 
i) Relinquish top down view of knowledge generation 
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ii) Acknowledge children as valid and competent social actors and 
constructors of knowledge and subsequently acknowledge their 
constructions as valid and meaningful 
iii) Children should be perceived as participants in research 
iv) Children should play an active role in the development of the research 
design 
 
4.3 Participants 
The study was conducted in the Western Cape.  The total sample consisted of 56 
thirteen19
 
 year old children selected from a total of three schools in rural and urban 
geographical locations.  The motivation for using this age group was the following:  
Firstly, they are still embedded in childhood in terms of developmental theory.  
Secondly, they are legally regarded as children in terms of the South African 
Constitution (1996), The Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005) and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child which was ratified by the South African 
Government.  Thirdly, this age group is at a developmental stage of systematic 
reasoning with the capacity for abstract thought and formal operations (Louw, & 
Louw, 2007; Piaget, as cited in Papalia & Olds, 1992) and the ability to debate, and 
critically engage with complex concepts and to present their ideas, opinions and 
feelings in an articulate and conceptually elaborated manner (Papalia & Olds, 1992). 
                                                 
19 At the commencement of the data collection all the participants were 13 years old. However, the 
data collection scheduled spanned over a period of five months and eight of the participants turned 14 
years old during that period. 
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The participants of the study were selected using purposive or theoretical20 
sampling.  Since the aim of qualitative research is not to generalise to the broader 
population (Mouton, as cited in Stevens, 1996), purposive sampling is an acceptable 
sampling technique in qualitative research and in the current context ensured 
inclusion of children from across all demographics as well as lowered the possibility 
of attrition21
means selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their 
relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position… and 
most importantly the explanation or account which you are developing… 
it is concerned with constructing a sample which is meaningful 
theoretically, because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which 
help to develop and test your theory and explanation. (p. 94) 
.  Mason (1996) further argues that purposive (or theoretical) sampling: 
 
The schools included in the study were purposively selected from a sampling frame 
of nine schools.  These nine schools formed part of a research contractual 
arrangement and subsequently afforded the researcher unproblematic access to 
children of the required age.  Once the sampling frame was established three schools 
were purposively selected from the sampling frame.  The primary motivation for the 
final selection of the three participating schools was that they offered access to 
children from different racial, cultural, language and social class backgrounds.  The 
sample reflected equal gender composition, while the cultural, racial and language 
disparities reflected the geographical realities.  The actual participants were also 
                                                 
20 ‘Theoretical sampling’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘purposive sampling’.  
21 Since the study follows a longitudinal series of focus groups, participant attrition was an important 
variable to consider. 
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purposively selected in collaboration with the schools’ life skills teachers.  
Additional inclusion criteria included: perceived reliability, enthusiasm, willingness 
to participate and commitment.  The participants were drawn from two urban and 
one rural location.  Following is a description of each group: 
Group 1 consisted of 8 children residing in the Kuilsriver area and attending an Ex-
Model C22
Group 2 consisted of eight children residing in the Kuilsriver area and attending a 
previously disadvantaged public school.  These children typically reside in the less 
affluent designation of Kuilsriver. 
 high school.  These children typically reside in the more affluent 
designation of Kuilsriver. 
Group 3 consisted of eight children residing in the rural area of Genadendal and 
attending a previously disadvantaged public school.   
Group 4 consisted of eight children residing in the rural area of Genadendal and 
attending a previously disadvantaged public school.   
Group 5 consisted of eight children residing in the township of Parkwood and 
attending a previously disadvantaged public school. 
Group 6 consisted of eight children residing in the township of Parkwood and 
attending a previously disadvantaged public school. 
Group 7 consisted of consisted of eight children residing in the Kuilsriver area and 
attending an Ex-Model C high school.  These children typically reside in the more 
affluent designation of Kuilsriver. 
 
                                                 
22 Model C schools were previously advantaged and generally have more financial, physical and 
human resources. 
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4.3.1 Description of Research Context 
Kuilsriver 
Participants from Group 1, 2 and 7 were selected from students residing in the 
Kuilsriver area.  Kuilriver is situated in the Northern Suburbs of Cape Town 
approximately 25 km from the Cape Town city centre.  It is characterised by two 
diverse neighbourhoods, a previously advantaged well-resourced middle class and a 
previously disadvantaged and poorly resourced working class.  In this suburb, skills 
and education levels are relatively high and unemployment fairly low.   
 
Parkwood 
Participants from Group 5 and 6 were selected from the Coloured township of 
Parkwood, situated on the Cape Flats23
 
 approximately 15 km from the Cape Town 
city centre.  Parkwood is characterised by low levels of skills and education, and 
high levels of unemployment, poverty, substance abuse, crime and gangsterism. 
Genadendal 
Participants from Group 3 and 4 were selected from the rural town of Genadendal.  
Genadendal, which has the distinction of being the first mission station in South 
Africa, is a small rural town situated approximately 200 km from Cape Town in the 
Overberg region of the Western Cape.  The town has approximately 3500 
exclusively Coloured inhabitants, and is characterised by few resources and many 
                                                 
23 The Cape Flats is a vast expanse of flat land situated on the outskirts of Cape Town and houses a 
vast number of Coloured and Black townships.  These townships are characterized by high 
unemployment and crime, and poor infrastructure. 
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infrastructural deficits.  The inhabitants are mainly children, youth, and older 
persons.  Economically active adults between the ages of approximately 20 to 45 
tend to be living and working outside the town.  The main source of employment for 
this community is the surrounding farmlands. 
 
4.4 Method of Data Collection 
Focus group interviews constituted the primary data collection technique.  The 
technique essentially collects qualitative data to provide insight into attitudes, 
perceptions, experiences and opinions.  According to Stewart and Shamdasani 
(1990), “the key to using focus groups successfully in social science research is 
assuring that their use is consistent with the objectives and the purpose of the study” 
(p. 76).  The technique conforms to this contention both in terms of being consistent 
with the aims of the project as well as consistent with the broader epistemological 
framework of social constructionism.  The focus group process provides the 
relational context that constructionism espouses as the key element in the 
construction of meanings.  In relation, Krueger (1994) contends that focus groups 
provide a mutual influencing process as it is essentially a socially orientated 
procedure.  Furthermore, children are found to respond more freely in focus groups 
as it provides a more relaxed environment (Smithson, 2000) and enhances 
engagement between the researcher and the children (Thomas & O’Kane, 1998). 
 
As the design was based on sustained contact, the design followed a three phase 
process with each phase consisting of seven groups, comprising eight participants 
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per group.  Most literature on focus groups recommend that the group number be 
anywhere between six and twelve participants.   
 
Given the nature of the research aims, it was not methodologically prudent to 
attempt to garner the information from the participants in a direct way.  Therefore, 
the discussion was located within a broad theme and the emerging meanings 
extrapolated.  This process was advanced by a discussion of the participants’ 
perception of well-being, the problems and difficulties that they, as children, are 
currently experiencing within their social lives, and their experiences of being 
young.  In other words, their discussions of well-being, their current problems and 
their experiences of being young, essentially functioned as ‘hermeneutic keys’ 
(Gadamer, 1976) to extrapolate their meanings of childhood; or as from Gadamer’s 
perspective, to advance the ‘horizons of understanding’.  For Gadamer (1976), 
understanding is embedded in one’s ‘present horizons’, ‘knowledge and experience’ 
and ‘effective history’.  These ‘hermeneutic keys’ function as triggers to access the 
‘horizons of understanding’.   
 
The interview protocol was largely unstructured, with only three core questions (one 
in each focus group phase) and a number of probes designed to elicit the 
psychological, social and political-historical meanings of childhood as they are 
embedded in the ‘present horizons’, ‘knowledge and experience’ and ‘effective 
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history’.  A premium was placed on creating a flowing discussion and spontaneous 
ambiance.  The three core questions24
i) What does it mean for you to be well? (exploring what well-
being means to them) 
 (hermeneutic keys) were: 
ii) What are the problems (important issues) that you (as young 
people) are currently facing within the community? 
iii) What is it like being a young person in the world today?  
 
The actual focus groups were preceded by one pre-emptive contact session to 
facilitate rapport-building, which was explicitly aimed at increasing the ecological 
validity of the data.  The author previously found that a strong rapport between the 
participants and group facilitators not only facilitated the focus group process but 
also advanced the collection of richer, more complex and detailed accounts (see e.g. 
Savahl et al., 2006).  The focus groups were followed with a termination session that 
ensured a structured exit point for the researcher, as well as giving the respondents 
the opportunity to add or amend certain viewpoints and reflect on the experience of 
being involved in the research.  Christensen and James (2000) believe that the 
concept of reflexivity should extend to the participants as well and consequently 
attribute great importance to the reflections of the participants.  Even though the pre-
emptive and termination session were not formal focus group sessions, the 
information garnered was considered admissible to the overall data set.  
Furthermore, the researcher found that informal discussions with participants before 
                                                 
24 These questions were used by the researcher in a previous project and proved successful in 
generating discussion around the nature and experiences of children and young people. 
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or after the focus group sessions yielded a rich amount of information.  The content 
of these discussions were also included in the overall data set.   
 
The same groups comprising the same participants were used for each phase.  The 
attrition rate was very low with only two children, one each from Group 1 and 
Group 6, failing to attend the final group discussion.  With the inclusion of the pre-
emptive and termination sessions this effectively translated into 35 contact sessions 
and 21 focus groups sessions.  Each session was between 60 and 90 minutes in 
duration and was conducted by the author who has had considerable experience both 
working with, and conducting group discussions with children and youth.  The table 
below provides a graphical representation of the data collection protocol.  The 
phases explored the previously specified psychological and social dimensions of 
childhood.   
Table 1: The data collection protocol 
 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 
Group 1 Pre-emptive 
session  
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 2 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 3 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 4 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 5 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 6 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
Group 7 Pre-emptive 
session 
Focus 
Group 1 
Focus 
Group 2 
Focus 
Group 3 
Termination  
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The transcription schedule reflects at which point data was collected.  The focus 
groups were recorded using a digital Dictaphone and saved as a digital audio-file.   
Thereafter, the raw audio data was transcribed verbatim by a private company 
offering transcription and translation services.  The participants were informed and 
gave permission for this to take place.  The author had previously used the services 
of the company which operates under a strict ethical code.  This company is also 
often used by the Human Sciences Research Council25
  Table 2:  Transcription Convention 
 and private law practices.  
The transcribed data was verified by the researcher and served as the initial phase of 
analysis.  Besides verifying that the spoken word was accurately captured, the 
verification process was also characterised by reflexive listening where the author 
reconciled the field-notes and memos with the transcribed data.  The following 
transcription convention was used. 
F Facilitator 
MR Male Respondent 
FR Female Respondent 
AR Multiple Respondents 
[text] Explanatory text  
… Omitted text 
 
After each contact session, detailed memos where developed.  Memos constitute the 
reflections of the group facilitator immediately after the data collection session.  
They can be defined as specialised written records that document various instances 
                                                 
25 The Human Sciences Research Council is a statutory body that supports development nationally by 
conducting large scale policy-relevant social research. 
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of the research process.  Thus memos are an essential methodological tool in 
qualitative research, ensuring methodological rigour and contributing to the validity 
of qualitative research studies.  Following Kvale (1996) three types of memos were 
used in the current study: 
i. Process memos, which document the entire research process. 
ii. Interview memos, which document the actual interview process.  These 
memos consist of theoretical memos (summarising the substantive 
theoretical issues that emerged during the interview), methodological memos 
(outlining the methodological dynamics of the interview process) and 
personal memos (describing the researcher’s experience of the interview 
process). 
iii. Analysis memos, which document the dynamics of the analysis process.  The 
memos were used as supplementary texts in the data analysis phase. 
        
4.4.1 Focus Group Interview Protocol 
Session One: Pre-emptive Meeting 
Session Two: Focus Group One 
Core Question 1:  What does it mean for you to be well? 
Probes: 1. Elucidate their understanding of well-being, and what it  
 means to them. 
2. Domains of well being (probe their understanding of the 
various domains of well-being): 
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• Socio-psychological constructs (self-esteem, 
self-concept, social relationships, personal 
safety, discrimination) 
• Perceived future (explore hope etc) 
• Physical (health, nutrition) 
Session Three: Focus Group Two 
Core Question 2: What are the problems (important issues) that you (as young 
  people) are currently facing?  
Probes: 1. Explore each problem in detail specifically noting the 
nature  and dynamic of the power relations between children and 
 adults that perpetuates these social problems: 
• Experiences of participation, marginalisation, 
discrimination, and prejudice 
• The role of the law (including social rules and 
regulations in their experience of these social 
problems) 
• Children’s role in society (how they think 
they fit in and what contributions they think 
that they can make)  
• Civic participation and perceptions of 
citizenship 
Session Four:  Focus Group Three 
Core Question 3: What is it like being a child (young person) today? 
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Probes: 1. Explore each sphere or social space of childhood, i.e. 
household, neighbourhood, community, school and society 
in general 
 2. What are the positives and negatives of the experiences in 
each sphere. 
 3. What can be done to create a more favourable experience 
of childhood. 
Session Five Termination 
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Depth Hermeneutics  
Thompson’s (1984, 1990) depth hermeneutics was utilised as the primary method to 
frame the analysis.  Depth hermeneutics allows for the systematic interpretation of 
the meanings, opinions, beliefs and understandings conveyed by everyday 
constructions (Stevens, 1996; Thompson, 1984, 1990).  The technique works from 
the assumption that the interpretation of symbolic forms occurs within a particular 
socio-historical context, “as it attempts to provide the ideological significance of 
such symbolic forms” (Stevens, 1996, p. 35).   Thompson defines symbolic forms as 
“a broad range of actions and utterances, images and texts, which are produced by 
subjects and recognised by them and others as meaningful” (1990, p. 59).  While 
Thompson regards linguistic utterances as key in this regard, symbolic forms can 
also be non-linguistic in nature.  
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Based on the philosophical tenets as espoused by Ricoeur26
The value of this idea is orientated towards the interpretation (or re-
interpretation) of meaningful phenomenon, but in which different types of 
analysis can play legitimate and mutually supportive roles.  It enables us 
to see that that the process of interpretation is not necessarily opposed to 
types of analysis which are concerned with structural features of symbolic 
forms or with the social-historical conditions of action and interaction, 
but that, on the contrary, these types of analysis can be liked together and 
construed as necessary steps along the path of interpretation. (p. 21) 
, the value of depth 
hermeneutics lies in its acknowledgement of the fact that an understanding and 
interpretation of phenomenon is actually a reinterpretation of the individual’s 
understanding or interpretation of that phenomenon.  Or as Thompson (1990) states: 
 
This technique was specifically selected for a number of reasons.  Firstly, by its very 
nature and design, it allows for the analysis of symbolic forms and ideology.  
Thompson initially developed depth hermeneutics as an overarching framework for 
the analysis of cultural phenomenon.  However, he found it to be highly applicable 
to the analysis of ideology.  He argues that when applied to ideological 
phenomenon, depth hermeneutics aims to elucidate the ideological nature of 
symbolic forms, i.e. elucidating the ways that meaning serves to establish and 
sustain relations of domination.  Thus, when applied to the study of ideology and 
symbolic forms, depth hermeneutics now has critical intent.  Secondly, the 
framework is congruous to the conceptualisation of ideology that this study 
                                                 
26 While Thompson (1984, 1990) is generally in accord with Ricouer’s thesis about meaning and 
interpretation he disagrees significantly with Ricouer’s underplaying of the importance of social and 
historical circumstances in interpretation. 
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employs, i.e. how meaning serves to establish and maintain relations of domination.  
Thirdly, the framework engenders the broad epistemological framework of social 
constructionism that frames the current study. 
 
Drawing on the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987/1992), Thompson (1984, 1990) 
and van Dijk (1997) the method of the present study consisted of three analytically 
interrelated27 phases of analysis, viz. social-historical analysis, discursive analysis 
and interpretation/reinterpretation28
 
.   
The first phase was concerned with how the socio-historical context influenced the 
production of symbolic forms.  The contention is that since symbolic forms do not 
exist independently, the temporal, physical and socio-historical context is essential 
to the understanding of how meaning is mobilised.  Thompson (1984) argues that 
discourse must be viewed as situated practices, “expressions are uttered… by 
particular agents at particular times and in particular settings…”, and that the social 
contexts in which discourse are produced are critical determinants of their 
production.  Acknowledging Thompson (1984), Duncan (1993) insists that in order 
to elicit a comprehensive understanding of how meaning is constructed in discourse, 
it is “essential that the researcher identifies and attempts to reconstruct the temporal 
and physical context of its production as comprehensively as possible” (p. 75).  
Duncan (1993) is rightly arguing for the consideration of the broader social forces 
which structure the social contexts, as it is these forces that inevitably determine the 
nature of the domination which discourses ideologically serve to maintain 
                                                 
27 See Thompson (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of the dimensions. 
28 See also Duncan (1993) and Stevens (1996). 
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(Thompson, 1984).  This is implicit to the study and is an ongoing process that takes 
place throughout the course of the study. 
 
The second phase, discourse or discursive analysis, is concerned with the analysis of 
the structural features of symbolic forms.  This phase is essentially the prime 
analytic phase of depth hermeneutics.  Defined as the analysis of functional or 
performative use of language, this systematic method elucidates discursive activity 
by isolating structural units that are theoretically assigned, i.e. forms, functions, 
meanings, categorical values, interpretations, strategies and beliefs (van Dyk, as 
cited in Duncan, 1993).  Both Duncan (1993) and Thompson (1984) are of the 
opinion that the forms of discourse which express ideology must essentially be seen 
as linguistic constructions.  In this phase of analysis, the discourses of childhood 
well-being were examined as linguistic constructions consisting of explanatory 
narratives, and chains of reasoning which can be deconstructed.  These 
deconstructions allow for the elucidation of the ideological features of discourses on 
childhood by explicating procedures and strategies of legitimation, dissimulation 
and reification (see also Duncan, 1993).    
 
There exists a range of definitions of discourse.  For the purpose of this study the 
two that provide the best working definition for the study of ideology is that of Burr 
(1995) and Dant (1991).  Burr’s (1995), constructionist and oft quoted definition 
sees discourse as:  
a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements 
and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of 
events. (p. 48) 
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Dant (1991) on the other hand, offers a more explicit meaning orientated definition 
typical of those seeking a more ideological based type of discourse analysis.  He 
sees discourse as: 
the material content of utterances exchanged in social contexts that are 
imbued with meaning by the intention of utterers and treated as 
meaningful by other participants. (p. 7) 
 
Parker (1992) and Kress (1985) offer a more post-structuralist approach: 
A good working definition of discourse should be that it is a system of 
statements which constructs an object. (Parker, 1992, p. 5) 
 
A discourse is a set of possible statements about a given area, and 
organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, 
object or process is to be talked about. (Kress, 1985, p. 7) 
 
Given the range of definitions of discourse, and the fact that discourse analysis does 
not engender a unified approach, there are numerous versions of doing discourse 
analysis.  Within the social sciences two versions of discourse analysis can be 
generally distinguished.  The first version, with roots in ethnomethodology and 
communication studies, focuses on the discourse practices and how speakers draw 
on various forms of discursive resources to construct particular realities and to 
achieve certain aims in interpersonal contexts (see e.g. Edward, 1997; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Willig, 2000).  The second version commonly associated with the 
Foucauldian tradition, focuses on the function of discourse in the constitution of 
subjectivity, selfhood and power relations (see e.g. Hollway, 1984).  Based on Potter 
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and Wetherell’s (1987/1992) approach this study employed a version of discourse 
analysis that can best be described as an amalgamation of the two, an eclectic 
approach that focuses on elucidating the discursive activity of the interlocuters 
whilst acknowledging the imbrication of discourse, power and subjectivity.  Indeed 
Wetherell (1998) argues that “a stance that reads one in terms of the other continues 
to provide the most productive basis for discourse work in social psychology” (p. 
388).  
 
The applicability of using discourse analysis as a means to analyse ideology is 
supported by van Dijk, Neff, van Aertselaer and Putz (2004) who argue that since 
ideologies are not innate but learned social practices, they are often commented on, 
discussed, legitimated and defended in discourse.  In other words, the ideologies are 
reproduced in discourse and it is largely through discourse that various forms of 
ideologies are perpetuated and disseminated to children and youth.  They 
subsequently argue that the study of discursive and communicative practices is one 
of the most productive methods in studying ideology.  Furthermore, they believe that 
discourse analysis would allow for the elucidation of the underlying socio-cognitive 
structures of ideologies. 
 
Discourse research is based on the premise that meanings emerge from complex 
social and historical processes (Wetherell, 2001).  The ability of discourse analysis 
to reveal how the participants create meaning (through the analysis of discursive 
activity, nuances and contradictions) in their life within diverse social, historical and 
political milieus are the prime motivating factors.  The broad question was therefore: 
How do children, within the contemporary social landscape, use language to 
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construct versions of the world (Potter & Wetherell, 1992).  It is this constructive 
view of language that is the central theoretical tenet of discourse analysis.  
Furthermore, it is pre-empted that the meanings emerging from the discourse is the 
product of cultural, historical and social processes.  Discourse analysts typically ask 
two questions.  What are people trying to achieve with their talk, and how are they 
going about doing it.  Considering the above, the question that intuitively comes to 
mind is: how does one actually go about identifying the discourses?  Duncan (1993) 
and Billig (as cited in Duncan, 1993) warn that there is no mechanical process or 
preset programme to be followed when analysing discourse.  Levett (1989, as cited 
in Duncan, 1993) believes that the essence of analysis is extensive background 
reading and theoretically informed thought.  Similarly, Billig argues that the text is 
not the starting point; rather the analyst will already have built up a knowledge of 
the topic before starting the search required for understanding the particular text (as 
cited in Duncan, 1993, p. 77). 
 
Indeed, the author, at reaching the point of analysis, had completed the literature 
review and theoretical considerations.  Furthermore, the author had extensive 
research exposure in the field of child well-being and childhood.  With this insight 
and context, the emerging themes and discourses were thus more easily identifiable 
than if this had not been the case.  Duncan (1993), Stevens (1996) and Henning 
(2000) point out that discourse analysis is often preceded by a content thematic 
analysis which assists in making initial sense of the data.  This is essential, 
especially if there is a large corpus of texts.  This suggestion was followed in the 
current study where the author used a basic thematic analysis technique prior to the 
discourse analysis.  What this basically entailed was the identification of broad 
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themes or thematic domains.  Thereafter, the analysis proceeded by explicating the 
discourses that emerged within these thematic domains.  It is important to note that, 
in accordance with Duncan (1993), the most important consideration in this stage is 
“to locate the broad recurring, as well as atypical, discursive patterns or themes – 
rather than focussing on the analysis of every word or inflection – which appeared in 
the discourses under scrutiny” (p. 78). 
 
The final phase of interpretation/reinterpretation draws on the first two phases, 
attempting to provide a comprehensive explication of the meanings generated by the 
discourses.  Essentially then, it is concerned with the construction of meaning.  It 
also reveals the social context within which the discourse or symbolic forms 
function, as well as its structural features.  The level of interpretation within this 
phase is significant as it also provides a reinterpretation.  Thompson (1990) states 
thus: 
The process of interpretation is at the same time a process of re-
interpretation, in the sense that it is a re-interpretation … of an object 
domain which is already interpreted and understood by the subjects who 
make up the socio-historical world. (p. 22) 
 
This process of interpretation/reinterpretation does, however, create the possibility 
for multiple interpretations. 
 
Duncan (1993) stresses that the three stages of analysis should not be seen as distinct 
from one another, but rather as a single on-going process.  Moreover, these phases 
are not presented in the neat sequence displayed above when the actual findings of 
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the study are discussed in Chapter Five and Six.  In accordance with Duncan’s 
(1993) recommendations, the findings will only consist of the final interpretations of 
the discourses analysed and an explication of the emerging meanings.  It is common 
practice for discourse analysts, as a method of validation, to present the entire corpus 
of texts as an addendum.  The main advantage of this practice is that it allows the 
reader to evaluate the plausibility of the interpretations, and where possible, to 
contemplate alternatives interpretations (Duncan, 1993).  In the current study, as 
there was an inordinate amount of raw data (transcripts), the author, for practical 
purposes, decided to refrain from employing this practice29
 
.  However, 59 extracts 
from the corpus of texts have been included in the discussion (Chapter Five) to give 
meaning and support to the interpretations. 
4.6 Well-being: The Hermeneutic Key 
Since the concept of well-being was used as an important ‘hermeneutic key’ in the 
study, the following section provides a brief synopsis of the current status of the 
concept. 
 
Well-being has a long history and can be traced back to Jahoda’s (1958) concept of 
positive psychological health, and more acutely to the concept of quality of life (see 
Cummins, 1995).  Child well-being gained significance with the increased public 
and political concern for children in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  During the last three 
decades an intensified interest in the well-being of children has been seen, both 
locally and internationally.   
 
                                                 
29 The entire corpus of texts is available to the reader on request. 
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The conventional understanding of child well-being has been conceptualised and 
associated with an absence of positive behaviours and the presence of physical 
deficiencies (see e.g. Moore, 1997) and more recently with the prevention of 
problem behaviour (see e.g. Moore & Keyes, 2003) and promoting strengths and 
positive outcomes (Pollard & Rosenberg, 2003).  Contemporary notions of well-
being have envisaged developing an integrated model that amalgamates the 
treatment and prevention of problem behaviour and the promoting strengths 
approaches (see e.g. Pollard & Rosenberg, 2003).  While these integrated models are 
cogent and have appeared to have good outcomes in the public health arena, it is 
important that the concept is thoroughly conceptualised and that consensus is 
reached on what constitutes well-being.  Furthermore, it has been recognised that 
when conceptualising and defining the concept, cognisance needs to be taken of the 
specific social and cultural milieu (Pollard & Rosenberg, 2003).  Pollard and 
Rosenberg (2003) define well-being as: 
A state of successful performance throughout the life course integrating 
physical, cognitive, and socio-emotional function that results in 
productive activities deemed significant by one’s cultural community, 
fulfilling social relationships, and the ability to transcend moderate 
psychosocial and environmental problems.  (p. 14) 
 
Pollard and Rosenberg’s (2003) definition of well-being acknowledges critical 
contextual factors, namely culture, social relationships, as well as various stress 
factors. Consequently, ‘productive activities’ are determined by what the socio-
cultural community of the individual regards as important and necessary. Similarly, 
the rules of engagement for social relationships are also culturally determined.  
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Finally, this definition recognises that for all individuals there are various factors, 
both tangible and intangible, that have potentially deleterious consequences for well-
being (Willenberg et al., 2006).  
 
Considering the multifaceted and composite nature of well-being, a perusal of 
contemporary literature on well-being suggests that the concept is often 
differentiated into a number of dimensions (Land, Lamb & Mustillo, 2001; Pollard 
& Davidson, 2001; Pollard & Lee, 2003; Thornton, 2001; Zaff, Smith, Rogers, 
Leavitt, Halle & Bornstein, 2003).  Thornton (2001), drawing on the work of a 
number of authors, and Pollard and Lee (2003), after conducting comprehensive and 
systematic reviews, identified five key domains consistent in the literature viz. 
physical, psychological, cognitive and educational, social, and economic.  Physical 
well-being includes general physical attributes such as height, weight, nutrition, 
physical abilities, and overall health and susceptibility to diseases.  The 
psychological/emotional dimension encompasses psychological constructs such as 
self-efficacy, self-esteem, self-worth, happiness, anxiety, and stress.  Social well-
being is concerned with the quality of children’s social relationships and includes 
personal interaction, social coping skills, delinquency, and pro-social behaviour.  
Cognitive and educational well-being includes factors such as cognitive ability, 
knowledge acquisition, and school attendance and achievement.  Finally, economic 
well-being pertains to economic determinants of quality of life such as standards of 
living and caregiver employment status. Zaff et al. (2003) and Pollard and Davidson 
(2001) collapsed Thornton’s five domains into three namely, physical, socio-
emotional and cognitive, whilst Land et al. (2001), drawing on the quality of life 
literature proposed by Cummins (1995) expanded it to seven: material, health and 
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safety, productive activity, place in community, education, social relationships and 
emotional /spiritual.  The Multinational Project for Monitoring and Measuring 
Children’s Well-Being uses a variation of Thornton’s five domains in their 
construction of indicators (Chapin Hall, 2005).  These are safety and physical status, 
personal life, civic life, children’s economic resources and contribution and 
children’s activities.   
 
Due to its complex and broad nature, the concept of well-being, as a holistic 
concept, has not received much attention for empirical investigation.  There have 
however been numerous studies, albeit not directly concerned with the concept of 
well-being, that focused on various key domains of well-being such as the physical 
(see e.g. Immink, & Payongayong, 1999), social (see e.g. Gifford-Smith & 
Brownell, 2003), psychological (see e.g. Reynolds, Wallace, Hill, Weist & Nabors 
(2001), and educational (see e.g. Piekarska, 2000).  Government reports, 
extrapolating child data from various social surveys generally provide the most 
comprehensive account of the well-being of children.  For example, in the US, the 
Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics publishes an annual 
report entitled Key National Indicators on Child Well-Being, that provides 
descriptive data on child and youth well-being.  Furthermore, countries that are 
signatories to the UNCRC are obligated to provide regular reports on the state and 
well-being of their resident children.  In South Africa, for example, the Children in 
2001 report provided a descriptive account of the state and well-being of South 
Africa’s children.  South Africa also has a number of non-governmental 
organisations developing regular publications that outline the state of South Africa’s 
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children.  IDASA’s Children’s Budget Review and the Children Institute’s annual 
Child Gauge are examples of these endeavours.  
 
Other local initiatives include the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social 
Security (ACESS), who in 2002, explored children’s experiences of poverty. The 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) (2004) similarly investigated the 
experiences of children living in poverty and the extent to which their socio-
economic rights were being realised.  These findings indicate a violation of 
children’s socio-economic rights and highlight the debilitating effects of poverty in 
relation to children’s well-being.  Under the auspices of the UNESCO Growing up 
in Cities project, Swart-Kruger and Chawla (2002) investigated children’s 
perceptions of their community environments and their recommendations for 
improvements to make their city more child-friendly. Their findings indicate safe 
places to play, general public safety, transport, and waste management as key areas 
of concern identified by the participants. The Department of Labour commissioned a 
report that explored children’s views on labour practices (Clacherty & Budlender, 
2004). They found that children were excessively involved in domestic chores and 
labour practices that negatively impacted on their well-being. Finally, Ward (2007) 
explored adolescents’ perceptions and experiences of community violence and 
gangsterism. She found negative behavioural and psychological outcomes associated 
with violence exposure. 
 
There have also been dedicated initiatives aimed at developing indicators to monitor 
the various domains of well-being.  Dawes et al. (2007) have focused on developing 
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a rights-based approach, while Willenberg et al. (2006) used the child participation 
approach to develop indicators from children’s perspectives. 
 
While well-being is merely used as a hermeneutic key in the current study, the above 
discussion demonstrates the importance of the concept in contemporary child 
research, especially with regard to issues relating to policy and practice.   
 
4.7 Validity 
Validity, reliability and generalisability remain the holy trinity in research and all 
studies aspire to score highly on these measures which would then indicate scientific 
rigor (Kvale, 1996).  The concept of validity is often used as a general term referring 
to all three.  In qualitative research, the relevance of validity is a domain that 
remains highly contested within the field of scientific research (Pyett, 2003; 
Sparkes, 2001).  Indeed the major point of contention in the debate around the 
scientific legitimacy of qualitative research is the concept of validity.  Quantitative 
researchers often point out qualitative study’s lack of adherence to validity measures 
and on the basis of these shortcomings, regard qualitative studies as unscientific.  
Proponents of quantitative research use the lack of adherence of qualitative research 
to validity measures to claim them to be unscientific.  
 
However, proponents of anti-positivist paradigms, who espouse qualitative methods, 
have responded in a number of ways.  They have, for example, attempted to directly 
adopt quantitative criteria within qualitative research.  However, Jardine (1990) 
believes that qualitative research will never satisfy the criteria of objectivity desired 
by quantitative researchers and thus argues for a reformulation.  Proponents of 
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qualitative research have endeavoured to redefine the notion of validity and 
developed concepts that are more in line with interpretivist pursuits.  In agreement, 
Smith (1990) contends that the underlying assumptions of qualitative inquiry 
precludes using method based criteria and rather requires a reformulation of validity.  
Smith (1984) fervently suggests that practitioners should “dispense with 
traditionalist ideas of subjectivity and truth and realise that we are beyond method” 
(p. 390).  Taking up the challenge of reformulation, Lincoln and Guba (1985) for 
example put forward the pursuits of credibility, authenticity and legitimacy.   
 
Cresswell (1998) has formulated eight criteria or techniques which he believes is 
important for a valid qualitative study.  These include prolonged engagement, 
triangulation, peer review (debriefing), member checks, thick description and 
external audits.  Hammersly (1987) notes that qualitative research is valid “if it 
represents accurately those features of the phenomenon that it is intended to 
describe, explain or theorise” (p. 69).  Wolcott (1990), however, is critical of the 
reformulation attempts arguing that neither validity nor any analogous concept is 
useful in qualitative research.  He favours accuracy of ‘understanding’ as a more 
fundamental concept than validity in qualitative research.  Pyett (2003) similarly 
argues that qualitative researchers need to ask themselves the following question: 
How can we have confidence that our account is an accurate representation? 
Maxwell (2002) puts forward a critical realist position.  He contends that since we 
have no direct knowledge of the objects of our accounts, we have no independent 
entity to which to compare these accounts.  Maxwell is essentially suggesting that 
the validity of an account is not contingent on method or procedures, but rather its 
relationship to those things it is intended to be an account of.  This is consistent with 
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Hammersley and Atkinson’s (1983) contention that it is inferences drawn from data 
and not data in itself that should be seen as valid or invalid.  Commenting on this 
perspective of validity Maxwell (2002) states: 
The applicability of the concept of validity presented here does not 
depend on the existence of absolute truth or reality to which an account 
can be compared, but only on the fact that there exists ways of accessing 
accounts that do not depend entirely on the features of the account itself, 
but in some way relate to those things that the account claims to be about. 
(p. 42) 
 
Following Mishler (1990), Maxwell further argues that validity is perspectival and 
‘understanding’ relative.  This essentially means that the validity and understanding 
of an account is contingent on the perspective and understanding of a specific 
community of inquirers.  This point is critical in determining the validity measure of 
the current study.  Its implication is reflected on in the final chapter. 
 
Maxwell (2002) identifies three categories of understanding and corresponding 
types of validity that concern qualitative researchers.  The first, descriptive validity, 
is concerned with the factual accuracy of the account.  Maxwell basis descriptive 
validity30
                                                 
30 This concept corresponds to what Runciman (1983) calls ‘reportage’ or ‘primary understanding’. 
 on Wolcott’s (1990) contention that “description is the foundation upon 
which qualitative research is built” (p. 27), and asks the question: “are you as the 
researcher accurately reporting what you saw and heard”?  The key issue in 
descriptive validity is accuracy of the account and the meaning of the account is not 
in dispute (Maxwell, 2002).  Meaning is the key concern for the second type of 
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validity in Maxwell’s typology, referred to as interpretive validity.  With no 
quantitative counterpart, interpretive validity is concerned with capturing an 
understanding of what the account means from the perspective of the participants.  It 
is thus concerned with the accuracy of the inferences made, based on the participants 
talk, actions and behaviours.  The third type of validity identified by Maxwell 
(2002) is theoretical validity which refers to the application of a theoretical construct 
to the descriptive and interpretive understanding of account.  In other words, it refers 
to an account’s function as a theoretical explanation of phenomena.  Maxwell (2002) 
explains that theoretical validity focuses on the “legitimacy of the application of a 
given concept or theory to established facts” (p. 52).  
 
While these reformulations have at least tacitly been taken up by the research 
community there is a voice that calls for an even more radical transformation of the 
concept.  Again, under the broad epistemological banner of social constructionism, 
interpretivism and discursive psychologists, commentators such as Aguinaldo 
(2004), Kvale (1996) and Sparkes (2001) have questioned the nature of the concept 
and perceived of it as a social and discursive construction developed to maintain 
power within the research environment.  Ironically, it appears that validity functions 
as an apparatus of ideology to maintain relations of domination of one form of 
understanding (science) over another.  Validity makes available a range of linguistic 
repertoires (Aguinaldo, 2004), formalised within the structures of scientific 
convention to assert and determine method and assert certain knowledge claims as 
valid and scientific and subvert others as illegitimate and unscientific.  As 
Aguinaldo (2004) argues: 
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validity polices the social sciences and operates as a form of power that is 
practiced through its capacity to de/legitimise social knowledge, research 
practice and experiential possibilities. (p. 128) 
 
Validity must then be interrogated for its discursive (Aguinaldo, 2004) and 
ideological function within the social sciences.  This interrogation is the necessary 
first step in the successful reformulation of validity. Aguinaldo (2004), however, 
warns that during the process of reformulation, one must guard against merely 
putting forward an alternate regime of truth as well as the practice of foreclosing 
through binary opposition; be it valid/invalid or even trustworthy/non-trustworthy.  
In that sense the validity question is changed from: “Is that research valid?” to “what 
is that research valid for?”  In Aguinaldo’s (2004) sense validity is then not a 
determination of binary opposites (valid versus not valid) but rather an interrogation 
that “necessitates multiple and sometimes contradictory readings of the functions 
any particular research representation can serve” (p. 130). 
 
Noting the current contestation regarding validity, Angen (2000) summarised these 
attempts under two broad configurations, viz., ethical validation and substantive 
validation31
                                                 
31 “The term validation rather that validity is used deliberately to emphasise the way in which a 
judgement of the trustworthiness or goodness of a piece of research is a continuous process occurring 
within a community of researchers…”(Angen, 2000, p. 387). 
.  These configurations are considered with reference to the qualities of 
the researcher.  Ethical validation refers to the way that researchers provide 
beneficial (of benefit to the community), generative (moving beyond current 
understanding) and transformative (effectiveness of change) answers to questions 
asked by researchers.   
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The acknowledgement or even celebration of subjectivity in qualitative research 
provides the base for substantive validation.  Angen (2000) states that substantive 
validation indicates a focus on process.  More specifically, the focus should be on 
the thorough documentation of the process of the research.  This means that the 
researcher needs to produce ‘substantive’ evidence of rigor, thoroughness and 
comprehensiveness of the process that was followed in order to reach the 
understandings and interpretations (Madison, as cited in Angen, 2000).  This implies 
a commitment to reflexivity, which entails a process of critical self-reflection 
(Alcoff, 1994).  Angen (2000) believes that accounts of self-reflexivity and the 
socio-personal histories of the researchers also impact on substantive validation.  
 
As noted earlier, the above configurations are, to a large extent, contingent on the 
characteristics and competencies of the researcher.  Angen (2000), in fact, believes 
that the researcher is the instrument through which the understanding of the topic is 
revealed while Morse (1994) and Patton (1990) note that the quality of the research 
is related to the skills, training, insights and capacities of the researcher.  
Furthermore, Pyett (2003) argues that the specific attributes of the researcher 
determine how the research is conceptualised, designed and analysed.  Others have 
noted the important attributes of a good qualitative researcher e.g. good 
interpersonal skills, resilience and commitment, flexibility and attention to detail 
(McCarl-Nielson, 1990), intense involvement in the research process (Sanjek, 1990), 
and being a creative and persuasive writer (Angen, 2000).  The ethical and 
substantive validation with reference to the qualities of the researcher must resonate 
with the consumers of the research. 
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While the above discussion presented the status and position of validity in 
qualitative research, it did not demonstrate how validity was conceptualised or the 
actual criteria, strategies or techniques that were followed in the current study.  
These strategies are outlined below. 
 
A critical reference group consisting of four children was established to guide the 
study.  These children participated in a previous study on child well-being and were 
familiar with the research process.  They were consulted on four occasions prior to 
data collection where they provided useful insight and recommendations into the 
design of the study, sampling and the development of the interview protocol.   
 
Member checking, which refers to the process where the analysed information is 
taken back to the participants for verification, was effected.  The researcher verbally 
reported back to four of the seven groups who confirmed that the information was an 
accurate reflection of what transpired in the groups.  
 
Memos, which refer to the documentation of the thoughts and processes during the 
stages of the study, were recorded.  This included the documentation of reflexive 
moments during the entire study. 
 
Morse, Baret, Mayan, Olsen and Spiers (2002) believe that a critical task of 
achieving validity in qualitative research is ensuring coherence between the research 
questions and the method.  They refer to this as ‘methodological coherence’ which 
was a key consideration throughout the course of the study.  This also included 
theoretical sampling which ensures that the selected participants have the best 
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knowledge and experience of the research topic.  Morse et al. (2002) believe that 
this “ensures efficient and effective saturation of categories, with optimal quality 
data…” (p. 12). 
 
Finally, a detailed audit trail, as presented in this chapter and supplemented in 
Chapter Seven enhances the study’s validity as consumers of the manuscript are 
presented with sufficient information to allow for the corroboration of the findings.  
A method of validation often employed by discourse analysts is to present, as an 
addendum, the entire corpus of texts from which the interpretations were drawn.  
The advantage of this practice is that it allows the reader the opportunity to more 
effectively evaluate the plausibility of the interpretations (Duncan, 1993).  However, 
in the current study the raw data was in excess of 400 pages, and as previously 
suggested, for practical purposes, only 59 extracts from the corpus of texts have 
been included in the discussion to give meaning and support to the interpretations. 
 
4.8  Ethical Considerations 
How the researcher conceptualises childhood has important implications for research 
practice, including method and ethical considerations.  In the section on Design, the 
author pointed out how the transition from a conceptualisation of children as objects 
of research to subjects and then to valid participants and social actors in society, has 
significantly impacted on methodological and design considerations.  Morrow and 
Richards (1996) point out that respect for children as valid rights holders and social 
actors and the subsequent acknowledgement of their competencies “need to become 
a methodological technique in itself” (p. 100).  With this recognition of rights and 
competencies emerges the need to adhere to a code of ethics when engaging with 
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children (Greig & Taylor, 1999).  It has been pointed out by Alderson (1995) and 
others that it is with sound method that the ethics of research with children can be 
advanced.   
 
Christensen and Prout (2002) argue that the new conceptualisation of children as 
valid social actors has advanced the ethical complexity of conducting research with 
children.  They state that: 
It proliferates the number of cross-cutting relationships and expands the 
possibility that interests may come into conflict.  This is likely to create 
not only new ethical problems and dilemmas for the researcher, but also 
particular responsibilities. (p. 482) 
 
However, Christensen and Prout (2002) and others (see e.g. Solberg, 1996) contend 
that this does not necessarily mean that unique considerations for children need to be 
developed or that children require a special set of ethical guidelines.  Similarly 
Harden, Scott, Backet-Milburn and Jackson (2000) and Thomas and O’Kane (1998) 
believe that ethical issues applicable to children are consistent with those involving 
adults.  Christensen and Prout (2002) put forward the notion of ‘ethical symmetry’ 
wherein they postulate that ethical guidelines between researcher and participant 
should be the same for adults and for children.  They do, however, argue against the 
age and developmentally based perception of children’s competencies and suggest 
that practices used in research with children need to acknowledge and take 
cognisance of children’s experiences, interests, values and social routines.  This 
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entails that the researcher needs to consider and “engage with the local cultures of 
communicating among children paying attention to the social actions of children, 
their use of language and the meanings they put into words, notions and actions” 
(Christensen, as cited in Christensen & Prout, 2002, p. 483). 
 
Posing a great ethical challenge to developing and sustaining this ethical symmetry, 
according to Morrow and Richards, “is the disparities in power and status between 
adults and children” (1996, p. 98).  This power differential contributes to the 
‘othering’ or marginalisation of children.  Part of the task of engaging in ethical 
research with children is to acknowledge and redress these disparities and unequal 
power dynamic that is inherent in child and adult relations (Thomas & O’Kane, 
1998).  Redressing this imbalance would allow children to participate on their own 
terms.   
 
Kirk (2007) and Thomas and O’Kane (1998) suggest that the use of participatory 
techniques could assist in reducing the power imbalance.  Christensen (2004) argues 
that the researcher should relate to the child participants as fellow competent human 
beings, while Alderson (2000) has emphasised the importance of developing 
rapport.  Similarly, Mauthner (1997) has pointed to the importance of negotiating 
the delicate relationship between researcher and the child.  
 
Of course the discussion on the issue of power is indicative of the liberation-
protection dichotomy that pervades perceptions of the contemporary child.  A 
research process that is too liberal might cause undue harm, while over-protection 
may inhibit children’s participation (Thomas & O’Kane, 1998).  Assimilating these 
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issues and aligning them to contemporary principles of ethical research is a complex 
task of balance and reflection on the part of the researcher.  There are implications 
which are outlined below. 
 
While the principles of ‘non-malifecence’ (do no harm), ‘beneficence’ (of benefit to 
the research participants), ‘autonomy and informed consent’, ‘confidentiality’, 
‘respect and privacy’, and ‘dissemination and reporting’ are universally accepted 
principles of ethical research, they take on a different format with child research.  
With regard to ‘non-malifecence’ the researcher needs to actively and consistently 
maintain a climate of safety for the participant.  This entails, on a practical level, 
consistent monitoring of the state of the child by verbal confirmation and also by the 
observation of non-verbal behaviour that might indicate distress.  ‘Beneficence’ 
requires that children have a full understanding of the benefits of participation but 
also entails active reflection by the researcher that these benefits are real and 
plausible.  Both these issues imply that the design and conceptualisation of the study 
has an ethical genesis. 
 
Thomas and O’Kane (1998) suggest that with regard to ‘autonomy’ and ‘informed 
consent’ an active agreement on the part of the child and a passive agreement on the 
part of the parent/guardian are needed for ethically appropriate research.  This 
departs markedly from the traditional practice of obtaining consent from parents and 
assent from children.  This active consent also implies that children have complete 
autonomy over their participation and involvement in all aspects of research (Mahon 
et al., 1996).  This includes the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time and 
without prejudice. 
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The principle of confidentiality, which entails the protection of information provided 
by the child, is an especially important, albeit dilemmatic, feature of research with 
children (Thomas & O’Kane, 1998) encapsulated by the question “what do we do if 
a child discloses that she or he is being abused?” (p. 339).  Disclosure of current, 
imminent or potential harm to the child poses serious challenges with repercussions 
relating to confidentiality, trust and credibility of the research.  Mahon et al. (1996) 
believe that complete confidentiality can never be guaranteed to child participants 
and that the researcher is duty bound to report the information to professional 
agencies. Others such as Alderson (1995) believe that the matter needs to be 
discussed with the child prior to reporting, whilst Williamson (as cited in Thomas & 
O’Kane, 1998) recommends that the researcher and child should collaboratively 
develop a strategy for dealing with the disclosure.  More radically, Thomas and 
O’Kane’s (1998) assert that the reporting of information severely jeopardises the 
relationship between the researcher and the child.  Following a middle ground 
approach based on a pre-emptive agreement at the initiation of the project is 
suggested.  This was followed in the current study.  
 
With an acknowledgement of children as valid social actors and active members of 
society comes a need to respect children’s autonomy and right to privacy.  In a 
practical sense this implies a large degree of reflection on the part of the researcher, 
where the researcher should refrain from employing discursive and shrewd interview 
strategies to finesse and elicit information from child participants who clearly wish 
not to divulge certain information. 
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The reporting of information involves the dissemination of findings.  In child 
research, an ethically appropriate strategy would entail member checks or reporting 
back to the participants prior to the traditional dissemination protocols. 
 
To conclude this section, it is important to acknowledge the moral and 
methodological dilemmas that arise from conducting research with children.  The 
extent to which these dilemmas are ethically symmetrical to, or reconcilable with, 
universal principles of ethics and the underlying conceptualisation of children 
determines the ethical standard of the research.  Thomas and O’Kane (1998) argue 
that the ethical appropriateness of research with children can be enhanced by 
adopting a participatory approach “which gives children control over the research 
process and methods which are in tune with children’s ways of seeing and relating to 
their world” (p. 337).  Following is a statement of the ethical procedures followed in 
the study. 
 
This project, closely informed by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), the South African Constitution and the Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005), 
prioritises the application of the highest ethical standards.  The project complies 
with the ten-point ethics guidelines as outlined by Alderson (1995) in Children, 
ethics and social research as well as UNICEF’s (2002) Principles and guidelines for 
ethical research with children, taking special cognisance of the issues of 
i) Acknowledgement of children as active and valid social actors 
ii) Confidentiality 
iii) Informed consent 
iv) Involving children without exploiting, intrusion or misrepresentation 
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v) Treating children with respect and as active participants and moral agents 
of their own well-being  
vi) Dissemination of findings 
 
The following guidelines were developed to ensure the realisation of the above: 
i) Before the commencement of the focus groups, children were clearly 
informed about the rationale behind the study and the nature of their 
participation. They were informed of the option of non-participation 
without discrimination and that this was applicable at any time or phase 
of the study.  The facilitator took due consideration that all the children 
had given consent based on a clear and informed understanding before 
proceeding.  Consent was obtained in both a written and verbal format 
from the children and their parents.  The participant was also allowed to 
claim certain or all content of individual responses as inadmissible to the 
research project.  The researcher agreed to omit all such content from the 
transcripts. 
ii)  Confidentiality in terms of the protection of disclosed information and 
the protection of the children’s identity was strictly enforced.  No 
registration requirements were applicable.  No surnames were used 
during the discussion and individual first names were changed.  Children 
were advised prior to the commencement of the focus groups that 
disclosure of any current or potential abuse would need to be engaged 
with and may need to be referred for professional assistance.  The 
participants were also asked to ensure that any information divulged 
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during the discussion be treated as confidential and not be discussed 
outside the group. 
iii) Permission was obtained for any recording (written or audio) from all the 
children.  If any objection was obtained for the audio-recording, the 
researcher endeavoured to refrain from using it.  Non-verbal gestures 
were also considered.  The researcher further endeavoured to 
immediately terminate audio recording if even one child exhibited 
feelings of being uncomfortable with the audio recording, even after 
giving verbal permission.  No video recording equipment was utilised.  
iv) The findings of the process were presented to four of the seven groups in 
the form of a verbal report, before being compiled in the current 
manuscript.  The remaining three groups were not available for the report 
back.  Permission was also obtained from the children, parents/guardians 
as well as the School and Education Department, concerning the 
dissemination of the outcomes. 
 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter detailed the methodological strategy employed in the current study.  
Specific factors around design, participant selection, instrumentation and analysis 
strategies were outlined.  The most profound explication of the chapter was the 
delineation of the child participation model that was followed.  It appears that this 
conceptualisation is rapidly becoming the standard in child research.  While shifting 
away from conceptualisations of children as immature social beings evokes a sense 
of moral righteousness, it has resulted in the need for new and creative methods for 
conducting research with children.  The proliferation of the child participation model 
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in contemporary projects is indicative of the response.  Child participation, however, 
is not a set of standardised methods, a recipe or step-wise procedure that one can 
follow.  Indeed, in its pure form, it rather resembles a loose selection of ideas of how 
to think about conducting research with children rather than specific methods or data 
collection techniques.  Child participation is therefore less about certain procedures 
but rather a constant process of critical reflection.  Another critical issue is that of 
negotiating the power differential between children and adults and reaching general 
consensus about how children are conceptualised and the role of children in society.  
Once consensus is reached, on this then it is possible to proceed to develop creative 
data collection techniques with children and construct novel ways of involving 
children in the research process.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction32
This chapter is predominantly concerned with reaching an understanding of the 
young people’s perceptions of well-being.  More specifically, the focus is on 
elucidating the discourses that they use and highlighting the discursive practices that 
they draw on to make sense of their well-being.  The emerging discourses will then 
be used to develop the meanings of childhood.   
 
 
The central discourses emerging from the corpus of texts were located in three broad 
thematic categories or domains viz. personal safety, social and environmental 
context, and socio-psychological well-being.  These discourses, as they emerge 
within the thematic domains, are presented below.   
 
5.2 Thematic Domains of Well-Being 
5.2.1 Personal Safety 
Being exposed to, and experiencing various forms of violence, abuse and criminal 
activity were the key elements of this thematic domain.  These issues were 
invariably associated with the specific social contexts of the participants.  
Furthermore, the discourses strongly point to the psychological functioning of the 
participants.  A range of psychological responses associated with violence and abuse 
manifested in the focus group sessions, with fear and anxiety being the most 
prominent responses.  In their explication of well-being, this domain was the most 
dominant and prolific in the discussion, generating intense reactions.  
 
                                                 
32 Some of the extracts have been translated from Afrikaans and are presented in English.  
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The extracts below demonstrate the intensity of the children’s responses: 
1. FR: Violence. People in the neighbourhood always clashing with one 
2. another.  
3. FR: Sexual abuse and AIDS are the things that bother me. I know this 
4. girl that went out with this guy and he drugged her and when she came 
5. to her senses she discovered she was raped! It’s sickening to know that  
6. such things are happening to us children. 
7. F:   That’s really sad! So this is what I’m hearing…  
8. MR: I think the world has gone crazy. Men and everyone need anger 
9. management. 
10. MR …if you are a man, you must never hit a woman.  And to see it in  
11. front of you is just the worst experience. 
12. FR: At a very young age you expose yourself to all kinds of gangster  
13. elements, especially growing up in Cape Town. 
14. FR: That doesn’t mean that we should accept these elements! 
15. MR: I know, but we’re so used to it.  We sometimes seem not to notice  
16. it anymore. 
17. FR: You get grade 4 children with no life-experience shouting gang  
18. slogans and talking to each other in a gangster lingo. Now you tell me,  
19. where did they get that from? 
20. MR: It could be anybody: a parent, an uncle, friend or just the 
21  neighbourhood. 
22. MR: So we should hold all of society accountable. 
       Extract 1 (Group 1) 
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The children’s comments in the above excerpt signify their intense dissatisfaction 
with the pervasiveness of violence in their society and introduce a highly 
conspicuous discourse i.e. ‘personal safety as a non-negotiable’.  This discourse was 
particularly evident in the delivery of the responses.  Furthermore, the tone and 
demeanour portrayed a sense of exigency.  This, together with the fact that all the 
participants of the group responded in a consistent and forceful manner, supports the 
non-negotiable sentiment of the discourse.  Further evidence of its significance is 
revealed in the fact that all the participants within the study acknowledged the 
impact of experience and exposure to violence on their lives and well-being. 
 
In Line 2 of the above extract, a female participant demonstrates the close proximity 
and imminence of instances of abuse and sexual violence in her anecdotal portrayal 
of a sexually violent incident. This, together with a first hand account of witnessing 
violence (Line 4), functions to lend a sense of credibility to the contentions as well 
as attempting to ensure that a complete understanding is achieved by the 
interlocutors.  It is further interesting to note how the participants make sense of 
violence by the critical appraisal of how it is perpetuated in society.  They even 
extended the appraisal to include an examination of their own responses to it (Lines 
14-21).  The discourse does however portray the resistance towards the current state 
of affairs regarding crime and violence.  However, by displaying a sense of 
familiarity with instances of violence as well as a keen self-awareness of their 
reaction and responses to it: “we are so used to it”, a discursive theme, albeit of a 
contradictory nature to the dominant discourse, that of ‘desensitisation’, emerges.  
This theme is rather interesting as it appears to be running a strong contradictory line 
to the dominant discourse, yet is conspicuously present.  On closer examination 
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however, the desensitisation in fact supports the discourse, as it suggests an intense 
familiarity and consistent exposure.  The emergence of this theme supports findings 
by Overstreet and Braun (2000) as well as Leoschut and Burton (2006) who found 
that subjects reported feeling safe even though they were exposed to chronic 
community violence.  The contradiction between this dominant discourse and the 
conspicuous portrayal of desensitisation is the first indication of the contestations 
present within the meaning making process of the participants. 
 
A further point to note is the participants’ use of the narrative to demonstrate the 
meanings of exposure to violence.  Shaw (2004) demonstrates how narratives 
provide a route to meaning.  In this instance both the anecdotal experience and the 
self appraisal are presented in narrative form.  Thus, in the process of retelling, the 
participants are allowing themselves an opportunity to re-examine the details of the 
experiences of violence in an attempt to make sense of the experiences (Shaw, 
2004).  
 
While the internal reaction to violence is not overt in the above extract, it is 
conspicuously demonstrated in the following selection of excerpts from the rural 
high school participants: 
1. MR Must not worry that people are going to attack you 
2. [silence] 
3. MR [different respondent] For example you are walking, and there by  
4. us it is very dark and there are no streetlights, I’m actually quite scared,  
5. and the path that I’ve to walk to get to my friends is very dark, I’m too  
6. scared, I cant see where the people are going to come out to attack me,  
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7. and the police drive very quickly, without taking note of anything, they  
8. are only interested in doing there own things.  
9. FR I want to walk as I want, it is not nice to have to look over your  
10. shoulder all the time 
      Extract 2 (Group 3: translated) 
 
In Line 1, the respondent clearly constructs his well-being as being dependent on a 
psychological state, inferring constructs such as fear, anxiety and psychological 
distress in relation to the issue of safety.  This is consistent with previous research 
which shows a relationship between persistent exposure to community violence and 
negative emotional and behavioural outcomes (see e.g. Berman, Kurtines, Silverman 
& Serafini, 1996; Bowen & Chapman, 1996; Cooley-Quille, Turner & Beidel, 1995; 
Hinton-Nelson, Roberts and Snyder, 1996; Osofsky, 1995; Overstreet & Braun, 
2000).  Furthermore, research has also shown that exposure to community violence 
can lead to a state of chronic threat characterised by symptoms of post traumatic 
stress disorder (Overstreet & Braun, 2000; Pynoos, Steinberg & Goenjian, 1996).  A 
closer examination of the extract posits that this respondent qualifies the previous 
statement without any prompting from the facilitator (Line 3).  This response was 
possibly induced by the participants’ dissatisfaction with the lack of detail provided 
by the previous respondent and the subsequent need to provide a comprehensive and 
detailed explanation, so that the message could be more powerfully delivered.  In so 
doing, he not only foregrounds the significance of ‘safety’ but also elucidates the 
multidimensional nature of children’s well-being.  The final response (Lines 9-10) 
supports the previous statement, also pointing to the inherent fear present in 
children’s daily functioning as well as behaviour restriction.  Similarly, Overstreet 
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and Braun (2000) acknowledge that perception of threat may lead to change in 
behaviour characterised by the preference of indoor activities to outdoor activities.  
Perception of threat has also been found to have a negative impact on academic 
achievement (see e.g. Henrich, Schwab-Stone, Fanti, Jones & Ruchkin, 2004).  The 
dominant discourse present in the extract is nevertheless that of ‘safety as a non-
negotiable’. 
 
The excerpts are further suggesting that well-being (in this case psychological), is 
exacerbated by poor infrastructural and service delivery.  The children claimed that 
the poor conditions of the road, lack of streetlights and the lack of police officials in 
the area contributed negatively to their well-being as it increased their risk of 
personal injury.  Similarly Dawes (2003) believes that this is typical of areas 
characterised by poverty.  He believes that interventions focussed on the 
improvement of infrastructure, safety and reduction of poverty would contribute to 
the improvement of the quality of life and well-being of children in these 
communities.  Salzinger, Feldman, Stockhammer and Hood (2002) further outline 
the relationship between exposure to violence and neighbourhood (community) 
contextual factors.  Advocating for an ecological perspective, these authors argue 
that exposure is positively correlated with economic disadvantage.  Similarly, 
Esbensen and Huizinga (1991) as well as Schwab-Stone, Ayers, Kasprow, Voyce, 
Barone, Shriver, and Weissberg (1995)  found that neighbourhood type was related 
to violence exposure, with children from poorer neighbourhoods reporting higher 
levels of community exposure.  An important point to note when engaging with 
these texts is the inherent sense of helplessness portrayed by these and the other 
participants of the study.  They clearly are presenting themselves as helpless 
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recipients of the situation.  When probed regarding their role in society, they 
responded as follows. 
1. FR: What can we do, that’s the way it is 
2. I: What do you mean, why don’t you do something 
3. MR: Its just the way things are.  Like what, as a teenager you can’t  
4. just do things 
5. I: Why not 
6. MR: [responds] because it doesn’t work like that… 
7. FR: But we shouldn’t just take things lying down, we are people too… 
       Extract 3 (Group 7) 
 
The above represents the first indication of ideology in action.  From the above 
extract, it seems that the participants have bought into the notion that “its just the 
way things are” and have to some extent accepted their position in society.  While 
this ‘interpretive repertoire’ is challenged later in the discussion, the above extract 
portrays the legitimisation and reification modus operandi of ideology, in the sense 
that they have prescribed to the notion of social relations between adults and 
teenagers (children) being natural and permanent and which follows a line of 
reasoning that ultimately legitimates and rationalises the nature of the social 
relations between the two.  A concept put forward by Potter and Wetherell (1992), 
an interpretive repertoire is defined as:  
a culturally and habitual line of argument comprised of recognisable 
themes, common places and tropes (Wetherell, 1998, p. 400).   
And 
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The building blocks speakers use for constructing versions of actions, 
cognitive processes and other phenomena.  Any particular repertoire is 
constituted out of a restrictive range of terms used in a specific or stylistic 
and grammatical fashion.  Commonly these terms are derived from one 
or more key metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be 
signalled by certain tropes or figures of speech. (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, 
p. 172) 
And 
By interpretive repertoires we mean broadly discernable clusters of 
terms, descriptions or figures of speech often assembled around 
metaphors…they are available resources for making evaluations, 
constructing factual versions and performing particular actions. (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1995, p. 89) 
 
However, even though there appeared to be a prescription to this repertoire of 
children being of inferior in social status, there appears to be a subtle element of 
resistance already emerging (Line 7).  It is this element that lays the foundation for 
the contestations that emerge later.  Of equal significance to note, is the presence of 
another important theme that is also touched upon, that of helplessness, which needs 
to be examined vis-à-vis the broader context of psychological reaction to violence.  
While the emotional response of fear was already alluded to previously, the 
psychological reaction becomes pertinent. 
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To further examine the relationship between violence exposure and the participants’ 
perceived psychological reaction, it may be useful to consider further explications.  
The following excerpt, for example, provides further context and evidence. 
1. FR: you mustn’t come home and think will my father hit me, will he  
2. hit my mother, or something like that 
3. MR: you need to feel that you are surviving in this world, to be in a  
4. stable environment… to come home and feel happy and safe 
5. FR: even if you live in a poor household you need to feel safe 
6. FR: what about the Std. 6 girl that was raped by one of the men who  
7. worked by the school. There are quite a few things like that going  
8. around…it’s the norm… we just so used to hearing these things. 
       Extract 4 (Group 2) 
 
The above extract undoubtedly demonstrates a close relationship between violence 
and their psychological state demonstrated by the ‘feelings of safety’ discursive 
theme.  Line 1 makes the link between the psychological state and exposure and the 
experience of intra-familial and inter-spousal violence.  There is a large corpus of 
literature that outlines the psychological sequelae of inter-spousal violence for 
children, e.g. depression and dissociative disorders (Malchiodi, 1997; Reynolds et 
al. 2001), anxiety disorders, eating disorders and phobic and obsessive responses 
(McIntosh, 2002) as well as low self-esteem, aggressive and regressive behaviours, 
poor interpersonal relations and self-blame (Campbell & Lewandowski, 1997; 
Cummings & Davies, 1994).  In Line 3, the participant further portrays the 
significance of perceived safety and emotional stability.  What is interesting is not 
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the relationship, which is in fact not new knowledge, but rather the degree of effort 
that the participants are going through to portray this relationship.   
 
The psychological reaction to violence reveals another discourse that is overtly 
present in the extract, that of ‘helplessness and vulnerability’.  Lack of agency in the 
negotiation of social relationships and engagement with the adult world, leaves the 
children vulnerable to the exploits of the adult world.  There is a sense that children 
are the receivers of the society’s actions and behaviours and, for various reasons, 
lack the capacity to challenge (physically or ideologically) the actions and 
behaviours.  Sentiments of legitimisation and reification are again subtly present in 
the above extract.  Strongly influenced by the discourse of ‘helplessness and 
vulnerability’, a further analysis of the responses shows the ‘personal safety as a 
non-negotiable’ discourse as omnipresent.  The repetition of the word(s) “need” and 
“happy and safe” demonstrates this contention explicitly.  It appears to be presented 
as an entitlement, which could indicate the assimilation of alternate repertoires into 
their cognitive structure.  In this case, it could be children’s rights rhetoric which 
was often a topic of discussion with the participants during the various meetings.  It 
could be the assimilation of these alternate meanings that initiates the resistance and 
contestation that becomes a key feature of the discussion, as will be revealed as the 
discussion progresses.  It is interesting to note their emphasis that this entitlement 
should apply to the lower economic group as well.  Lines 6-8 point to the frequency 
of these events, with further evidence of the ‘desensitisation’ discursive theme as 
there appears to be a sense of normalisation to this exposure. 
Another explicit example of violence exposure is presented by a female participant 
from an urban group. 
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1. FR: …we sit in class today and this female, not a female a girl at our  
2. school…  
3. she came down the bridge, …two guys came from behind her and  
4. grabbed her, and she  ran off… and when she came here she was in a  
5. state…         
       Extract 5 (Group 1) 
The discernible rearticulating of her words from “not a female,” to “a girl at our 
school” negates any probable perception of a far-removed relation.  This discursive 
manoeuvre to demonstrate the contiguity of the relationship serves to highlight their 
firsthand exposure to violence.  The extract further highlights the typical events that 
children are exposed to on a daily basis.  The children’s reaction to this sort of 
incident is best described by a female participant’s matter of fact response: 
1. FR: I feel unsafe and not secure 
       Extract 6 (Group 1) 
While the above quotation provides the quintessential expression of the children’s 
feelings towards violence, the deeper psychological impact is more cogently 
displayed in the following quotations by female participants: 
1. I: Do you feel unsafe in your neighbourhood? 
2. FR: Extremely, sometimes you just, when you walking and you  
3. thinking, what’s going to happen, what’s going to happen now when you 
4. go around this corner…we so scared…we can’t even breathe. 
       Extract 7 (Group 7) 
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1. FR: yes, you kind of inside you in this little umm like a box in this  
2. thing and there’s no way out because you the only one in the box and  
3. that’s how we feel when you constantly have to face these things that we 
4. can’t do anything about and you the only one there at the moment 
[emphasis added] 
       Extract 8 (Group 1) 
 
The first quotation depicts the daily psychological distress experienced by this 
participant, suggesting a consciousness governed by fear and anxiety.  The major 
concern is that these fears are not imagined or constructed, but presented as real and 
plausible possibilities.  The rest of the group concurred with this description and 
proceeded to provide further anecdotal evidence of exposure to violence.  This 
second extract (I feel unsafe and not secure), profound in both content and delivery, 
exemplifies the psychological impact of violence.  It suggests a life-world of 
constant struggle, isolation and helplessness.  The quotation further suggests a 
devastating impact on the development of the self.  Both the discourses of 
‘helplessness and vulnerability’ and ‘marginalisation’ are clearly evident in this 
quotation.  The manner of the delivery further depicts the intensity of the feelings 
and assists in creating the ethos of ‘helplessness and vulnerability’.  The participant 
is experiencing her childhood as a space of helplessness, isolation and 
marginalisation.  While she is not directly attributing these experiences to the nature 
of adult-child relations, her constant use of the word ‘we’ is a subtle reference that 
undoubtedly refers to childhood as a unified and singular group, and by implication 
suggests that these experiences are brought on by the simple membership to the 
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social category of childhood.  The transformation of the singular to the collective 
pronoun is also of analytic value and depicts the participants’ intent.  This transition 
driven by the participants’ strategic intent, whereby the singular is used in 
collaboration with the metaphor to exaggerate the experience (in this case anxiety, 
isolation and helplessness), is meant to remind or sensitise the interlocutor to the 
typical reality of the childhood.  In this way the interlocutors are drawn into the 
experiences.  Furthermore, while she is not capturing the mechanisms of how 
ideology operates, the potential outcomes of the ideological process is starkly 
revealed. 
 
Even though the children concurred that their ‘helplessness’ was experienced as a 
collective, it also appears to be experienced individually, or in isolation, as the 
italicised part of the quotation strongly emphasises. This refers to the fragmentation 
modus operandi of ideology whereby the distinctions and divisions between 
individuals and groups are foregrounded, perpetuating disunity and creating in-
group and out-group symbolic forms.   
 
Closely related to exposure to violence, is the discursive theme of sexual abuse, 
which included discussion around inappropriate sexual propositioning.  The female 
respondents spoke at length of restricted freedom due to the threat of sexual violence 
and demonstrated their unhappiness in having their dress-code determined by the 
behaviour of men.  When asked what else they needed security from, they felt that 
“men”, especially “older men” were a threat. 
1. FR: Yes, older men proposition us all the time 
      Extract 9 (Group 6: Translated) 
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1. FR: I mean you as a girl or woman should be able to walk freely in. 
2 the road in whatever you want to wear and then the people they look at 
3. you and they have other ideas.  And that you should be able to do or   
4. wear whatever you want to.  And not be worried, oh don’t walk down  
5. here alone, they just rape you and stuff like that.  
6. FR I think girls can wear what they want to wear.  Like the men  
7. should just keep their hands off you [exclamation]. 
       Extract 10 (Group 2) 
1. FR: And I want to be safe, and say go where I want to go and walk  
2. where I want to walk… 
  Extract 11 (Group 1) 
1. FR: I just want to say that I want to be able to walk wherever I want  
2. and not be bothered by other people.  
      Extract 12 (Group 4:Translated) 
 
1. FR: The boys are so touchy, and we can do nothing… 
      Extract 13 (Group 6: Translated) 
 
The above extracts again elucidate the ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ discourse 
that is inherent to the corpora of texts, in as much as they are ‘helpless’ against the 
power that society, especially adults, exerts over children.  The extracts indicate that 
since the participants’ behaviours, actions and movements are restricted, the locus of 
power, in this instance is moved from the ideological to the physical.  The children’s 
reaction to this is explicit in their demonstration of internal psychological factors 
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such as ‘frustration’ and ‘desperation’ brought across by the intimation of what they 
“want” and the ways that their lives “should be”.  The emergence and apparent 
proliferation of this discourse is consistent with models of traumatic stress (see e.g. 
Pynoos et al., 1996) which identifies feelings of hopelessness and helplessness as 
outcomes of sustained exposure to violence. 
 
A rather interesting and contradictory discursive theme that emerged within one 
group was their lack of importance attached to exposure to violence.  The 
participants of this group, rather ironically, all resided in a neighbourhood that was 
characterised by violent crime, drug and alcohol abuse and high rates of 
unemployment.  Initially, it appeared that the reason for their indifference towards 
personal safety was as a result of them being street smart and able to negotiate the 
vagaries of a violent environment.  For example, participants acknowledged the 
relationship between safety and well-being but claimed that they “need to feel safe in 
order to feel well but for me its no problem I can handle myself in my 
neighbourhood”, and that they “knew all the gangsters” in their area.  There even 
appeared to be a sense of status attached to alignment with gangs with one female 
participant claiming that: 
1. FR: you see, I’m safe here, see my uncle is the leader of the biggest  
2. gang here, so no-one will mess with me. 
       Extract 14 (Group 6) 
 
Extract 14 was extremely interesting in its delivery.  While it appeared to be 
volunteered hesitantly, there was a subtle yet definite tone of pride.  In fact, the 
hesitation appeared to be used both consciously and deliberately to evoke a certain 
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aura.  It appears that a certain amount of status is attached to gang association.  In 
this case, the association is used in a sort of crude positioning.  In other words, 
positioning herself as a close relative of a notorious gangster she achieves two 
things.  Firstly, she is both confirming her safety to the group and reaffirming the 
notion that her social environment is a place of safety for her.  Secondly, she is 
raising her status within the group.  Even though Wetherell (1998) points out that 
subject positions are highly occasioned and situated, the above two points suggest 
that it would not be a huge leap to suggest that she engages in similar positioning 
within her social circle in general.  Her presentation of this information subsequently 
led to a barrage of other participants claiming similar safety networks with 
gangsters, based largely on friendship and familial relations.  At this point there are 
a number of positions being taken up by various participants.  Antaki, Condor and 
Levine (1996) note the important relationship between this type of positioning and 
the maintenance of social identities: 
Such bringings-to-bear are briefly over and done, of course, but their 
accumulated record is what gives a person their (portfolio of) identities.  
Ephemeral as they might be, they become available for future invocation 
…The speakers are doing these things at once: invoking social identities, 
negotiating what the features or boundaries of those identities are and 
accumulating a record of having those identities.  They will be able in the 
next round of their interactional history, to draw on having all been 
exposed to this conversational display of identities. (p. 488) 
 
This bout of positioning presented above, while seemingly contradictory to the 
dominant discourse, in fact, reaffirms it quite profoundly, as even though they 
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regarded personal safety as a non-issue, they nonetheless engaged in rather arduous 
and rigorous accounts of positioning themselves as ‘safe children’.  Put crudely, 
from the participants’ point of view, it is profoundly important, but not an issue. 
 
Thereafter, the discussion suggested that their feelings towards safety were couched 
within the ‘desensitisation’ discursive theme.  The participants in this specific group 
spoke freely about the witnessing of both domestic and neighbourhood violence.  
There was a clear indication that these instances of violence were common everyday 
occurrences.  They appeared to have a matter of fact response to questions about 
how it affected them.  One could then argue that it is not a desensitisation, or even 
that a means of coping has evolved.  Rather, it appears that it has become 
assimilated as part of life and what it means to be a child.  As the following excerpt 
suggests: 
1. FR: Actually, you don’t think of it 24/7, it’s just built into the way you  
2. are 
       Extract 15 (Group 5)  
 
This assimilation and strong sentiment of ‘naturalisation’ in the above extract 
demonstrates the reification mode of operation of ideology, as the participant has 
subscribed to the idea that their reaction is normative and typical.  The extent of the 
‘reification’ is made apparent when examining the tone of participant’s response, 
which was complacent, proud and even sanctimonious.  In this instance the 
reification functions by creating this sense of natural progression and masking the 
fact that it is actually being used to exert control over the individual.  The essence of 
the domination is further exaggerated by the fact that the participant has not only 
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subscribed to this naturalised sense of progression but also feels a sense of 
accomplishment and achievement. 
 
Further discussion, albeit much later in the session, revealed further contradictions 
within the discourses.  Here the same participants intimated about the importance of 
safety in groups.  They claimed that it was important to walk home from school in a 
group, and also highlighted the dangers of certain areas within the community.  It is 
therefore, rather contradictory to earlier claims.  The discussion again carried a 
‘matter of fact’ tone.  The claim that it appears to be an accepted factor of their 
existence and assimilated into the meaning of childhood is again apparent and is 
explicitly demonstrated in the participants’ discussion of ‘walking the angles’.  As 
the excerpt below demonstrates: 
1. FR: You must know how to walk the angles. 
2. I: What do you mean 
3. FR: You know the angles.  The guys always want to grab you, so  
4. when they see you coming, they stand in a way that they can easily grab 
5  you 
6. I: Grab you in a sexual way? Is that what you mean? 
7. FR: [responds] Yes, so walk in a way that takes you past them  
8. where they can’t grab you, but at the same time, you don’t walk the  
9. long way, or show them that you avoiding them.  You mustn’t  
10. show them that you scared, they mustn’t think you just a  
11. litie (child)… I won’t let them see… if they see then they target you…  
12. then you in groot (big) trouble. 
       Extract 16 (Group 5) 
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While the above extract lends further support to the discourse of ‘safety as a non-
negotiable’ discourse, it demonstrates the complexity of the discourse.  Firstly, at a 
minimum, it suggests that they are reasonably street smart.  Secondly, it strongly 
intimates that this knowledge has been garnered through experience, which 
essentially translates into actual unwanted physical contact with strong sexual 
connotations.  Finally, it also shows how the social environment is a key 
determinant of behaviour.  In this case, the social category (of being a child) is a 
determinant of behaviour.  It is further interesting to note the participant’s 
suggestion of not showing fear (Lines 8-10).  In this case the participant is 
suggesting that at times, when one’s safety is threatened, it is important not to 
present yourself as a child.  Interestingly, the participant uses the colloquial term 
“litie” in reference to a child.  This term, while directly translating into the word 
child, carries a definite connotation of weakness or inferiority.  This suggests that 
membership to the childhood social category carries an implication of weakness, 
‘helplessness and vulnerability’.  The question is therefore, if the individual was an 
adult would they experience the situation in the same way as the child did. 
 
Other contradictory themes were also present in the discourses.  Previous discussion 
demonstrated how participants would go to great lengths to depict their world as 
unsafe.  The claim that “the world is not safe, the adults make it not safe” best 
demonstrates this contention.  However, these claims advanced some contradictory 
engagement, as the following dialogue illustrates: 
1. FR1: Why are parents so overprotective? 
2. FR2: but they have to be because they want to keep their children safe. 
3. FR1: if you going to be overprotective, but then they are going to lie. 
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4. FR2: But children also do wrong things. 
5. FR1:  but you can’t also just keep children in – then they not going to  
6. experience the world 
7. FR3: In a way it is wrong because you can’t keep children in, but also 
8. in a way you must also allow them… 
       Extract 17 (Group 6)  
 
The extract depicts the conflicting nature of the participants meaning making 
process.  The four subsequent responses to the question in Line 1 show opposing 
points of view with a subtle use of the blaming rhetoric as a means of justification.  
The repetitive use of the word “but” is also strategically used by the participants to 
advance and justify their argument.  This whole engagement is further enhanced by 
the precise turn taking by the participants. The nature and tone of the engagement 
suggests that there was a definite sense that they felt it important that both sides’ 
argument was equally presented.  This point is substantiated by the final response 
where another participant summarised the debate lending equal credence to both 
points of view.  Of course, the participants are in effect involved in a recreation of 
the protection/liberation repertoire that is topical within contemporary child 
research. 
 
The importance of social support was also apparent.  For these children, social 
support was important in helping them to negotiate the daily threats to their personal 
safety.  Consider for example the following extracts: 
1. FR: to me, its like say security is like … I know that if someone  
2. should do something wrong to me I can run to one of my family not to  
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3. defend me but to at least tell them and they will either support, not  
4. support me, but stand up for.  
      Extract 18 (Group 1) 
 
1. MR: Yes, umm your parents can, security can also be in the form of  
2. protection, where they tell u no don’t go to that place that’s the wrong  
3. party.  That for me is also security. 
4. MR: security of your friendship with you friends 
5. F: Okay, what is that 
6. MR: you can rely on them if you need something or you them to do  
7. something for you they will always be there. You secure that you can  
8. rely on them. That is also a form of security. 
       Extract 19 (Group 1) 
 
The above extracts provides both active (“they tell you don’t go to that place that is 
the wrong party”) and passive (“you can rely on them…they will always be there”) 
depictions of the buffering role that social support can play in relation to personal 
safety issues.  In this instance it is unique that the ‘us’ and ‘them’ rhetorical 
strategies are used to demonstrate a positive and beneficial rather than a polarised 
relationship, which it is generally used to achieve.  However, further in the analysis 
the same rhetorical strategies are used as a means to demonstrate a different 
outcome.  As presented previously, the parents’ involvement in the social lives of 
children is then depicted in stark contrast to the above.   
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Overall, the discourses to emerge within this thematic category reveal overt issues of 
power.  The discourses demonstrate that their feelings of insecurity and cognitions, 
which include perception of threat, show how the meanings attached to childhood 
establish relations of domination.  Put differently, it reveals how the interplay of 
power constructs various meanings of childhood. 
     
5.2.2 Social and Environmental Context 
“To be in a stable environment” was often the first response to the question of well-
being, suggesting that the broader social context is a key determinant of well-being.  
This response was usually met with a high degree of concurrence among participants 
and it was often presented as a proviso for well-being.   
1. FR: because if a child has a good home environment and brought up  
2. properly, then there’s no problem, but if the environment is not good,  
3. then there’s always problems 
4. FR: Yes, I agree, I think you need a stable environment… 
       Extract 20 (Group 7) 
 
The above extract elucidates how the ‘if – then’ and ‘if – but’ rhetorical strategies 
are used to advance the notion of causality between the social environment and well-
being.  A ‘stable environment’ can thus be included as a ‘non-negotiable’ discourse.  
The participants conceptualised the environment as constituting both the physical 
and social environment and often included discussion around infrastructure, 
recreational facilities, as well as services such as transport, municipal, health and 
police services.  This conceptualisation provides further evidence of the need to 
address the concept of child well-being, as an integrated whole, rather than 
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perceiving it as a distinct multi-dimensional phenomena.  In other words, the 
components or domains of well-being should be perceived as closely interrelated 
and mutually influencing and should not be considered in isolation from each other.  
As the discussion continues, this phenomenon becomes more explicit. 
 
Poor infrastructure and lack of community services were frequently mentioned as 
impediments to well-being.  As previously mentioned, this was to a large extent 
related to personal safety.  A female respondent believed that the poor conditions of 
the road, lack of streetlights and the lack of police officials in the area contributed 
negatively to their well-being.   
 
The lack of recreational facilities emerged consistently as a point of discussion.  The 
participants mentioned the need for a gym, parks, a library, a swimming pool and 
community centre.  They believed that the presence of these facilities would 
contribute significantly to their well-being.  More specifically, they felt that it would 
help them “forget about problems” and “calm” them.  A female respondent further 
mentioned that the lack of these activities for children was often the instigating 
factor that contributed to their involvement in deviant behaviour. 
1. MR: We do not have recreational facilities in our neighbourhood.   
2. Therefore most of the young people end up just drinking and so on 
3. MR: There is not enough things to do 
4. F: The fact that there are not enough things to do here – How does it  
5. make you feel?  
6. MR: We do wrong things 
7. F: Like what? 
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8. FR: Drink, use drugs  
9. MR: Experiment with drugs and such things… 
10. F: And how does it make you feel?  
11. MR: Frustrated, its like banging your head against the wall. 
      Extract 21 (Group 3: Translated) 
 
The above extract shows the blaming rhetoric in action.  The participants are clearly 
trying to externalise the cause of deviant behaviour.  This is accomplished by the use 
of the blaming rhetoric to maximise the causal relationship between the lack of 
recreational activities and deviant behaviour.  The recreational activities in this way 
function as an excuse for the deviant behaviour.  Excuses are accounts which 
acknowledge that certain related acts are adverse but claim that the genesis of the 
acts lie in some external agency (Austin, 1962; Potter & Wetherell, 1992).  Using 
Semin and Manstead’s (1983) typology of excuses, a closer look at the extract 
suggests that the participant is ‘appealing to mitigating circumstances’ and using the 
lack of recreational activities as a ‘scapegoat’.  The use of the metaphor (Line 11) 
also deserves some consideration.  In this instance the participant is using a 
metaphorical construction to help package and present the contention more 
persuasively.  Overall, the rhetorical strategies in the above extract are functioning 
to maintain the social integrity of young people at one level and the social standing 
of the actual participant on another.  While this appears to be the functional aim of 
the account, it also implicitly reveals that the participants’ behaviour is to a large 
extent contingent on the social context which is ultimately determined by adult 
society.  The level of autonomy that children have over their behaviour is therefore 
questioned. 
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Probably the most telling explication of the significance of this category was 
presented by male participants from the urban group.  In the first of the two extracts 
presented below, the participant comments on the prerequisites for well-being.  He 
asserted: 
1. MR: Probably to enjoy your life…and your surrounding have to be  
2. totally A Ok. 
3. I: A Ok? 
4. MR: [replies]Yes, where you live and where you stay, the people  
5. around you, your friends and family; the stuff that you do: in your 
6. family; and things like that  
7. should be OK.  Because if its not, then there’s going to be trouble. 
       Extract 22 (Group 1) 
 
The ‘non-negotiable’ discourse is again evident; in this instance it is related to the 
social environment.  It is interesting to note how the participant perceives his well-
being as a fusion of the social milieu (“your surrounding has to be A OK”) and 
social relations (“your family and friends; the stuff that you do in your family and 
things like that should be OK”) and presents it as a definitive condition of well-being 
(“because if its not, then there’s going to be trouble”).  This excerpt provides further 
evidence that well-being consists of closely related and mutually influencing 
elements rather than disparate components.  Kjørholt (2003) similarly argues that: 
research focusing on childhood and children’s social practices in everyday 
life must also include the dynamic inter-relations between children’s 
 
 
 
 
 191 
activities and practices with peers on the one hand, and the surrounding 
society and cultural context on the other. (p. 262) 
 
In the second extract, the participant comments on the impact of the social 
environment: 
1. MR: Its how your environment is, like say you live in an  
2. environment where you just drink, fight and that.  Now you can’t be 
3. a child in an environment like that.  Then the children in the road,  
4. they do things like adults do.  Now you feel so out, then you also want 
5. to do it, then you have to make a choice now.  Do you want to do it or 
6. don’t you. But it’s complicated.  Once you do it then you are no  
7. longer a child…you not a child anymore, you now an adult… 
       Extract 23 (Group 5) 
 
For this participant the social environment is the defining factor in the experience of 
childhood.  While the participant touched on the issue of peer pressure and the need 
for group membership, the emergent point is the contested nature of childhood.  
Here the contestation is at the level of the individual.  The social environment 
creates a dilemma which the child then has to contest within the self.  The fact that 
the child has two options, both of which have undesirable consequences, is further 
evidence of the constestation.  On the one hand, you risk sacrificing your childhood 
membership as the participant is claiming that involvement in some activities 
implies a premature termination of childhood.  It is clear that, on this occasion at 
least, the participant has conceptualised childhood as a space of innocence and 
purity.  He is thus, discursively it seems, protecting the integrity of childhood, 
 
 
 
 
 192 
because “once you do it then you are no longer a child”.  However, on the other 
hand, you run the risk of being marginalised and isolated.  Group membership and a 
sense of acceptance are important factors that impact on the integrity of the self.  
The fact that abstention would lead to a potential loss of group membership is 
significant.  It is these forms of dilemmas that inhibit the world of the child and 
shows how the social environment could act as a key determinant of well-being.  It 
appears that even the social environment can potentially act as a space for ideology. 
 
The participant further voiced discontent about poor community services and was 
especially irate about poor health and police services, citing instances of corruption 
and inefficiency as well as lack of access to medication and poor treatment at these 
facilities.  They further indicated that they, as children were often discriminated 
against.  Commenting on experiences of requesting condoms at the local health 
clinic, the children reported: 
1. Multiple Respondents: They don’t want to give you 
2. MR: [imitates response from clinic] You are too young. 
3. FR: [continues imitation] You too young , you cant have sex  
4. MR: And they also say… 
5. MR: [imitates general response] Go away you wasting our time, go...  
6. I: Now what effect does that have on young  people…  
7. MR: We stay away 
8. FR: And they rude…on this one occasion when I was sick and went to  
9. the clinic without an appointment, I was horribly insulted in front of  
10. other people. 
      Extract 24 (Group 3: Translated) 
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The above extract is a quintessential example of discourses in action.  The 
proliferation of these discourses fuel negative perceptions of children (Prout & 
James, 1997), which in turn leads to discriminatory practices against young people, 
as the last quotation demonstrates.  The use of narratives as well as the act of 
imitating adults’ responses to children (Line 2 and 3) is decisive in that it posits the 
participants’ insistence on the accurate portrayal of how children are treated.  The 
imitation itself was devoid of any humour in its delivery and was used exclusively as 
a mechanism to portray accuracy.  This imitation is a well-known discursive 
technique of ‘speaking by the mouth of the other’ which enables the speaker to make 
inferences about what the ‘other’ believes.  It has the further rhetorical outcome of 
ridiculing the other’s opinions or words33
 
.   
What is fundamental about these engagements with society is the young people’s 
behavioural (“we stay away”, from the clinic) reaction to it.  Various other accounts 
and anecdotal evidence from the participants posit the profound effect that these 
discourses and common-sense constructions of children have on the behavioural 
patterns of the young people.  One participant was highly convinced that the skewed 
perceptions of adult society towards young people were directly responsible for a 
number of deviant-type behaviours.  She argued thus: 
1. FR: I know of this couple, this young couple that decided to have sex,  
2. or not like decided but wanted to have sex.  So the guy went to the clinic  
3. for condoms, and you know…he was chased away… and now the girl is  
4. pregnant. 
5. I: But you can’t blame it on the clinic, the staff at the clinic didn’t force  
                                                 
33 See van Dijk et al (2004) for further examples. 
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6. the couple to have sex.  That was irresponsible to have sex like that, don’t 
7. you think 
8. FR: No, the responsible thing was to go to the clinic to get condoms…  
9. they did that… so were they responsible or not?… so much AIDS here 
10. world today, adults getting AIDS from not wanting to use condoms, so  
11. those young people were very responsible, even more responsible than 
12. all the thousands of people that got AIDS from sex without condoms.   
13. But sometimes you just react. 
14. I: You make a good point.  But why did they still have sex then… were  
15. they just reacting to the clinic, to show them… 
16. FR: Its difficult to say you know, I don’t know what was going  
17. their minds… but sometimes you just react, like you don’t care because  
18. you can’t anymore with people that treat you like nothing… and the  
19. hormones maybe the hormones made them just do it. 
      Extract 25 (Group 4: Translated) 
 
The above account makes for an interesting analysis.  In this account it is rather 
axiomatic that the participant is going to great lengths to depict the young people as 
responsible.  To a certain degree she achieves this in her precise detailed narration of 
the sequence of events as they unfolded.  She specifically details certain acts of the 
young people that depict them as blameless whilst similarly depicting the behaviour 
of the clinic staff as blameworthy.  When questioned on this (Line 5), the defences 
were immediate, as if anticipated.  The participant at this point in the discussion had 
two options, either justification or an excuse.  The immediacy of the defence 
suggests that the participant had previously deliberated on the matter and organised 
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a cogent retort in the form of a justification.  The overall upshot of the defence is 
that the young couple were actually “very responsible”, even more so than the 
typical adult couple.  The nature of a justification in this sense is that they remind 
the interlocutor of the broader frame of ethics, moral conventions and societal rules 
wherein life is carried out (Gergen, 1999). 
 
With further interrogation, the rhetorical tactics and defences are however changed.  
Here, the participant first rhetorically distances herself from the couple, in what can 
be called a ‘denial of volition’ (Semin & Manstead, 1983) and subsequently comes 
up with an excuse for the activity (Lines 16-19).  In this way the veracity of the 
excuse cannot be questioned, as “I don’t know what was going through their minds”, 
lends greater credence to the excuse.  Potter (1997) refers to the use of “I don’t 
know” as stake inoculation.  The fact that people perceive others as always having a 
vested interest in some position, often leads respondents to present themselves as 
having no stake in the outcome.  If they are seen as having no interest, then their 
position will be regarded as valid and untainted.  In this extract the “I don’t know” is 
strategically used to create this discursive distance.   
 
The excuse itself contained three arms which compliment each other and lend 
further credibility.  The first was located internally, “you just react”, the second was 
located externally in the form of scapegoating, “cant anymore with people that treat 
you like that” and the third was based on natural drives, “maybe the hormones made 
them just do it”.  These excuses are consistent with Scott and Lyman’s (1968, as 
cited in Potter & Wetherell, 1992) typology of excuses.  In all three instances the 
aim was to externalise the blame and deflect attention away from matters where 
 
 
 
 
 196 
blame could potentially be allocated.  The focus of social constructionism and 
discourse analysis in particular is on how accounts are constructed.  The account 
above shows how the participant uses various rhetorical strategies and discursive 
techniques to construct their version of the events.  A further point of consideration 
is examining both the function or purposes it achieves as well as the outcomes.  
From an ideological perspective it is necessary to look beyond discourse and even 
beyond the context that provides meaning to the discourse.  It is essential for the 
ideological analyst to elucidate the underlying power relations that are present.  
More specifically, how is language used to mask certain instances of domination?   
In this case in particular, what emerged as significant was how language was used, 
strategically and deliberately, to elucidate and expose instances of domination.  
  
Finally, closely noting the vast array of children’s ‘needs’ as well as the experienced 
discrimination, the discourse of ‘(non)-acknowledgment’ is evident.   
1. I: Do you think that sometimes adults don’t acknowledge, don’t believe  
2. that as young people you should have rights and … 
3. MR: [continues] and that we don’t belong to this world… only when  
4. you 21.  Yes, I think so. 
5. FR: They say [imitates] “What rights do you have, you are children,  
6. you must just do”     Extract 26 (Group 1) 
 
The above extract is suggesting that on a societal level children appear not to be 
acknowledged for the role that they play in society, or as valid social actors or 
contributors.  At best they are seen to be perceived as a nuisance as they are told “go 
away you wasting our time, go play or do something”.  At worst they are perceived 
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as non-valid members of society, encapsulated in the statement, “What rights do you 
have, you are children, you must just do” (Lines 5-6). At first glance it appears that 
the discourse of ‘non-acknowledgement’ is the dominant discourse.  A closer 
reading however points to the presence of the more powerful ‘marginalisation’ 
discourse.   
 
Furthermore, there seems to be a sentiment that children need to exercise a high 
degree of autonomy in their own individual development.  The paradox is 
conspicuous.  On a superficial level, it appears that children are being protected, and 
that is the sentiment that is very often put forward by adages such as “children 
should be seen and not heard”.  In this case it is “you are too young to have sex”.  
However, the participants claimed that society’s general reaction in terms of the 
behavioural response in this instance is overtly laissez-faire, with children largely 
left to their own development.  It is these attitudes and behavioural characteristics of 
adult society that strongly contributes to feelings of ‘marginalisation’ which is a key 
feature of the participants’ discourses.  For the children from the rural town, the 
geographical isolation further exacerbated the feelings of ‘marginalisation’.  This 
discourse of ‘marginalisation’ has significance for the following thematic domain as 
well. 
 
5.2.3 Socio-psychological 
This thematic domain included discussion around psychological well-being, social 
acceptance, participation, respect/acknowledgement, interpersonal relations, 
substance abuse, discrimination, role models and social support.    
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The significance of the ‘self’ as a key construct of psychological well-being was the 
central concept of psychological well-being.  However, following the 
epistemological position of the current study, the ‘self’ is conceived of discursively.  
In this way, the focus is not on the self as an entity but rather on the different ways 
the self is constructed within different contexts.  Potter and Wetherell (1992) 
explains that “the question becomes not what is the true nature of the self, but how is 
the self talked about, how is it theorised in discourse” (p. 102).  This perspective 
advances the notion of a multitude of selves.  Thus, depending on the context or 
intention, the person could draw on various models of the self to describe 
themselves. 
 
Whilst an analysis of the texts shows evidence of this multitude of constructions, the 
common denominator was the centrality of the ‘self’ in contributing to well-being.  
As the extracts reveal: 
1. I: What does it mean for you to be well? 
2. MR: To feel good about yourself, like inside you happy with who you  
3. are, and not to feel down. 
4. I: Can you give me an example, what do you mean to be happy with  
5. who you are? 
6. MR: Like, I’m good at sports and she now he’s good at schoolwork.   
7. So you must be happy with what you got… 
      Extract 27 (Group 3: Translated) 
1. FR: To be happy with yourself and to be pleased with your life as a  
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2. young person and not to be under or doing something that you don’t  
3 want to. 
      Extract 28 (Group 1) 
 
While each quotation is depicting a different theoretical variant of the ‘self’, e.g. 
trait theory “…I’m good at sports and she now she’s good at schoolwork”, and role 
theory “To be happy with yourself and to be pleased with your life as a young 
person”, well-being is clearly constructed around the integrity and stability of the 
‘self’.  In other words, being well means that the ‘self’ is functioning successfully.  
If the integrity of the ‘self’ is breached, well-being is compromised.  In the current 
study, it appears that society’s attitude towards young people could trigger these 
effects.  As two participants, commenting on some teachers’ attitudes and behaviour 
towards learners, state: 
1. FR: It destroys your self-esteem. 
2. MR: They are committing character murder. 
      Extract 29 (Group 1: Translated) 
 
These descriptions, both powerful in content and delivery, succinctly convey the 
notion of a fragile self-esteem.  The word usage is interesting as it indicates a sense 
of inevitability and permanency.  The discourse of ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ 
is also overtly present.  However, in this instance it appears that the participants are 
consciously aiming to project the ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ discourse.  Potter 
and Wetherell (1992) contend that the ‘self’ is articulated in discourse in ways that 
will enhance one’s claim to be heard.  Here the ‘self’ is positioned as being under 
duress, a fragile entity suffering under the throes of society.  By this subtle 
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positioning of the ‘self’ within the discourse, the participants are staking a stronger 
claim that their voices should be heard or warrant special consideration.  This 
discourse is itself ideological.  Not in the sense that it is maintaining relations of 
domination, but rather that it is being used to reveal instances of domination.  The 
fragility of the ‘self’ is the main concern implicitly highlighted by the above 
excerpts.  It is well accepted within developmental theory that the development of 
the ‘self’ is a product of the child’s interaction with society and that its development 
is critical for successfully negotiating subsequent stages of development.  If the 
development of the ‘self’ is then stifled, it is axiomatic that children’s development 
is going to be severely impeded.   In fact, this knowledge has become assimilated 
into the everyday discourse of child rearing practices.  In the discussions, it appeared 
as if the participants were using this notion to emphasise the severity of the abuse.  
Interestingly enough the word ‘abuse’ was not used in any of the narratives.   
 
Social acceptance also proved influential in the functioning of the self. 
1. FR: I think to be accepted for who you are. Not only at home, but also  
2. wherever you go. To be accepted for who you are… It’s very difficult. So  
3. being accepted would mean everything. 
       Extract 30 (Group 1) 
1. FR: …as a young person everybody, every single one wants to be  
2. accepted and  that’s why they do things to be accepted into a group. 
3. MR: Some children… they aren’t accepted so they do what they can  
4. to be accepted or at least acknowledged for their existence… at least  
5. that person knows, I exist.  I think that’s the main thing, children want  
6. to know that they exist that they are accepted by society. 
 
 
 
 
 201 
       Extract 31 (Group 7) 
 
An analysis of these quotations clearly point to the functioning of the ‘self’.  In this 
instance it shows that these participants have constructed well-being in terms of the 
social acceptance of their self.  It again also points to well-being being a socially 
negotiated construct.  The content and word usage further suggests that social 
acceptance should be perceived as a ‘non-negotiable’. 
 
Other signs of low self-esteem emerged in response to evidence of pervasive 
negative sentiment, most notably when children were falsely accused or when they 
were presumed guilty based solely on their social status as children. 
1. FR: They just want to accuse you of things.  They rude to you.  They  
2. don’t know how you feel when they accuse you and you feel so bad, you 
3. feel like you worth nothing that they can just say those things of you 
4. I: When do they accuse you of things 
5. FR: [responds] That happens all the time 
6. I: And for what kind of things? But lets face it, sometimes you’re guilty 
7. right. 
8. FR: [responds] For anything.  It’s like it’s their hobby 
9. FR: [different participant] Then we must suffer the consequences 
10. FR: [different participant] They accuse you of ten things then maybe 
11. you do only one 
      Extract 32 (Group 6: Translated) 
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The discourses of ‘(dis)respect and (non)acknowledgement’, as well as ‘helplessness 
and vulnerability’, are evident in the above extract.  Whilst it is obvious that the 
impact of constant false accusations would erode the integrity of the self-esteem, the 
means by which they carry that over discursively makes for interesting analysis.  An 
analysis of the taxonomy of the extract shows the following: The issue of 
accusations is introduced and clearly shown to affect the self since “you feel like you 
are worth nothing”.  At this point there is a dialogue between the interviewer and 
one participant.  However, when this point of view is challenged by the researcher, 
the participant resorts to the use of a metaphor34
 
 (Line 8).  What is revealed in this 
instance is that the metaphor was used as a strategy to modify and strengthen the 
account after the previous formulations failed to produce the desired result.  It also 
appeared to be used as an invitation to the other participants to enter the discussion 
as thereafter, other participants, who had been quiet up until that point, joined the 
discussion in vigorous support of the claims being made.  In this instance, it appears 
as if their silence indicated that they were satisfied with what their peer was 
communicating.  When the point of view was threatened, they rapidly engaged to 
ensure that their point of view prevailed.   
The discourses of ‘(non)acknowledgment and (dis)respect’ as well as ‘helplessness 
and vulnerability’ were similarly pervasive within other groups.  As the following 
collection of extracts aptly demonstrate: 
1. FR: People have to respect your opinion as a child 
       Extract 33 (Group 2) 
1. FR: Because people don’t respect you or the way you look or the way  
                                                 
34 In strict grammatical sense it is actually a simile and not a metaphor.  
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2. you are 
       Extract 34 (Group 1) 
1. I: Do you sometimes feel as a child that you are not… 
2. MR: Yes. Most commonly at school 
3. MR: [continues] teachers say, “shut up and then you can’t respond” 
4. F: You feel that is because you are a child 
5. MR: Yes, yes and you can’t even think of saying anything back 
      Extract 35 (Group 1: Translated) 
 
1. MR: If you are just sitting around, and you are a youngster, then you  
2. must be up to no good. 
       Extract 36 (Group 7) 
 
The above excerpts point to the centrality of respect in the well-being of children 
and also further illustrate the discourses of ‘(dis)respect and 
(non)acknowledgement’.  There is also a strong element of the discourse of 
‘helplessness and vulnerability’ which clearly links to the accusations that the 
participants highlighted in the previous extracts.  A point of note is the participant’s 
use of the present tense in his explanation of disrespect (Extract 35, Line 3).  This 
narrative technique has the result of making the incident more contemporaneous and 
real, and more effectively demonstrates their ‘helplessness’.  Again, it would be 
accurate to contend that the emerging discourses are not manifestations but rather 
intended outcomes.  What is interesting, however, is that even though the 
participants appear to be yielding to the societal structure they do not, in this extract 
at least, posit hegemonic tendencies typical of repressed social categories in society.  
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A key point to emerge here (Extract 36) is the claim that it was essentially their 
social status as children that contributed to this conduct of adult society.   
 
Further fuelling the ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ discourse is the fact that social 
convention does not allow for children to voice their opinion or views (see Extract 
35).  This can be understood within the normative view of ideology where common-
sense understandings are used to exercise control and maintain relations of 
domination.  In support of the above contention, consider the following extract: 
1. MR: But they will see you as unrespectful, you are disrespecting them 
2. if you like talking back to them… 
3. MR: The fact that children can’t make a point without being told “you 
4. backchatting” is a big problem.  Children can’t defend themselves. 
5. MR: …and you can’t prove your point to them… that’s the thing, you  
6. can’t  say it wasn’t your fault… 
       Extract 37 (Group 7) 
 
It is not a denial of rights to participation, or even general disrespect, but rather a 
lack of meaningful acknowledgement of children and young people as valid and 
contributing members of society that advances this ‘helplessness’.  An interesting 
phenomenon that emerged was how the ‘(non)acknowledgment and (dis)respect’ is 
used to advance the ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ discourse.  The content speaks 
to ‘(non)acknowledgment and (dis)respect’ but the intended message is clearly to 
project ‘helplessness’.  As contended previously, the ‘helplessness and 
vulnerability’ discourse is often not a manifestation but rather an intended outcome 
or conscious proclamation.  
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The extract further demonstrates a quintessential example of the ideological nature 
of childhood.  This ‘backchatting’ is a colloquial term which means responding to 
someone who is reprimanding you.  The common shared rule or convention is that 
children are not allowed to respond to adults when being reprimanded.  The use of 
the term ‘backchatting’ has thus become a means to perpetuate control over children.  
It can thus be seen as a discursive instrument of ideology.  Further in the study, the 
texts show how the participants themselves have actually subscribed to the concept. 
 
Furthermore, the previous extracts demonstrated the tendency of the participants to 
locate the genesis of the problem within adult society’s frame of reference.  The 
resulting tension is demonstrated in the following response: 
1. FR: My point is that if grown-ups can’t have respect for me then I  
2. can’t have respect for them. From my side, its just normal, wouldn’t you  
3. say, just say if someone doesn’t have respect for you its natural you not  
4. gonna (going to) have respect for them. 
       Extract 38 (Group 1) 
 
It appears that the children’s reaction to this culture of disrespect, in fact perpetuates 
a cycle of disrespect between children and society in general.  The disrespect is not 
always explicit, but often results in instances of social deviance and delinquency.  In 
this statement the participant is using the ‘us’ and ‘them’ rhetorical strategy to 
demonstrate a polarised relationship between themselves and adult society.  This 
‘othering’ discursive strategy, as well as the use of the blaming and justification 
strategies, is also obvious.  The essence of these strategies is human nature or natural 
reactions.  Potter (1996) argues that speakers have a tendency to construct accounts 
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which invoke privileged knowledge.  It is these accounts that contribute to the 
authenticity of the sequence.  In this case, the participant is commenting, with 
authority, on her experience of the interaction with adults.  The participant is 
blaming adult society, i.e. externalising the cause of their behaviour and 
simultaneously justifying their behaviour as a ‘natural’ reaction.   
 
The lack of acknowledgement of children’s perspectives appears also to be 
fundamentally contributing towards the ethos of non-participation.  The participants, 
for example, claimed that their input was not regarded as important and that no 
platform was provided for them to voice their opinion.  Exaggerating the issue of 
non-participation is that they were often denied the right to voice their concern on 
matters that directly affected them.  The following collection of extracts provides the 
most telling examples: 
1. FR: I want to be heard…they must take our opinion as important  
2. MR:  I believe children under 18 should participate. The constitution says 
3. that children have the right to be heard so when you’re young and a child 
4. it means that you have the right to be heard and you should question 
5. sometimes. 
6. FR:  Our opinion should be taken into consideration, we are a part of 
7. South Africa and our opinion should matter. 
8. MR: I mean we’re the future doctors, lawyers, teachers and 
9. researchers so our rights should be protected now people should  
10. satisfy our best interest and stuff, now already so that we can build up 
11. to be good citizens. 
       Extract 39 (Group 2) 
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1. FR: They must also give me a chance to have my say so that I can also  
2. be part of decisions that they make.  Most of the decisions that my father  
3. makes has an impact on me and most of the time its not even a good.   
4. Because decisions were made here that I must live with for the rest of  
5. my life and it was made without consulting my brother, sister or myself. 
      Extract 40 (Group 4: Translated) 
1. MR: You are not even allowed to present your side of the story then  
2. its a big deal 
3. MR: its very difficult to raise your voice and actually say something  
4. like this is wrong, no I don’t like this. 
5. MR: You all know that its your right, you know that? 
6. MR: …yes, but they actually stopping us from having a say, they don’t  
7. believe in our rights  
8. MR: They think that we don’t have rights because they are law    
       Extract 41 (Group 1) 
 
The above extracts all show a conviction for the right to ‘participation’, with 
‘participation’ presented as a ‘non-negotiable’ of well-being.  The extracts further 
posit the intensity of the responses towards participation with the participants’ 
narrative tone being quite animated and excited.  They contended that they were 
excluded from significant decisions and believed that this negatively impacted on 
their well-being.  They further showed an acute awareness of their rights, explicitly 
demanding recognition of their rights.  This could in all likelihood be a residue of 
the participatory method.  Participation was presented as dependent on adult 
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society’s acknowledgement of these participation rights as “they don’t believe in our 
rights”.  
 
Also present in the extracts are clear indications of the ‘(non)-acknowledgement’ 
discourse as children claimed that they should be acknowledged as bona fide 
members of society.  They further show that the ‘(non)-participation’ and 
‘(non)acknowledgement’ discourse act in a mutually influencing way.  Further 
evidence is presented in the following excerpt: 
1. I: Do you feel that you’re part of this world, part of this country part of  
2. this [interrupted] community 
3. MR: [interrupts] No, I don’t feel. 
4. I: Why not? 
5. MR: [responds]the people don’t take note that you also have  
6. freedom, that you don’t have a say in this world 
7. MR: Children also have rights…we also people, we also have a say 
8. FR: but we feel they don’t let you 
9. MR: They take it away. 
10. MR: They take it away from you yeah. 
       Extract 42 (Group 6) 
 
The key message transmitted by this extract is that participation is dependent on 
external acknowledgement, or more specifically on adult society’s 
acknowledgement that children posses the right to participate.  Given that the 
children are not acknowledged as valid members of society, their rights are not 
respected and opportunities for participation are limited.  There is a discursive move 
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from demand for rights to acceptance which demonstrates, discursively at least, the 
effect of ideology on discourse. 
 
As a result of the ‘non-acknowledgement’ and ‘non-participation’, protracted 
discussions further revealed how these discourses contributed to the discourse of 
‘marginalisation’.  For the rural participants these feelings of ‘marginalisation’ 
were exacerbated by their geographical isolation. In fact, they tend to experience 
their geographical isolation itself, as a form of marginalisation.  For most, the 
discourses vacillated between ‘(non)acknowledgement’, ‘non-participation’ and 
‘marginalisation’, with the latter undoubtedly the most powerful, as revealed by the 
following extracts. 
1. I: Do you feel sometimes that you don’t belong? 
2. MR: Yes 
3. FR: Everyday, all the time, and nobody listens to you 
4. I: What do you mean nobody listens to you 
5. FR: [replies] If you don’t belong then nobody listens to you, then  
6. they tell you [animates a waving away action] right? 
7. I: I don’t know, you tell me 
8. FR: [replies] Well, right 
9. I: How does it make you feel that nobody listens to you? 
10. FR: Junk 
11. FR: I feel they don’t care 
12. I: What does junk mean? [translated] 
13. FR: Junk man, like you don’t exist, you are not seen in this world… 
14. I: You don’t exist 
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15. FR: [emphatic] yes 
16. MR: You feel like a stranger 
17. MR: You feel out man 
18. FR: You feel so empty inside 
19. MR: And you can feel it here boiling up in your throat 
       Extract 43 (Group 5) 
 
The extract portrays classic ‘marginalisation’ discourse.  The participant’s response 
to the question (Line 3) is of particular interest.  It is axiomatic that she is 
responding not only to the question but also addressing the inadequacy of the first 
response.  She finds it important to elaborate on the first response which she 
probably deems inadequate.  However, she continues to upgrade her response from 
“everyday” to “all the time”, a discursive manoeuvre intended to emphasise the 
serious nature of the trend, as well as to ensure that the message is brought across 
adequately and forcefully.  This is also typical of what Edwards and Potter (2001) 
refer to as ‘extreme case formulation’ which refers to the use of extreme accounts to 
indicate commitment and investment in those accounts.  In this example, the 
extreme case is being used to strengthen the account against doubt and reservation 
(see also Pomerantz, 1986).  
 
Less apparent, but still conspicuous nonetheless, is that the participant is consciously 
and deliberately making the link between ‘(non)acknowledgement’ and 
‘marginalisation’.  Her response to the probe regarding this is fascinating and 
complex.  At face value it appears as if she is simply referring to group membership 
(“if you don’t belong”), with children on the receiving end of an outgroup status.  A 
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closer examination posits a number of discourses operating simultaneously within 
this seemingly innocuous statement.  Firstly, the ‘othering’ discursive strategy is 
apparent, elucidated by the presence of the “if – then” rhetorical strategy.  Secondly, 
the ‘(non)acknowledgement’ discourse is operative since “you don’t belong”, which 
in this instance, implies that outgroup status results in them not being acknowledged 
as valid members of a group.  In this case the group membership under question is 
personhood.  Thirdly, the ‘non-participation’ discourse is overtly present, elucidated 
in this case by the waving away gesture.  This statement further serves to emphasise 
the inextricable link between the discourses of ‘non-acknowledgement and 
disrespect’ and ‘non-participation’.  Together, these discourses contribute to the 
‘marginalisation’ discourse.  The subsequent responses all appear to be supporting 
and confirming the discourse of ‘marginalisation’ in what appears to be an act of 
discursive scaffolding.  In other words, once the ‘marginalisation’ discourse was 
presented all subsequent responses were geared towards confirming its validity.  
This discursive manoeuvre was further advanced by precise turn taking and the use 
of short explicit responses which added to the overall feel of authenticity.  One can 
even go as far to say that it presented as a well-orchestrated and pre-determined 
performance.  At this point, identifying the intent of this engagement can only be 
mere conjecture.   
 
Also, what is fascinating is that it presented, albeit less fervently, in other groups 
and was a definite discursive trend throughout the study.  Rather than being the 
presence of the ‘marginalisation’ discourse, it would be more accurate to perceive of 
it as the ‘proclamation of marginalisation discourse’.  However, its presence does 
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not depart from the fact that marginalisation itself was a key feature in the current 
study. 
 
From the previous discussion it is axiomatic that the participants are engaged in a 
fierce positioning endeavour which appeared to be aimed at elucidating their status 
in society.  It is therefore strange that discourses that contradict this general trend are 
evident.  As the following selection of extracts reveal: 
1. FR: …but today we just think, the older people don’t respect us, why  
2. must we have respect for them, that’s all that runs through out  
3. minds, but we also wrong, no matter what a big person do we must  
4. still have respect. 
5.  FR:  But adults always want to tell you what to do when it suits them 
6. FR [responds] but you must listen to adults 
       Extract 44 (Group 6) 
1. I: What do you think your role is as a child, a young person? 
2. FR: Not to do wrong unnecessary things and just obey the things that 
3. your mother says 
4. MR: And don’t skinner with big people 
5. MR: And don’t keep you big, don’t talk to an uncle or so, talk to your  
6. own age, something like that 
       Extract 45 (Group 7) 
The above extracts do not show, with any degree of certainty, if the participants are 
merely replicating common constructions or if they acquiesce this to be the actual 
role of the child in society.  In fact, an analysis of demeanour, delivery and non-
verbal behaviour associated with the extracts similarly fail to provide any definite 
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answer.  The first extract shows the dichotomous nature of the (dis)respect 
discourse, and how the participant seamlessly moves between the two poles within 
one single statement.  It is, in fact, a typical example of how children have been 
socialised to accept certain constructions of childhood.  Of greater importance is the 
fact that both these extracts elucidate the ideological configuration of discourses.  
They seem to be positioning themselves inline with this inferior construction of 
childhood.  On this occasion, based on the above extract, it seems to imply a sense 
of ‘self-subjugation’.  In other words, even though they appeared to be challenging 
the status quo, they are actually submitting to, and accepting their subservient 
position in society.  On other occasions it appears as if they are strategically using 
the positionings to achieve particular social objectives (Hollway, 1984).  Of course, 
as Wetherell (1998) notes, some order can be put to the emerging array of positions 
by observing their consistency or fit with broader interpretive repertoires available to 
the children and youth.  The repertoires in the above extract include, for example, 
childhood as an inferior social category/class of society and childhood as a 
subservient social category/class in society. 
 
While it is clear that the positionings that the children have at their disposal are 
constrained by various institutionalised material and social practices (Willig, 2000), 
they appear to be attempting to use the available positions to showcase their 
dominated experience.  This point is starkly demonstrated when, on closer 
examination, it seems to be more than mere positioning but rather that they involved 
in genuine bouts of role-playing.  It is this role-playing that seems to be a key 
feature within the discourses.  During the interview process, the researcher had the 
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distinct impression that it was definite role-playing and not a response bias or 
socially desirable response set.   
 
The role playing theme was a common trend in most of the discourses.  A re-
examination of the corpus of texts suggests that the participants adopted a number of 
different roles or subject positions.  These different roles were correspondingly 
attached to the different discourses.  Contradictions in discourses therefore suggest 
the adoption of a different role.  What is less clear is when and why they adopt these 
roles, and also if they are completely conscious of the roles they are playing.  For 
example, for long periods of the interview the participants adopted the role of 
victims of society and expended a considerable amount of energy to construct and 
position themselves as such.  On other occasions, they felt it necessary to construct 
themselves as competent, valid individuals warranting equitable inclusion in society.  
Another adopted role is that of the ‘good child’.  It is within this role that the 
children appear to be accepting of their common-sense construction and lay 
understanding of what it means to be a child and what the role of the child is.  While 
it does not appear that the participants are attempting, in a shrewd or dishonest way, 
to mask the true nature of their social identity, it is not definitive if the participants 
are consciously switching roles or if it takes place without conscious thought.  The 
answer probably lies in examining how the adaptation of cultural norms, 
socialisation and particular ideologies become internalised.  As ideology becomes 
internalised, it operates at the level of consciousness.  However, at this age, 
according to Piaget’s theory, the participants would have developed the competence 
of abstract reasoning and may cognitively challenge the existing status quo.  
Considering that these participants have developed cognitively, consciousness 
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becomes the site of contestation between ideological hegemony and cognitive 
reasoning.  This contestation manifests in contradictions within discourses.  In other 
words, as ideology becomes internalised within their consciousness, the contestation 
arises between what they think and the ideology that is part of their consciousness.    
 
Another typical example that demonstrates this contention is presented below.  After 
a protracted discussion about the disrespect experienced at the hands of teachers and 
parents, the participants stated: 
1. MR: That’s why I say corporal punishment was the best way to 
2. discipline because if he does it, he knows what’s going to be, so he won’t 
3. do it because he’s going to get hurt. 
4. I: Do you agree with corporal punishment? 
5. FR: Yes 
6. MR: I agree with certain aspects 
7. I: Let me just play devils advocate. Didn’t you mention there a fear that 
8.  somebody was going to hit you and what about all those times when you’re 
9.  falsely accused of doing something and you get beaten and you didn’t do it? 
10. MR: That was a problem 
11. MR: Yeah, that was a problem 
12. MR: But then again nothings perfect.  You can’t have a perfect system 
13. MR: Yeah 
       Extract 46 (Group 7) 
 
This extract demonstrates clearly the stark contradictions with previous claims.  The 
transition from one role to the next is also seamless and therefore seems highly 
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unlikely that the participants were aware of their contradictory stance.  Yet, even 
when their contradictions were pointed out, their response was one of apathy and 
indifference.  This means that it was not merely a shift in discursive activity, but 
rather a genuine shift in position, or the adoption of a completely new role.  This 
also raises the question of whether it is a genuine contradiction.  As mentioned 
previously, these contradictions could actually be thought of as being the 
manifestations of the contestations.  It would then be inaccurate to ascribe particular 
importance to the contradictions in the individual sense and the focus should rather 
be placed on the essence of the contestations.  
 
In conjunction with the above, the participants often adopted the justification or 
legitimising rhetoric.  What is interesting is that this justification, whilst seemingly 
used to explain parents’ behaviour, was also aimed at explaining and justifying their 
own claims.  In other words, they were justifying their acceptance of the ideology.  
As the following extract further demonstrates: 
1. FR: You also have rights, but you must do what your parents tell you 
       Extract 47 (Group 6) 
 
This statement encapsulates the manifestation of ideology in particular Engels’s 
concept of false consciousness.  Moreover, it finds meaning when one contextualises 
it to the broader legal instruments, more specifically the UNCRC35
                                                 
35 See Chapter Two for a discussion on the UNCRC 
.  Whilst the 
UNCRC essentially provided legal rights to children, these rights are, to a large 
extent, ceded to the guidance of parents and caregivers.  Although the participant’s 
statement does not capture the complexity of the UNCRC, it does raise the concern 
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that legal instruments, such as the UNCRC, could potentially provide a false notion 
of possession of rights.   
 
However, the texts do not always reveal a sense of false consciousness.  On certain 
occasions the participants’ resistance of ideology is evident, as the participants 
lamented the fact that their rights were not complied with.  As the following quote 
demonstrates: 
1. MR: Children also have rights…we also people, we also have a say. 
2. FR: But we feel they don’t let you. 
3. MR: They take it away. 
4. MR: They take it away from you yeah. 
5. I: What do they take away from you, your rights? 
6. MR: Yeah, they take it away from you. 
7. FR: Yeah, we don’t really have rights, they just say we do. 
8. I: Why do you say so? 
9. FR: [responds] because its all talk, what rights do we have? 
       Extract 48 (Group 6) 
 
While the above suggests that the participants have an awareness of their rights, the 
key issue to emerge is that the proliferation of rights is dependent on adult society’s 
recognition and acknowledgement of these rights.  A related and interesting spin on 
this point emerged within the discussions, with the participants claiming that on 
certain occasions they were expected to fulfil the roles and responsibilities of adults.  
On these occasions, they claimed, they were no longer children.  Following is a 
selection of quotes detailing the above contention. 
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1. FR: Sometimes adults want to hand over responsibility to us, then we  
2. not laaities36
       Extract 49 (Group 5) 
, we only laaities when it suits them. 
1. FR: And if they are drunk… then who must look after the children.   
2. Then we are not laities.  Who is drunk then? 
      Extract 50 (Group 5: Translated) 
1. FR: We must be in by 9 o’ clock… now there’s either a problem at  
2. home or somebody’s drunk or whatever, take your pick, then you  
3. must look after the house, you must clean, you must cook, you   
4. must see that the small children are OK, then you not a laaitie. 
5. MR: Uh, then you are now big enough 
6. MR: You have sisters to look after 
7. FR: Or brothers 
8. FR: Your sister must wash by 4 o’ clock, the food must be finished by 
9. this time, by six o’ clock, you must clean the house, the whole  
10. house, daddy’s going to come home, now I must work fast 
11. FR: And the next morning you must dress the your brothers and  
12. sisters, make breakfast and stuff, see that they OK and when you  
13. come to school late then they tell you “don’t bring your home 
14.  problems to school”.  So we must be a laaitie, act like one, but do  
15. what the adults do, and all that stuff and then the end nobody  
16. takes note  
      Extract 51 (Group 6: Translated) 
                                                 
36 A colloquial, belligerent term for children, generally used to perpetuate the inferior status of 
children.   
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The above extracts support the claim that even though they are generally not 
recognised to possess bona fide rights, they were still expected at times to fulfil the 
roles of adults.  The conspicuous irony is that, in these instances, it is apparently 
adults who are presenting with maladaptive behaviour and that the day to day 
responsibilities then become the children’s burden.  Adding to the children’s burden 
is the fact that they have to fulfil these adult roles and responsibilities without the 
benefit of social privileges usually afforded to adults, as well as having to operate 
without recognition and acknowledgement of the role that they fulfil.  It is for this 
reason that the participants lamented the fact that they “must be a child” but still 
have to “do what the adults do and… nobody takes note”.  It is worth noting the 
content of the discourse and the explicit detail used in the description by the 
participants of Group 6.  Potter (1996) notes the use of detailed descriptions as a 
means to shore up the facticity of accounts.   
They can provide an impression of being there by sketching features, 
although not substantial to the claim or argument would have been 
apparent to someone who actually witnessed some event. (pp. 117-118) 
 
A re-look at the above extracts confirm Potter’s contention as the participants were 
involved in an elaborate attempt to portray themselves as competent and responsible 
citizens.  The participants used detailed narratives and were again involved in a 
precise bout of turn-taking with each subsequent response supporting and then 
building on the narrative.  Added to this was even though the extract contained 
accounts by different participants, it presents like a single and continuous narrative.  
This suggests that the accounts were consciously and deliberately produced.  They 
are again involved in a contestation of positioning.  On this occasion they are 
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contesting their position in society, the common-sense construction of children as 
irresponsible and the subsequent notion that they are not valid members of society.  
In this instance one could even extend the argument and claim that alcohol was 
merely an incidental theme, and the primary aim of the participants was to present 
themselves as competent and responsible citizens.  They are thus resisting the 
ideology.  Duncan (1993) notes that ideology and its constituent discourses are not 
always accepted without question and resistance from the dominated group.  Levett 
succinctly argues that “power exists with resistances to it” (as cited in Duncan, 
1993, p. 57).  Similar, both Thompson (1984) and Gramsci (1978) point out that 
even though discourse is the primary means through which ideology functions to 
reproduce and maintain asymmetrical relations of power, it is also the primary 
instrument through which domination is resisted or opposed (Duncan, 1993).  It is, 
however, worth mentioning that the issue of alcohol appeared to be constantly 
emerging within the group discussions as a point of concern.  This issue of alcohol 
abuse will be addressed presently. 
 
Another related theme that emerged consistently within the discussions is 
encapsulated in the claim that “adults like taking out their problems on children, and 
there is nothing we can do about it”.  While this statement seems straightforward 
enough, regardless of the fact that the participants appear to be victimised at the 
level of the physical and ideological, it finds similarities with the epigenic theory of 
de Mause (1973).  de Mause (1973) essentially argued that childhood was 
historically characterised by constant physical and sexual abuse by adults, which 
resulted directly from adults’ inability to maintain their psychological integrity.  In 
other words, they vented their problems on children.  While de Mause (1973) 
 
 
 
 
 221 
presented his theory as a historical treatise it appears to be applicable to 
contemporary society as well.  Again it is worth pointing out the role that the 
participants are adopting and the discourses associated with this role.  As intimated 
previously, discourse is used as an instrument of resistance.  Here the participant 
adopts the role of the victim and is supported aptly by the ‘helplessness and 
vulnerability’ discourse.  The following extract referring to interaction with 
educators provides further evidence. 
1. FR: They take it out on you 
2. I: What? 
3. FR: [responds] Their problems, they take their problems out on you. 
4. MR: Had a bad class now they take it out on you…and you can do  
5. nothing 
6. MR: You become like their punching bag… 
       Extract 52 (Group 5) 
 
The extract provides strong support for the arguments detailed above and clearly 
shows how adults exert both physical and ideological control over the children as 
“they take their problems out on you … and you can do nothing”.  What the 
participants are suggesting is that, from an ideological point of view, a child has no 
recourse to abuse from adults and it is an accepted practice.  A particular point to 
note is the use of the metaphor (Line 6) which is probably used to drive home the 
discourse of ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ more strongly, but also demonstrates 
the ideological role of childhood in controlling the behaviour of children.  It is a 
subtle and intelligent piece of discursive activity as the punching bag generally takes 
a beating, but cannot return any offensive.  What the use of the metaphor further 
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portrays is that the participant is consciously attempting to portray this discourse.  
Again, one can refer to the ‘proclamation’ of the ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ 
discourse.  This is significant because the participants are strategically using the 
discursive space created by the interview as an opportunity to elucidate the nature of 
these relations. 
 
The participants also communicated the importance of social and interpersonal 
relationships, specifically highlighting the importance of belonging to a social circle 
and having “a social life”, and claiming that it “is important…” and “…its part of 
life”.   Moreover, they mentioned that the breakdown in interpersonal relations 
between themselves and parents, teachers and peers affected them profoundly.  This 
is consistent with findings by Gorecka and Niespoj-Roguszko (as cited in Piekarska, 
2000), who found a high incidence of reported conflicts with teachers and parents 
concerning school performance.  The authors further reported that participants 
demonstrated high levels of frustration, fear and anger towards school and teachers.  
Similarly, Piekarska (2000) found that abusive behaviours by teachers significantly 
increased the stress levels of learners.  In the current study the participants intimated 
that strained relations with friends and peers had similar negative outcomes and 
profoundly affected their sense of well-being. 
 
The need for social support emerged as a relevant theme in this thematic domain and 
was related to the need for love and emotional support from friends and family.  
This supports the notion that social support effectively contributes to the 
maintenance of the psychological integrity. 
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When probed the participants responded as follows: 
1. MR: Friends must stand by you and give you support… 
      Extract 53 (Group 2: Translated) 
2. MR:  family love 
3. I:  [repeats] Family love? 
4. MR: Family love. When get home you get food and love and when you  
5. feeling down there’s someone to say look here that’s right, do it this way,  
6. don’t worry I am here. That is love, your family caring for you. That’s  
7. important.  
8. I: To be cared for? 
9. MR: Yes, to be cared for.  When you know people care for you, inside 
10. you it  just feels OK.  Like its OK and you not alone in this world. 
       Extract 54 (Group 1) 
11. MR: You can rely on them if you need something or you them to do  
12. something for you they will always be there. 
        Extract 55 (Group 1) 
 
The above extracts support the significance of social support both in terms of the 
content of actual responses and also in terms of the subtle suggestion that, as social 
beings, children and young people require a certain level of interpersonal interaction.  
A closer reading of the extracts further supports the notion that social support 
effectively contributes to the maintenance of the psychological integrity.   
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Closely related to the theme of social support was that of the need for role models.  
Jencks and Meyer’s (as cited in Curtis, Dooley & Phipps, 2004) ‘theory of collective 
socialisation’ underscores the importance of adult role models for positive child 
outcomes.  Similarly, participants believed that the presence of mentors or role 
models would contribute positively to their development.   
1. FR: A person, who looks well after you, helps you with everything;  
2. that you can turn to 
3. I:   A guardian or a care giver Ok! 
4. MR: A mentor 
5. MR: … You need a mentor, someone that can guide you, someone who  
6. can help you through life, and someone that you can learn from. 
7. Someone that already has experience and of good experience you can  
8. learn. I know that you must do up your own experience and that it’s one  
9. of the best ways to learn but you can keep certain mistakes aside by  
10. learning from other people. 
       Extract 56 (Group 2) 
 
Socio-economic concerns were also raised by the participants.  They contended that 
there were limited employment opportunities in the local community and cited 
examples of young people, who have completed formal schooling, having no 
opportunities for economic growth and falling victim to a range of social evils.  
Another major concern was the abuse of alcohol.  The participants linked alcohol 
consumption to the poor economic conditions in the community and intimated that 
alcohol consumption is destroying community life and family life.  They further 
cited a number of examples where parents’ alcohol abuse affected them negatively.  
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This sentiment was exclusive to the rural participants and the participants from 
former disadvantaged areas with a low socio-economic status.  Groups conducted 
with participants from the higher socio-economic status exhibited no negative 
sentiment towards alcohol.  The following extract depicts the concerns of alcohol: 
1. I: What else don’t you like? 
2. FR1: If my daddy’s drunk 
3. FR2: Oh, don’t speak… my daddy is the worst when he is drunk 
4. FR3: My daddy’s an alcoholic. He can’t stop drinking, during the week  
5. then he says he’s going to work, then he go drink 
6. I: And how does all of this make you feel 
7. FR2: You feel down… you feel sad…it’s embarrassing, because your  
8. friends is around you and then they laugh, and then I’m so  
9. embarrassed that I  don’t even want to show my face.  If they ask  
10. me…then I say no its not my daddy it’s my uncle 
11. FR4: You feel ashamed of yourself, you feel ashamed of him 
12. MR1: You feel, yoh, like your head, your head just want to explode… 
13. FR1: …6 o’ clock in the morning then they start and drink the whole  
14. time until the afternoon, and then they go sleep, and then they drunk… 
15. I: How often, do they drink, like only on weekends? 
16. FR2: What! every single day, but yeah the weekends are worse. 
      Extract 57 (Group 6: Translated) 
 
The above extract is characteristic of children’s experiences of living with parents 
and in neighbourhoods where alcohol abuse is rife.  There exists a wealth of 
literature that documents the relationship between parental alcohol abuse and 
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adverse childhood experiences (Dube, Anda, Felitti, Croft, Edwards & Giles, 2001), 
child maltreatment (Walsh, MacMillan, Jamieson, 2003), increased risk for 
childhood stressors (Sher, Gershuny, Peterson & Raskin, 1997) and severe 
behavioural and emotional problems (Christensen & Bilenberg, 2000).  The above 
text shows a consistency with some of these findings.  The significance of this 
extract is heightened by the fact that, of the eight participants in the group, the 
responses of five suggest that they are living in households characterised by severe 
alcohol abuse.  While this is not an attempt at quantifying the issue, it is rather 
concerning that the majority of the group, more or less randomly selected, 
experienced such direct and severe exposure. 
 
While the psychological impact “your head just want to explode” and the social 
impact “I’m so embarrassed that I don’t even want to show my face” is obvious, it 
does not appear that elucidating these constituents is their primary aim.   Rather, 
while they clearly acknowledge that alcohol abuse is a serious social problem, they 
appear to be going to great lengths to locate the problem within the parents and 
adults in general and not the alcohol.  This is clearly encapsulated in the following 
extract: 
1. FR: That’s why I say, if you want to drink, drink for yourself and not 
2. for other people. 
       Extract 58 (Group 6) 
 
The reason for this complicated piece of discursive positioning is not obvious.  One 
can speculate and suggest that the overall upshot is to maintain or protect their own 
entitlement to drink.  Their belief is that extraneous factors contribute to alcohol 
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abuse and if you “drink, drink for yourself and not for other people”, then one can 
guard against abuse.  
 
Other extracts, most notably from the rural participants, show a different 
conceptualisation of alcohol abuse.  In this context there appeared to be a collective 
animosity towards alcohol and alcohol vendors with some participants even 
portraying it as the prime evil within the community.  They claimed, for example, 
that “if alcohol can go away, then everything would be fine”.  This is inconsistent 
with the above and some literature, especially the social learning and behavioural 
modelling literature, which predict cyclical alcohol abuse.   
Another fascinating retort regarding alcohol use was furnished by a rural participant.  
He claimed the following: 
1. MR: In our community, alcohol is a problem.  You see small children  
2. running around, broken clothes, no shoes, in the cold wind, they go  
3. to school with no jersey or anything…no food, and you know  
4. where the parents are, drunk, they laying drunk somewhere, not at  
5. all worried about their children.  Now you tell me, is that right?  No  
6. its not, I wouldn’t do that 
      Extract 59 (Group 4: Translated)  
 
This extract cogently locates the blame both within the parents as well as alcohol.  
However, the overall aim of the contention does not appear to be blaming, but rather 
an intelligent manoeuvre to discount the responsible nature of parents.  Through this 
strategy the participant is then essentially challenging the common-sense perception 
that adult society is naturally more responsible than children.  In the first section of 
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the account he systematically constructs a detailed37 narrative of children in distress 
and then proceeds to locate the problem within adults’ irresponsible drinking 
behaviour.  This is followed by an instance of discursive brilliance (Line 5).  He 
poses a question38
 
 based on adult society’s own rules of moral conduct, and 
proceeds to answer it himself without waiting for a response.  In fact, it appears as if 
he did not want a response at all.  This discursive manoeuvre lends a sense of 
authenticity to his response by creating the impression that the answer was obvious 
and definitive.  Finally, he reinforces the notion by claiming that “I wouldn’t do it”.  
The extract again reveals the contestations within childhood.  Here the participant is 
contesting his position as an irresponsible child.  He is not challenging his individual 
status as a member of a group, typically explained by social identity theory.  Rather, 
he is contesting the status of childhood as inferior within the hierarchy.  One can 
even claim that the theme of alcohol was incidental and that the argument was 
generic.  As noted before, this participant is essentially (through discourse) resisting 
the ideology.   
5.3 Summary of the emerging discourses 
The findings indicate that the participants’ discourses can be located within three 
interrelated thematic domains viz.: personal safety, social and environmental context 
and psycho-social functioning.  These emerging domains are consistent with those 
identified in international literature (see e.g. Land et al., 2001; Pollard & Davidson, 
2001; Pollard & Lee, 2003; Thornton, 2001; Zaff, Smith, Rogers, Leavitt, Halle & 
                                                 
37 The use of detailed descriptions to build up the facticity of accounts has been previously discussed 
and applies in this example as well. 
38 The question was posed as genuine and not as a rhetorical question. 
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Bornstein, 2003) and local initiatives (see e.g. Dawes et al., 2007, September & 
Savahl, 2009).   
 
The emerging discourses, viz. ‘personal safety, a stable social environment, a stable 
‘self’ and participation, as non-negotiables’; ‘helplessness and vulnerability’; 
‘(non)acknowledgement’ and (dis)respect’  and ‘marginalisation’ are indicative of 
the actual meanings that the participants attribute to well-being and lends support to 
Pollard and Rosenberg’s (2003) definition.  The close and mutually influencing 
relationship of the domains and discourses suggest that the concept of well-being 
should be perceived as an integrated whole consisting of closely interacting 
components rather than a discrete multidimensional phenomenon.  
 
‘Personal safety as a non-negotiable’, as it relates to exposure and experiences of 
violence, was the most pervasive discourse and was consistent in the discussions of 
all three thematic domains.  It was furthermore present in the discourses of all the 
participants, irrespective of social class and economic status.  However, a trend can 
be identified whereby those participants residing in the rural and lower socio-
economic areas provided narratives depicting first hand exposure, while the 
participants from the more affluent areas provided secondary anecdotal evidence.  
For sexual abuse, the findings were even more alarming, with all female participants 
reporting first hand experience.  It is therefore not entirely surprising that the 
discourses suggest that the profound psychological impact of violence exposure is 
inconsistent across socio-economic groups. 
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A ‘stable social environment as a non-negotiable’ was another discourse that 
featured prominently.  The meanings of well-being in this instance were attached to 
the integrity of the physical and social environment, in particular the infrastructure 
and provision of community services.  What emerged as quite significant was the 
minutiae of children’s and young people’s relationship with the social environment, 
i.e., what was the nature of their engagement and how did this affect their well-
being. 
 
A ‘stable self as a non-negotiable’ emerged in the thematic domain of psycho-
social.  This discursive theme includes social acceptance and good social relations.  
The final non-negotiable was ‘participation’.  Children were quite impassioned 
about their role in society and their right to participation.  The conviction was, 
however, more pronounced by the urban participants than the rural participants.  The 
internal determinant here is the level of self-esteem of the participants.  The urban 
participants for example posited a higher level of self-esteem than the rural 
participants, were more outspoken, vociferous, and resolute in their claims for 
participation rights. 
 
‘Helplessness and vulnerability’ was another discourse that was pervasive in the 
corpus of texts.  Whether referring to their ‘helplessness and vulnerability’ in the 
face of physical and sexual violence, or as a remnant of being at the receiving end of 
a power relationship with adults, this discourse is substantial in its effects.   
Other closely related discourses are that of ‘(non)acknowledgement’ and 
‘(dis)respect’ and ‘desensitisation’.  This collection of related discourses is 
ultimately both a residue and catalyst of typical negative discourses and perceptions 
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that pervades society’s view of children as incomplete members of society (James & 
Prout, 1997; Qvortrup, 1994). 
 
The discourse of ‘marginalisation’ emerged as a key trend throughout the entire 
study.  It appears to be considered as a sort of composite or index discourse 
comprising the ‘(non)acknowledgement and (dis)respect’, ‘helplessness and 
vulnerability’ and (non)participation discourses.  One could extend the contention 
and in fact argue that it appears to be the culmination or manifestation of all the 
pervasive discourses within the participants talk.  At times, an analysis revealed a 
strange spin on the discourse as it appeared not to be a manifestation but a 
proclaiming of discourses.  Participants were constantly positioning, negotiating and 
contesting the terms of their childhood within the discussion.  The use of the 
narrative and the supply of anecdotal evidence are both conspicuous and prolific in 
the corpus of texts.  Understandably the children are using the narrative as a 
meaning-making device (Shaw, 2004).  Their use of discursive and narrative 
techniques to bring their message across was in itself interesting.  Through these 
techniques the participants were able to conjure up powerful images and effectively 
communicate the components of their well-being.  It is also very evident that the 
children used this process as a platform to voice their discontent at their current 
experiences of childhood.  A re-look at the corpus of texts as a whole, would in fact 
indicate that the children are often engaging in a type of pseudo political discourse 
with the primary function of highlighting the nature of their social space.  An 
interesting point that arises is whether this positioning, negotiating and contesting 
are unique to these discussions, i.e. are children only using this opportunity to get 
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their voices heard.  Or alternatively, is this typical of the lived world of the young 
person. 
 
Indeed it appears that the nature of children’s engagement with the social world, in 
particular the adult actors’ attitudes and common-sense perceptions of children and 
childhood, is a pertinent factor of their well-being.  Ultimately then the study is 
revealing that childhood is not regarded as a legitimate province of meaning 
(Corsaro, 2005) and that the notion of children as valid co-constructors of society is 
still some way off. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter focused on detailing the emerging discourses of well-being.  It is 
important to remember that the study is following an analysis protocol that combines 
the two key discourse analysis trends.  The current chapter was largely concerned 
with providing the conversational and ethnomethodological analysis on the 
participants’ discussion.  More specifically the focus was on elucidating what the 
participants were achieving with their utterances, how they achieved this through the 
use of specific discursive resources, how social organisation is accomplished in talk 
(Wetherell, 1992) and how the meanings were intersubjectively understood (Sacks, 
1992).  Within the analysis protocol the next step would be to offer an interpretation 
of how these discourses construct various meanings of childhood and the extent to 
which these meanings are ideologically configured.  This will be taken up in Chapter 
Seven.  The following chapter explores the relationship between discourse and 
meaning, in particular highlighting the complex nature between ideology and 
knowledge and how this finds expression in discourse. 
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CHAPTER SIX: FROM DISCOURSES TO MEANINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
At this point it might be useful to briefly reflect on the status of the overall project in 
general and the analysis in particular.  To reflect on the former, a re-look at the aims 
and objectives of the study would be useful.  As previously intimated, the study aims 
to explore the meanings that children assign to ‘childhood’.  More specifically the 
study aims to explore the extent to which these meanings of ‘childhood’ are 
ideologically configured.  The following key objectives guided the study:  
(i) to examine how children use specific discursive resources and repertoires 
to construct childhood well-being 
(ii) to examine how these constructions are manifested in their discourses 
(iii) to examine how these discourses construct various meanings of 
childhood 
(iv) to examine the extent to which these meanings are ideologically 
configured  
 
The previous chapter, concerned with the actual discourse analysis, addressed the 
first two objectives while Chapter Seven will address objectives three and four and 
is concerned with meaning generation and will explicate the meanings of childhood.  
The current chapter is aimed at theoretically contexualising the findings by 
providing a theoretical underpinning of the relationship between discourse and 
meaning.  In other words, before these meanings of childhood are considered, it will 
be necessary to reflect on the nature of discourse and ideology.  
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6.2 On the Nature of Discourse and Ideology 
Within the field of ideology many questions are unresolved.  One question that is 
particularly problematic is the relationship between discourse and ideology.  To 
address this issue the work of van Dijk (1995, 2003) is considered. 
 
van Dijk puts forward a tentative theory based on elucidating the relationship 
between ideology and shared social representations39
                                                 
39 Consisting of knowledge, attitudes and beliefs and defined as organized clusters of socially shared 
beliefs. 
.  Following this line of 
reasoning, van Dijk explains that a racist ideology could be the basis of racist 
attitudes people share about ‘other’ groups.  However, since socially shared 
knowledge also falls within this rubric, it follows that knowledge is also 
ideologically biased.  van Dijk rejects this notion and claims that it would be 
inconsistent to assume that all knowledge is ideological.  An examination of the 
texts in the current study, in fact, show support for the above contention.  He puts 
forward the theoretical proposition that each group would have shared knowledge 
within a specific epistemic community that may or may not be ideologically biased.  
van Dijk’s point is that regardless of the ideological status of knowledge, there is 
group consensus and belief that this knowledge is true and accurate.  “In other 
words, both in their perceptions, interactions or discourses, group members deal 
with such beliefs as corresponding to the facts” (van Dijk, 2003, p. 17).  Within the 
current study, this is clearly demonstrated by the contradictions within the 
participants’ discourses.  On the one hand they show contempt for certain practices 
and prejudices against them as young people.  However, on the other hand their 
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discourses often echo socially shared knowledge about the role and place of children 
in society. 
 
While van Dijk’s key motive is to elucidate the complex nature between ideology 
and knowledge and their expression in discourse, he acknowledges the complexity 
of the interaction and suggests that some details, especially those regarding the 
relevant mental and social processes are still largely obscure. 
 
For the current study, the most interesting question would be to ascertain whether 
ideology is constructed by or manifested in discourse.  Following social 
constructionism, it is accurate to work from the premise that language does not map 
or mirror reality but in fact constructs it.  An extension of this principle to the 
current study suggests that ideology is constructed in language.  However, a perusal 
of the emerging discourses in the previous chapter strongly indicates that ideology is 
both constructed by, and manifested in discourse.  van Dijk (1998) similarly believes 
that ideology both shapes discourse and is formed by discourse.  However, although 
discourse is not the only ideologically based social practices they are possibly the 
most critical (van Dijk, 1998).  Whilst other forms of social practices are able to 
demonstrate the presence of ideologies, the specific features of discourse, which 
allows both for the manifestation as well as the exact means of how this is achieved, 
is often hard to articulate.  van Dijk similarly argues that merely intimating about 
“production of meaning” (1998, p. 204), as is typical of scholarly studies, does not 
elucidate the role of discourse on ideological meaning construction.  He attributes 
this to the inherent vagueness of the term, more specifically in the generic way that 
the term is often used.  Added to this, meaning is also contingent on the theoretical 
 
 
 
 
 236 
and subject position, i.e. it would mean different things to different people.  In other 
words, the linguists, sociologists, psychologists and philosophers will be 
inextricably tied up to their subject positions and theoretical positions.  Furthermore, 
there may also be diverse conceptualisations within these individual disciplines.  
With its strong constructionist base, the current study, following the propositions of 
Wittgenstein (1978), conceives of the meaning of a text or expression to be 
dependent on the context of its usage.  Gergen (1994) extends the argument to 
include the relational account of meaning that essentially argues that the meanings 
of utterances are contingent on the intersubjective activities between interlocutors. 
 
What the above is suggesting is that the mere location and consideration of the 
social context fails to reveal all the details in its entirety.  Simply considering the 
social context would not reveal the mechanics of how institutions and social actors 
function to sustain relations of domination.  In other words, it underestimates the 
role of ideology and falls short in revealing the means through which discourse 
functions to sustain relations of domination.  Discourse is therefore aimed not at 
revealing multiple realities but rather the reality that depicts the relations of 
domination. 
 
Interestingly enough, van Dijk’s (1998) socio-cognitive approach makes similar 
claims linking meaning to the assignation of interpretation and understanding to 
discourse and its elements.  van Dijk (1998) states: 
Meanings are not so much abstract properties of words or expressions, 
rather the kinds of things language users assign to such expressions in 
processes of interpretation or understanding…meanings of discourse or 
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language in use are contextual or situated, and depend on the 
(interpretation of the) participants. (p. 204-205, emphasis in original) 
 
van Dijk (1998) makes another important point.  He argues that these meaning 
assignations are a function of cognitive processing and warns against an exclusive 
socially orientated discourse analysis which he believes intuitively infers the 
meanings rather than providing a rigorous elucidation. van Dijk’s argument is 
undoubtedly cognitive.  His position is that social representations are mapped on 
verbally expressed meanings of talk and text.  The meanings of discourses emerge as 
a result of interlocutors “selecting relevant portions of mental models about events” 
(van Dijk, 1998, p. 205).  Since models contain social representations, which may 
embody ideology, the meanings themselves are potentially ideological.  To access 
these meanings, van Dijk (1998) proposes lexical analysis.  He argues that social 
representations  
may be conventionalised and codified in the lexicon, as the respective 
negative and positive meanings of the well-known pair ‘terrorist’ and 
‘freedom fighter’ suggest.  Lexical analysis is still the most obvious (and 
still fruitful) component in ideological discourse analysis. (p. 205) 
 
Whilst van Dijk’s argument of the importance of the cognitive dimension in 
meaning production is significant, it is problematic to regard it as the defining 
feature of an ideological analysis.  It is therefore important that the cognitive 
dimension be considered along with the contextual and situated nature of discourse 
as well as the dynamics of intersubjective meaning making. 
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6.3 Concluding Remarks 
In the final analysis, to ascertain a plausible understanding of the mechanisms 
through which discourse constructs meaning, an approach that integrates the 
importance of linguistic constituents, social context and situatedness and social 
interaction is required.   The current study engendered an analysis approach that 
foregrounded these aspects of drawing on the work of van Dijk (1998, 2003) and 
Thompson (1984, 1990) in particular, to offer an interpretation of how these 
discourses construct various meanings of childhood.  More specifically the focus 
was on elucidating how these meanings are ideologically configured.  This is taken 
up in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EMERGING MEANINGS OF CHILDHOOD 
7.1 Introduction 
As previously pointed out, Thompson’s (1984, 1990), three phase depth 
hermeneutics analysis framework was utilised as the primary method to frame the 
analysis.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the first phase, socio-historical analysis, is 
implicit and subsumed within the process of the study itself.  The second phase, 
discourse analysis, was addressed in Chapter Five.  The final phase, 
interpretation/reinterpretation is concerned with the structural features of meaning 
construction as it emerges within specific social contexts and is considered in this 
chapter. 
 
It is axiomatic from the emerging discourses explicated in Chapter Five that children 
have in some way been subject to control by adult society based to a large extent on 
their status as children.  While these discussions did not focus on where and how 
these dominant discourses are produced, it did show the extent to which these 
common-sense constructions manifested in children’s discourses.  It would then not 
be inaccurate to assume that if children are confronted by this sense of control on a 
regular basis they would invariably attempt to give meaning to it.  Meaning in the 
service of power is conceptualised as ideology in this study.  It is these ideological 
meanings as constructed by the discourses of the participants that constitute the 
focus of the current chapter.  This chapter therefore engages with the emerging 
meanings of childhood and the extent to which these meanings are ideologically 
configured.  The chapter concludes by considering an ideologically configured 
social constructionism as a framework to understand childhood. 
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7.2 On meaning and ideology: The emerging meanings of Childhood 
For the purposes of the current study, and in line with the epistemological and 
methodological trend, Thompson’s (1984, 1990) conceptualization of meaning is 
followed.  For Thompson (1984, 1990), meaning is a key component of ideology.  
As previously stipulated, Thompson defines ideology as ‘meaning in the service of 
power’, i.e. how meaning serves to maintain relations of domination between 
different social groups; in this case adults and children.  Thompson postulates that 
ideology operates “through a complex series of mechanisms whereby meaning is 
mobilized, in the discursive practices of everyday life, for the maintenance of 
relations of domination” (1984, p. 63).  
 
Thompson puts forward a positive conceptualisation of meaning by means of three 
interrelated theses.  Firstly, he asserts that meaning is not a stable and static 
linguistic product but should rather be perceived as a complex and fluctuating 
phenomenon.  Meaning is constituted both by the conditions of production and 
conditions of reception.  This meaning can only be understood by considering the 
socio-historical conditions within which it is produced as well as the specific social 
differentiations, such as class, gender, religion, region etc, within which it is 
received40
 
. 
Thompson’s second thesis is that meaning is contingent on the structural features of 
the linguistic product.  He is however not arguing that meaning is exclusively 
                                                 
40 In this respect Thompson concurs with Bourdieu’s view that “the linguistic product is fully realized 
as a message only if it is treated as such, that is, deciphered, and the schemes of interpretation which 
receivers employ in their creative appropriation of the product can be more or less distant from those 
which orientated the production” (Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 1984, p. 66). 
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constituted by structural features such as grammar, syntax and style but rather that 
meaning is constructed through these features.  This leads directly to his third thesis. 
Here Thompson argues that to arrive at an interpretation of the meaning of an 
utterance or expression does not merely require one to mark the socially and 
historically situated nature of the linguistic expression, but also requires an 
appreciation of what is actually being asserted in the expression.  In summary 
Thompson (1984) states that: 
if ideology operates by the mobilization of meaning for the maintenance of 
relations of domination, then the analysis of ideology must seek to 
interpret the meaning of linguistic expressions in relation to the social and 
historical conditions in which they are produced and received. (p. 66) 
 
Following Thompson, the analysis and interpretation of ideology is primarily 
concerned with language which is the principal medium through which meaning 
operates.  While the functional capacity of language has long been established (see 
e.g. Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1978) the relation between speech acts and the 
infusion with forms of power is often not emphasised.  Bourdieu (1977) makes this 
point cogently: 
Language is not only an instrument of communication or even of 
knowledge, but an instrument of power.  One seeks not only to be 
understood but also to be believed, obeyed, respected and distinguished.  
(p. 20) 
 
Bourdieu essentially means that the power of words is fundamentally linked to the 
institutional position or authority of the speaker.  In the case of adult/child relations, 
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at the most basic level, power and domination are exerted over young people 
through speech acts by virtue of their institutionally constructed authority, creating 
the sense that adult’s utterances have privilege over that of children and young 
people.  Secondly, it would appear that in the current study there is often a 
contradictory, or more accurately, a contested response from the participants.  Thus, 
as previously stipulated, and present as a key feature throughout the participants’ 
discourses, there is both a consensus and contestation of the common-sense 
constructions of the position of children in society.   
 
7.3 Childhood as a contested-consensual space 
Essentially, the previous discussion is suggesting that it is the meanings of 
childhood that become contested within the discourses.  If one takes into 
consideration the Wittgensteinian notion that meaning is essentially open for 
dispute, contingent on the differential capacity of various groups to provide 
meaning, then it follows that the mobilisation of meaning by the dominant group 
would serve to create and sustain the relations of domination.  Indeed Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) point out that it is through the articulation of meaning that power 
becomes elucidated.  Thompson (1984) thus rightly argues that it is the infusion of 
meaning with power, or relations of domination, that creates the opportunity for 
ideology to legitimate, dissimulate and reify the existing state of affairs, or as Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) point out, become hegemonic and pervasive.  In this sense, as the 
participants suggest, since adults dominate the discourse they control the 
mobilisation of meaning and subsequently they have power over children.  
However, this mobilisation of meaning is not without consequence.  An outcome of 
this mobilisation of meaning is the contestation-consensual dichotomy, which 
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occurs at three levels, viz. within the individual (within the consciousness of the 
child), between children (in the sense that they contest the nature of childhood 
between themselves) and between children and adult society (in the sense that they 
contest their position as valid social actors).  The participants’ discourses are 
however, suggesting that the three levels do not operate in isolation or autonomously 
from one another.  Rather, they should be conceived of as mutually influencing 
processes, or even more accurately as a single phenomenon.  This is quite evident in 
the discourses of the participants as they often demonstrate three levels within a 
single utterance, contention or assertion.   
 
While Chapter Two has posited the multidimensional nature of childhood, 
specifically explicating the various ways that childhood has been constructed, the 
ideological meanings seem to be emerging on a continuum.  Following this line of 
thought the point opposite that of contestation would be consensus.  The interplay of 
contestation and consensus is the interplay between two contrary tendencies of 
ideology.  What is rather interesting is the fact that both contestation and consensus 
operate in the same manner and have similar manifestations and outcomes.  In other 
words, as previously stipulated they operate at three levels, viz. within the child, 
between children and between children and adult society.  An examination of the 
texts of the study quite clearly depicts the presence of these consensual notions.  The 
grand meaning of ‘childhood as a consensual space’ serves to further elucidate the 
relations of domination between the children and adults in society in as much as 
their discourses often reflect an adherence to, and acceptance of, common-sense 
constructions of childhood that generally depict the child as not yet a valid member 
of society, but a ‘member in becoming’ who still requires the guidance and control 
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of adults.  From the adult perspective this is construed as their responsibility (and 
their right). While children may resent this, if interpolated into the dominant adult 
ideology, they will accept this as legitimate.     
   
It is the presence of these grand meanings within the discourses that reveal the 
continuum of power between children and adult society and conspicuously 
demonstrate how the status of ‘childhood’ serves to maintain these relations of 
domination.  The fact that it operates and manifests at the three levels mentioned 
above further points to the depth of its influence.  In other words, it is part of the 
children’s consciousness, exists as an accepted discourse between children, and most 
significantly between children and adult society.  Indeed, it is at these levels that the 
contestation and consensual meanings of childhood play themselves out most 
profoundly.  Following are relevant examples drawn from the participants’ 
discourses that depict the contested/consensual dichotomy operating on the three 
levels. 
 
7.3.1 Intrapersonal Level 
The contestation is cogently encapsulated in the thematic category of socio-
environmental context where the participants lay claim that their socio-
environmental context is the defining factor in the experience of childhood (see page 
190-191).  While the participants touched on the issue of peer pressure and the need 
for group membership, the emergent point is the contested nature of childhood.  
Here the contestation is at the level of the individual where the interplay is between 
the social environment as a non-negotiable and the helplessness and vulnerability 
discourses.  This experience creates a dilemma which the child then has to contest 
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within the self.  The nature of the dilemma was related to the fact that the child has 
two undesirable options; i.e. either participate in social deviance and be accepted 
within the group, but sacrifice what they see as the innocence of childhood; or 
refrain from participation and maintain their childhood, but risks losing the safety of 
group membership.  It is interesting to note how the participants have constructed 
this dilemma by perceiving deviance as a loss of childhood and alternatively 
constructing their identity as being dependent on group membership.  The fact that 
both options have the potential for undesirable consequences suggests evidence of 
the contestation.  On the one hand, they risk sacrificing their childhood membership 
as the participant is claiming that involvement in some activities implies a premature 
termination of childhood.  It is clear that, on this occasion at least, the participant has 
conceptualised childhood as a space of innocence and purity.  He is thus, 
discursively it seems, protecting the integrity of childhood, because “once you do it 
then you are no longer a child”.  Adhering to this line of reasoning implies a 
consensus to societal values.  However, on the other hand, “you” run the risk of 
being marginalised and isolated.  Group membership and a sense of acceptance are 
important factors that impact on the integrity of the self.  The fact that they see 
abstention as leading to a potential loss of group membership is significant.  It 
would seem then that even the social environment could potentially act as a space 
for ideology.  It is important to note that it is the extent that ideology has been 
assimilated into the cognitive structures that determine the level of the contestation 
or consensus.  It appears then, that the grand meaning of childhood as a 
contested/consensual space is in fact, outcomes of the ideological influence.  
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While the above is merely one instance of the contestation/consensus, it indicates 
the extent to which ideology has become internalised into the consciousness of the 
child.  Considering that these children have developed cognitively, the ideology 
comes into conflict with the cognitive reasoning.  Consciousness thus becomes the 
site of contestation, between ideological hegemony and cognitive reasoning.  This 
contestation manifests in contradictions within the discourses.  What this essentially 
means is that, as ideology becomes internalised within their consciousness, the 
meanings ascribed to childhood emerges from what they think and the ideology that 
is part of their consciousness.  It is the ubiquitous nature of the 
contestation/consensus tension that contributes to the grand meaning of childhood as 
a contested/consensual space. 
 
7.3.2 Interpersonal Level 
The interplay of the tension between children as they negotiate their understandings 
is also evident throughout the discourses that emerged in the focus groups.  A point 
of note is that the contradictions within the consciousness of the child has 
implications for how the contested/consensual meanings of childhood are 
constructed between children.  The evidence shows that the participants proffer 
similar as well as different views of the nature of childhood.  Again, this is most 
likely an outcome of the extent to which the dominant discourses have been 
assimilated into the consciousness of the children (ideological hegemony).  What is 
also quite interesting is the extent to which the participants intersubjectively 
construct the nature of childhood and well-being.  Often, they appear to be using the 
focus group as a means to challenge the existing status quo.  During these instances 
there are intricate and strategic discursive manoeuvres to present childhood as a 
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phase of exploitation and oppression.  On occasion it appears as if the discussions 
were planned and pre-meditated as participants expertly weave narratives that depict 
their dire circumstances.  During these discursive episodes the consensual meanings 
were constructed through collaborative efforts and delicate rhetorical positioning.   
This contention is best encapsulated in the discussion on the fragility of the ‘self’.  
Here the participants embarked on a subtle, yet sophisticated attempt to depict the 
fragility of the ‘self’ and the extent to which adult society negatively impacts on the 
development of the ‘self’.  The discourses of ‘marginalisation’ and ‘helplessness 
and vulnerability’ were used to achieve this (see page 199-200) and is evident in 
their proclamation that adult society is “committing character murder” and that their 
(i.e. adult’s) attitudes towards children “destroys your self-esteem”.  As the ‘self’ is 
articulated and positioned in discourse in ways that will enhance one’s claim to be 
heard (Potter & Wetherell, 1992), in this instance it is positioned as being under 
duress, thus staking a stronger claim that their voices should be heard.   
 
Another example of consensus at this level is evident during the discussion of 
‘participation as a non-negotiable’ as well as the discourses of 
(non)acknowledgement and (dis)respect (see pages 203 -210).  Here the participants 
collaboratively weaved a sense of entitlement that their voices be acknowledged as 
valid and real. 
 
The contested notion at the interpersonal level is best depicted during the discussion 
on exposure to community violence.  Here the participants’ claims that “what can 
we do, that’s the way it is”, “you can’t just do things” and “because it doesn’t work 
like that…” (see page 172) suggest that they are resigned to their position in society.  
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It portrays the legitimisation and reification modus operandi of ideology, in the 
sense that they have prescribed to the notion of social relations between adults and 
children being natural and permanent and which follows a line of reasoning that 
ultimately legitimates and rationalises the nature of the social relations between the 
two.  The response in form of the retort “but we shouldn’t just take things lying 
down, we are people too…” (see page 172) points to the emergent resistance and 
lays the basis for the contestation.  Another vivid example of this contestation 
emerged during the discussion on corporal punishment.  In two of the groups, the 
issue of corporal punishment emerged as a significant point of contestation.  During 
these discussions the group were profoundly split over the usefulness and legality of 
corporal punishment.  Supporters appeared to have internalised its use as a necessary 
means to ‘maintain order’, again depicting the legitimisation modus operandi of 
ideology.  Others argued against its legitimate use, basing their argument on child 
and human rights protocols.  Interestingly there was a critical group that argued both 
for and against corporal punishment.  It is within these individuals that the 
contestation was most profound. 
 
7.3.3 Societal Level 
The most prevalent contestation exists between children and adult society.  It is, in 
fact, the key level that the contestation/consensual meanings of childhood play 
themselves out within the focus group discussions.  At this level the participants 
were attempting to assign meaning to the unequal relations of power that exists 
between children and bearers of adult society ideology. 
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One can point to the socialisation process, and its associated institutions (school, 
home and media) as the prime agent of dissemination and sustainability, or what 
Althusser (1971) refers to as ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’.  As previously 
intimated, it is the infusion of meaning with power that creates the opportunity for 
ideology to legitimate, dissimulate and reify the existing state of affairs, but noting 
Althusser’s (1971) position, childhood itself appears to have become an instrument 
of ideology, or as Althusser (1971) argues, an ideological state apparatus, complete 
with a political and legal dimension, a hegemonic acceptance in society, and 
members who act to solidify its existence.  This is cogently displayed during the 
discussion on corporal punishment (see page 215-216), where some participants 
concur on the usefulness of corporal punishment. 
 
Beyond Althusser’s (1971) argument, writers such as Cambell and Levine (as cited 
in Billig, 1976) as well as Duncan (1993) and Bulhan (1985) argue that it is 
inevitable in societies characterised by relations of domination for the dominated to 
reproduce the discourse of the dominant group.  The essence of their position is that 
this is a result of the tendency of the dominated to strive for the elimination of 
cognitive dissonance.  Strains of cognitive dissonance are conspicuously present in 
the discourse produced by the participants in the current study.  However, in this 
instance it is not a mere reproduction of discourses but rather an active attempt at 
maintaining the system.  This contention comes across very strongly when the 
participants appear to be challenging the dominant discourse whilst simultaneously 
appearing to use society’s frame of reference to solidify their challenges.  This is 
aptly demonstrated in the quote “adults always want to tell you what to do...but you 
must listen to adults” (see page 212 for a contextual reference).  Poulantzas (as cited 
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in Duncan, 1993) arrives at a similar conclusion.  He argues that the “dominated 
classes live their conditions of political existence through the forms of dominant 
[group]... discourse...often they live even their revolt against domination...within the 
frame of reference of dominant legitimacy” (p. 226).  This essentially means that the 
child participants’ discourses in the current study are framed within parameters set 
by adult society. 
 
A similar argument to this is found in the work of Bulhan (1985) as well as in the 
writing of Althusser (1971).  These writers invest the dominated with an instinctive 
ability to resist, challenge and oppose prevailing discourses of the dominant.  While 
these resistances were prevalent in the current study, it is apparent that even the 
resistances were framed within the parameters set by the dominant discourses.  A 
cogent example of this is presented during the participants’ discussions on the 
effects of exposure to violence (see page 176-178 for a contextual reference).  These 
powerful descriptions suggest that the fears and psychological distress experienced 
as a result of violence exposure are not imagined or discursively constructed, but 
presented as real and plausible possibilities. The discourses of ‘helplessness and 
vulnerability’ and ‘marginalisation’ are immediately apparent and point to 
childhood as a space of helplessness and isolation.  According to these participants, 
the experiences of violence exposure and the resulting psychological distress is a 
result of being members of the social category of childhood.  The fact that they may 
be incorrectly assuming that adults are immune is immaterial.  Rather the critical 
point is the collaborative construction of childhood as a space of helplessness and 
vulnerability within which the ideological content is revealed. 
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For the participants, the nature of childhood, i.e. what it means to be a child, what is 
expected and what is allowed or not, has been internalised into their consciousness.  
It suggests that it is not merely the reproduction of the dominant discourses but a 
thorough acceptance of the state of affairs.  They live their domination with a sense 
of “these are the ways things must be”.  To a large extent this position is probably 
perpetuated by the fact that childhood is a temporary phase and that eventually they 
would be beyond the rules that limit their existence.  As childhood is a temporary 
life phase, merely biding one’s time would allow safe passage through the life phase 
and graduate to be both beyond, as well as the enforcer of the rules.  This contention 
finds support in the participants’ constant intimation about how things will be “when 
we grow up”.  It is through this understanding of the temporality of childhood that 
could potentially temper the resistance to the dominated discourses.  With the 
restriction of opposition, the presence of cognitive dissonance and contradictory 
notions within the consciousness creates a tension within the child.  This tension 
appears to be resolved through the participants immersing themselves in the implicit 
and explicit acts of negotiation. 
 
7.4 Negotiating a synthesis: Ideologically configured meanings of childhood 
On the continuum, located between consensus and contestation, is the notion of 
‘negotiation’, which acts as a synthesis between the polarised meanings of 
consensus and contestation.  In other words, as the contestation and consensus are 
outcomes, the negotiation is a process.  Within the texts of the current study these 
instances of negotiation are conspicuously present in the discursive space between 
consensus and contestation.  Whilst it is also true that it too functions on the three 
levels as previously stipulated, its more significant function is that it mediates 
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between the two opposing poles, as it were, acting as a synthesis or resolution to the 
contestation/consensus tension.  With regard to the actual discourses, this is 
demonstrated most prolifically, albeit ironically, by elucidating the nature of the 
‘non-negotiable discourses of safety’, ‘stable environment’ and ‘stable self’.  Even 
though a structural analysis would show a clear cut linguistic attempt at demanding 
these issues as being non-negotiable, they were in fact all negotiated within the 
course of the engagement.  During the process of actively positioning, 
compromising, highlighting, masking, legitimating, constructing etc, the participants 
were actually negotiating their position within a framework of these relations.  So, 
for example, when the participants constructed the ‘non-negotiable’ discourse, it 
was in fact negotiated discursively.   
 
The negotiation further suggests that although the discourse appeared compelling, it 
demonstrates that the meanings are not fixed but rather, as social constructionism in 
general argues, an open, shifting and indeterminate phenomenon. 
 
If the meanings are open and indeterminate, then an important question or task that 
emerges concerns identifying the factors which determine these different horizons of 
meanings.  While both Dant (1991) and Thompson (1984) correctly point to the 
social status of the producers, a more useful indicator would be to look at the 
broader social context, as espoused by Gouldner (as cited in Thompson, 1984) who 
emphasises the importance of situating ideology within a social context.  In other 
words, the above notion translates, within the context of the current study, to the 
following question: given that these discourses and meanings were negotiated within 
the engagement of data collection, essentially with a non-significant subject 
 
 
 
 
 253 
(researcher) in the participants’ lives, would the discourses be consistent in the 
process of their engagement with significant members and institutions in their lives?  
This is of course also a typical social constructionist argument and partly the 
argument that Gergen (1994) in particular, makes when he suggests that meaning is 
intersubjectively located in the relationship between interlocutors and not merely 
within the social context.  Gergen argues that words acquire their meaning “through 
the ways they are used in patterns of ongoing exchange …” or more precisely “by 
their function within a set of circumscribed rules” or ‘language games”41
 
 (Gergen, 
1994, p. 52-53).   In other words, it is not a mere consideration of the social context 
that is significant but rather elucidating how relations of domination are developed 
and sustained, within ideologically configured social rules and  frameworks, within 
specific social contexts.  It is this transcending character that must be grasped. 
To elucidate this it may be useful to look at the concept of split reference introduced 
by Ricoeur (as cited in Thompson, 1984) and adapted by Thompson (1984).  
Ricoeur (as cited in Thompson, 1984) argues that the understanding of discourse 
involves a suspension of the apparent meaning and the elucidation of second order 
reference, which refers to other aspects of experience which cannot be disclosed in a 
directly ostensive way.  Applying this concept to the analysis on ideology, 
Thompson (1984) suggests a splitting of the referential domain.  Thompson (1984) 
suggests that: 
the terms of discourse carry out their ideological role by explicitly 
referring to one thing and implicitly referring to another, by tangling 
                                                 
41 In a Wittgensteinien sense.  
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these multiple referents in a way which serves to sustain relations of 
domination. (p. 137-138) 
 
In other words, to interpret ideology requires a construction of meaning which 
discloses the referential domain of discourse, which identifies the individual 
referents, and explicitly reveals how their entanglement functions to sustain relations 
of domination.  Applied to the study of childhood, the now fashionable repertoire of 
childhood as an autonomous and valid life stage, presents children as valid members 
of society while implicitly advancing notions of children as vulnerable and in need 
of protection.  These referents become entangled, endorsing institutions and even 
legislation that advance and sanction the need for protection.  With protection comes 
strict guidelines and principles on behaviour, movement and discourse.  While the 
current study does not allow for the explication of this from a general perspective, it 
does show its manifestations which is revealed in, and can be inferred from, the 
participants’ discourses.  This is demonstrated most explicitly when the 
contestation/consensus meanings of childhood are presented within the same 
discourse or narrative.  At times the referents become so entangled that the 
participants contest, consent and negotiate the various meanings within the same 
utterance and expression.  It is precisely because of this entanglement that the 
participants would, for example, argue for autonomy and equal rights and 
simultaneously suggest contradictory notions.  This contention is perfectly 
encapsulated in the expression “you also have rights, but you must do what your 
parents tell you” (see page 216).  It is a key feature present throughout the 
participants’ discussions. 
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7.5 Towards an ideologically configured constructionism  
If one follows the widely held view of ideology as shared social representations, the 
above discussion suggests that ideology is shared between different groups, at 
different levels, as well as within groups.  However, since a group of people 
commuting on a bus, or those waiting to board a plane are unlikely to share a similar 
ideology, it becomes important to define the nature of a group as well as to 
determine which groups develop and share different ideologies.  van Dijk (1998) 
suggests that the criteria of group membership and social identification apply to 
social categories with relatively permanent characteristics e.g. religion, gender, age 
etc.  So, Christians, Muslims and Jews; males and females as well as children and 
adults demonstrate ideological positions that are related to their position and 
interests in society.  These are not merely random groups of people but could more 
accurately be described as ideological groupings by virtue of their social 
categorisation.  When the ideological group exercises a form of power or domination 
over other groups, then it would be more accurate to speak of a social class.  
However, the notion of social class suggested above, is not the classic Marxist 
tradition where one class ‘economically’ exploits the other, but rather shared social 
representations that are social, political, economic, but also, in the spirit of van Dijk 
(1998), cognitive and affective.   
 
Another decisive criterion is the shared experience of social conflict, discord or the 
common experience of exploitation or domination by one group over the other42
                                                 
42 Possibly sharing remnants of a Marxist conception.  In this instance dominant groups develop an 
ideology that is used to sustain its domination whilst the dominated groups develop ideologies as a 
basis for discourses of resistance or opposition. 
. 
The key issue here is that these social representations are the reference points of the 
 
 
 
 
 256 
exertion of power and sustenance of relations of domination.  Therefore, for 
children, within the social category of childhood, this means that part of their 
personal identity is entangled with the social identity.  The consensus/contestation 
meanings of childhood are possible manifestations of this identity entanglement.  
van Dijk (1998) extends his argument to demonstrate the role of ideology in the 
creation of a group identity.  He claims that groups and ideology mutually constitute 
each other and thus “no group can socially exist and act without a group identity and 
shared ideological beliefs of its members” (p. 154). 
 
Further consideration is required by the fact that various social actors may be 
members of various social groups or classes that each possess their own ideology.  
So, for example, if one looks at a black female adolescent, a number of contrasting 
ideologies operate within one consciousness.  While the ideologies may compliment 
one another, these different ideologies are often in conflict with one another.  The 
key point in this example is that belonging to these different social groups implies a 
number of different identities that may compliment or contradict one another.  The 
ideologies, in van Dijk’s (1998) sense, cognitively represent these identities43
                                                 
43 Of course there are arguments against equating group identity with ideology.  They suggest that 
ideologies, at best, form the basis of a group identity.   
.  Like 
Wetherell (1998) who notes that identities are constituted in discourse, and Mouffe 
(1992) who argues that subject positions are constructed in discourse, a key point of 
departure of the current study is that ideology is constructed in discourse.  Wetherell 
(1998) extends the argument claiming that discourse only partly accounts for subject 
positions and identity.  She argues that: 
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I want to emphasise the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject 
positions and the importance of accountability rather than discourse per 
se in fuelling the take up of positions in talk. (Wetherell 1998, p. 394) 
 
This contention is supported by the findings of the current study which demonstrate 
that subject positions are to a large extent ideologically configured.  However, as the 
texts show, it is not a single ideological configuration but a range of diverse and 
often competing ideological configurations that give rise to an ensemble of subject 
positions.  Mouffe (1992) for example argues that the social agent can be conceived 
of as being: 
constituted by an ensemble of subject positions’ that can never be socially 
fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of 
discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant 
movement of over-determination and displacement.  The identity of such 
a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and 
precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions 
and dependent on specific forms of identification.  It is therefore 
impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, 
homogenous entity.  We have to approach it as a plurality, dependent on 
the various subject positions through which it is constituted within 
various discursive formations. (as cited in Wetherell, 1998, p. 393-394) 
 
As the range of ideologically configured subject positions are often in conflict with 
one another, it essentially contributes to the contestation within the individual.  The 
black female adolescent’s philosophies and attitude toward life may conflict with her 
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beliefs of the role of the female or her experience of being black.  It is likely that the 
social context or situation that she finds herself in would determine which ideology 
prevails.  van Dijk (1998) argues that the social rules and norms would be the 
determining factor, with transgression resulting in unpleasant outcomes. 
“Transgression of the rule, and outright deviance and dissidence will be sanctioned 
by marginalisation, exclusion or elimination, whether physical, economic, social or 
cultural” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 151) 
 
In the current study, the presence of multiple identities of the participants is quite 
obvious.  Whilst the main grouping is ‘childhood’, other notable memberships are 
the geographical location (urban/rural), class (middle or working class), race (white, 
coloured and black) and language (English, Afrikaans, Xhosa).  In fact, one could 
even argue that the main grouping is adolescence, a sub-grouping of childhood, that 
presents with its own specific identity.  Even though the analysis did not focus on 
these differences the implication was apparent and can to some extent explain the 
conflicting discourses and contested meanings of childhood that emerged.   
 
With regard to the above, the concept of positioning can provide further explanation 
and context.  In Chapter Five the findings revealed how the participants used 
discursive strategies and repertoires to adopt various positions within the discussion. 
While Davies and Harre (1990) contend that positioning allows discourses to frame 
experiences and mediate behaviour, they also create opportunities to engage and use 
the discourse in various social situations (as cited in Burr, 2003).  With these two 
aspects of positioning operating at the same time, people are both constructors of, 
and constructed by discourses.  But discourses do more than that; they also structure 
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our subjective experience of the world.  Positioning within discourse thus provides 
us with the content of our subjectivity.  Burr (2003) explains that as soon as we 
adopt a position within a discourse, we experience the world and our objective 
selves from the perspective of that vantage point and have a “limited set of concepts, 
images, metaphors, ways of speaking, self-narratives and so on” upon which to draw 
(p. 119).  Ultimately then, how positions are constituted and taken up, that is how 
positions are offered, accepted, declined or claimed, determines us as persons.  As 
Davies and Harre (1999) explain: 
An individual emerges through the process of social interaction, not as a 
relatively fixed end product but as one who is constituted and 
reconstituted through the various discursive practices through which they 
interact.  Accordingly, who one is…is always an open question with a 
shifting answer depending on the positions made available within one’s 
own and others’ discursive practices and within those practices, the 
stories within which we make sense of our own and others’ lives. (p. 35) 
 
What this essentially means, at an extreme level, is that children function and 
construct their sense of self based on the selection of pre-determined positions.  
However, these positions are not necessarily determined by the children themselves, 
but rather by social and cultural determinants of adult society.   
 
Willig (2000) similarly points out that positionings become internalised and are used 
strategically to achieve certain social objectives and can potentially even structure 
the person’s private experience itself.  However, these positionings, and role-playing 
(as pointed out in Chapter Five) are to a large extent mediated and limited by 
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ideologically configured institutionalised, social and material practices.  As Willig 
(2000) argues: 
Positionings constitute ways-of-being through placing the subject within a 
network of meanings and social relations which facilitate as well as 
constrain what can be thought, said and done by someone so positioned. 
(p. 557)  
 
For example, for the participants it was impossible to position themselves as 
anything other than children and thus show these networks of meaning to be 
ideologically configured.  Whilst the role-playing can possibly be seen as an attempt 
to shirk certain positions accorded by childhood, the ideological constituents of 
childhood create a vacuum from which children cannot escape, regardless of the 
different roles or positions they adopt.  The vacillation, or running between different 
positions (both between and within participants) imply the adoption of diverse 
ideological identities and could indicate an attempt to escape or resist the ideology, 
but ultimately manifesting in the contestation. 
 
Following the above contentions, discourses and subject positions suggest diverse 
experiences of childhood and ultimately lend support to Frønes’ (1994) and Jenks’s 
(2004) notion of multiple childhoods.  However, the current study demonstrated that 
whilst the diversity existed, the core constituents of the meanings of childhood were 
consistent across the different groups.  For example, even though the participants 
from the working and middle class neighbourhoods experienced the issue of safety 
and security differently, the emerging meaning was consistent across groups.  This 
suggests that, regardless of the sub-identities of the different participants, the 
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ideological experiences and meanings of ‘childhood’ supersede the other structural 
or ideological positions.   
 
This is essentially the point that Qvortrup (2005; personal communication) makes 
when he rejects the multiple childhoods thesis.  Highlighting the importance of a 
generational account of childhood studies, Qvortrup (2005) argues that a focus on 
other social variables detracts from the essence of the generational perspective.  
Concerning what he calls the diversity thesis, he argues thus: 
it is not seeking what is common to children but is profoundly sceptical to 
the very idea of commonness. On the contrary, it seeks differences among 
children or between groups of children.  It is not unaware of 
contextualisation, but children or childhoods are contextualised in terms 
of variables such as class, gender, ethnicity, urbanisation etc. Since all 
such variables do not make distinctions between generations, it fails to 
problematise generational relations.  A focus on diversification of 
childhood therefore risks eradicating the social contours of childhood as a 
generational form to the advantage of maximising local contextual 
variables. (Qvortrup, 2005, p. 3) 
 
Of course Qvortrup (2005), as it is being argued in the current study, is not rejecting 
the importance of the diversity thesis, but rather highlighting the notion that the 
generational location of childhood should be regarded as the determining factor for 
identity and ideological construction.  For children, and indeed for the participants in 
the current study, it is apparent that regardless of the various diversifying factors, 
they all share similar ideological propositions.  However, it is also apparent that they 
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make different, sometimes radical, use of these ideological propositions in different 
social conditions.  This explains the large variation in the discourses and associated 
social practices and behaviour (van Dijk, 1998). 
 
This finding, and indeed the above explanation could be construed of as decidedly 
non-constructionist, as social constructionism would innately argue for the multiple 
perspective and diversity thesis.  In fact, it appears that it was theorists working from 
that epistemological position that initially put forward the notion of multiple 
childhoods.  Again, it is important to reiterate that the study is not rejecting the 
diversity and multiplicity thesis, but rather adopting the position that in the case of 
an ideological perspective, children should be perceived of as a single group (or 
class44
 
), as has been argued earlier.  In this way it becomes possible to elucidate the 
relations of domination and nature of the power relationship.  A focus on the other 
identities would undoubtedly cloud the focus on how these relations of domination 
operate.  This represents a quintessential example of Thompson’s ‘fragmentation’, 
more specifically the differentiation modus operandi of ideology whereby the 
distinctions and divisions between individuals and groups are foregrounded, 
perpetuating disunity and creating in-group and out-group ideological forms.   
Social constructionist theorists (see e.g. Hibberd, 2005; Parker, 1992; Willig, 1999) 
believe that social constructionism need not be inconsistent with realism. They put 
forward the notion of critical realism which sees the world and one’s knowledge, 
observations and experiences as generated by stable social structures within a 
structured reality (Willig, 1999).  This is referred to as ontological realism and 
                                                 
44 In the non-Marxist sense. 
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essentially means that there is a reality that exists outside of the discursive world 
which determines the nature of the discursive constructions.  In this study that reality 
is conceptualised as ideology. 
 
In this sense, the participants’ constructions of childhood are not arbitrary, but rather 
constructions informed and shaped by ideologically configured social relationships, 
that are in all likelihood imbued with issues of power and relations of domination.    
 
As this is a methodological argument and not a philosophical position, contestation 
regarding the suggestion of the meanings of childhood is similarly inapplicable.  
However, it does beg the question that if this group, class or structure of society 
should be perceived of as a single entity with a common experience, would a social 
constructionist perspective be adequate?  In other words, is it still viable to refer to 
childhood as a social construction?  Or would it be more useful to speak of 
childhood as an ideologically configured construction?  Social constructionism 
invests people with the capacity and freedom to intersubjectively negotiate meaning 
and reality between themselves and the social world.  Progress through the current 
study has suggested that while a social constructionist approach is useful in 
generating an understanding of how the meaning of childhood is intersubjectively 
constructed, it does little to grasp the unequal relations of power that exists between 
children and society.  The key point is that the meanings of childhood, whether 
constructed by or present in discourses, cannot be independent from the 
ideologically configured social, historical and material structures.  An ideologically 
configured constructionism would maintain the key social constructionist thrust that 
childhood is constructed in discourses which would include socially shared 
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historical, economic and cultural representations.  It will also add the critical 
component of elucidating the nature of how meaning is transferred through 
discourse to maintain relations of domination.  It will shift the focus to how 
symbolic forms develop and sustain these relations but also expose how ideology 
creates hegemonic tendencies within the consciousness of child and adult society.  It 
would also go a long way towards engaging with relativism, which has been the 
Achilles heel of social constructionism.  Childhood would then no longer be 
regarded as a mere discursive construction but a reality that exists (one of many), 
constructed discursively to maintain relations of domination and unequal power 
relations. 
 
The greatest contribution of conceiving of childhood as an ideologically configured 
construction is undoubtedly the fact that it elucidates the relationship between social 
practices associated with relations of power and domination on the one hand and 
social representations constituted in ideologies on the other.  Explicating how they 
construct and sustain each other is critical and is made possible by conceiving of 
childhood as an ideologically configured construction.  Importantly too, an 
ideological conception advances the addition of the cognitive and affective domains 
and allows an analysis of how they impact on the discursive.  This provides a more 
holistic approach than the discursive position of social constructionism. 
 
Of course the brand of social constuctionism that focuses on issues relating to power 
and how unequal power relations foster social inequality in society, could possibly 
provide some means of negotiating the shortcomings of light constructionism (see 
Chapter Three).  However, as previously intimated, this version is largely based on 
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the work of Foucault (1980) who had a particular aversion towards the concept of 
ideology, perceiving it as an effect of the relationship between institutional power 
and discourse.  This relegation of ideology to a mere effect or outcome variable is 
thus inappropriate for this project, which aims to elucidate the ideological nature of 
childhood construction.  
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter dealt with the development of the ideological meanings of childhood.  
The ideological meanings of childhood were identified as consensus, contestation 
and negotiation, existing on a continuum within individuals (intrapersonal), between 
individuals (interpersonal) and between children and adult society (societal).  
Critically, this chapter espouses a notion of childhood that gravitates away from the 
discursive position of social constructionism towards an ideologically configured 
constructionism.  Essentially this means that beyond shared representations of 
childhood as socially, historically and culturally manifested, one also needs to 
consider how childhood is positioned in discourse to maintain unequal relations.  
While this chapter elucidated the ideological configuration of the meanings of 
childhood, it also shows ideology as the referential point.  In other words, ideology 
structures the nature and content of discourse and language.  In that sense ideology 
determines the content of discussions and communications, e.g. the nature of 
socialising children, the child protection/liberation dichotomy, legislation and even 
formal developmental theory and child-rearing practices.  The relationship with 
language and ideology is critical.  Thompson (1984) argues that the language which 
is applicable is not the discreet ‘sociolect’ or meta-language but rather the language 
of everyday life.  This study has provided support to this notion and confirms that it 
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is the language of everyday life which is the actual locus of ideology and the actual 
site of meaning that sustains relations of domination. 
 
However, in line with van Dijk’s (1998) contention, the findings suggest that not all 
discursive activity is ideological.  While the discussions clearly show a range of 
discourses that are ideologically imbued, there are also discourses that construct 
perceptions and experiences of childhood devoid of ideological content.  However, it 
appears that the ideological imbrications emerge during the process of meaning 
assignation.  In other words, while the discursive constructions could be 
ideologically mute, aimed at providing vicarious descriptions of the experiences and 
nature of childhood, how the participants make sense of and assign meaning to these 
experiences is ideological.  So while their experiences of childhood exist as real, and 
the discourses are at times constructed to sanction the veracity of these accounts, the 
ideological constituents are located within the process of meaning making.  In sum 
to understand how ideologies work and how they are created and reproduced, it is 
necessary to look beyond discursive manifestations towards the mental and 
cognitive dimensions of discourse, i.e. meaning making and its embeddedness in 
social contexts and structures. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EPILOGUE 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three the concept of validity was engaged with at length.  The outcome 
of this engagement was an acknowledgement of the critical importance of sustaining 
validity throughout the qualitative enterprise.  Various conceptualisations and 
dimensions of validity were identified as significant pursuits in sustaining validity 
and rigour of qualitative studies.  Within these varying accounts, the concept of 
reflexivity consistently emerged as an important factor in contemporary qualitative 
projects.  As previously intimated, reflexivity refers to the self reflective process of 
“attending to the institutional location of historical and personal aspects of the 
research relationship” (Parker, 2005, p. 25).  In practice, this means much has to be 
considered during the method phase of the project.  This includes, but is not limited 
to the selection of the participants, triangulation of data collection methods and data 
sources, thick description and detailed report writing.  When it comes to the final 
phases, reflexivity practically entails a large degree of critical self-reflection and 
reconsideration.  This Chapter engenders these principles of reflexivity.   
 
A number of methodological and theoretical dilemmas emerged throughout the 
course of this study.  Identifying and explicating how they were negotiated is the 
focus of the current Chapter.  They will be presented and engaged with, however, 
not necessarily in the order of their occurrence or importance.  In the spirit of 
reflexivity, and to enhance the authenticity, the author has decided that this chapter 
will depart from orthodox academic prose and be written in the historical first 
person.  I have noted Parker’s (2005) warning about reducing reflexivity to a mere 
first person confession on what was done.  He argues that reflexivity is not simply 
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turning inward but rather “outward to the social relations that have enabled someone 
to experience themselves in relation to others” (p. 29).  I present each dilemma and 
then proceed to discuss how I negotiated its implications and dealt with it in the 
study. 
 
8.2 Well-Being as a Hermeneutic Key: A Point in Question 
Undoubtedly a key concern for the current study was the question around accessing 
information.  This essentially translated into the question: How was I going to get 
children to discuss childhood?  It was pointed out to me that it was unlikely that a 
direct, or even indirect, line of questioning would provide me with an instrument to 
elicit responses from the participants.  Indeed this dilemma was engaged with at 
length by my supervisory panel as well as the Faculty’s Higher Degrees Committee, 
which in fact declined to endorse the project proposal based on this methodological 
shortcoming.  This was my first methodological hurdle.  I negotiated it, under 
supervision, through the hermeneutic body of knowledge, as espoused by Gadamer 
(1976, 1994).  Gadamer put forward the concept of hermeneutic key, referring to a 
key concept, thought or phrase that would stimulate or increase access to your 
‘horizons of understanding’.  Using the concept of well-being as a hermeneutic key 
was based on my previous extensive research into children’s perceptions of well-
being (see e.g. Savahl et al, 2006; September & Savahl, 2009; Willenberg et al, 
2006).  It was during this research on well-being that I noticed that children’s 
discourses on the dimensions and complexities of well-being in fact pointed to a 
general construction of childhood.  From there it was a short step to tailor the 
discussion guide to use well-being as a hermeneutic key and subsequently focus the 
probes to generate discussions on childhood.  What the strategy achieved was that it 
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created a sense of continuity and fluidity as I was able to oscillate between probes on 
well-being and childhood as a seamless discursive process and not a fragmented 
discussion.  This created a more natural and comfortable environment and ultimately 
enhanced the quality of the data.  Overall the strategy was well justified as the 
discussion on well-being did in fact produce discourses that could elucidate the 
participants’ general construction of childhood.  Axiomatically, it was these 
discourses of well-being and childhood that were examined for its ideological 
content. 
 
8.3 The Discourse Analysis Dichotomy: Micro versus Macro Approaches 
I noted in Chapter Four that options in discourse analysis were quite diverse.  I also 
pointed out that in the field of psychology it is usual to distinguish between two 
distinct lines of discourse analysis.  Firstly, those that are associated with 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (see e.g. Edwards, 1997) and secondly, 
those focused on power and subjectivity often associated with the post-structuralist 
work of Foucault (see e.g.  Hollway, 1984).  The technique associated with Potter 
and Wetherell (1987/1992) used in the current study is generally understood to be 
located between the two (Wetherell, 1998), but metaphorically speaking, it is 
coming from the ethnomethodological tradition but facing towards the post-
structural horizon.  At face value, considering the main aim and objectives of the 
study, it appears that Foucault’s discourse analysis, focusing on imbrications of 
discourse, power and subjectification would be the obvious choice.  However, my 
main reservation was Foucault’s complete aversion to the concept of ideology.  
Consistent with the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987/1992) and Wetherell (1998) 
this study to some extent attempted to weave the two positions into a viable 
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approach to understand ideological configurations of discourse.  The extent to which 
it succeeds depends on the validity of the emerging meanings.  I would acknowledge 
that the emerging meanings may initially appear to be more topical than original and 
lacking in philosophical sophistication.  This may appear to be a huge stumbling 
block as the thrust of this dissertation is to engage with these contested concepts.  
However, I would urge consumers of this manuscript, and qualitative research in 
general, not to use internal logic and coherence, or even philosophical sophistication 
as factors of validity.  Here, validity refers not to whether the meanings are a true 
interpretation of the discourses, but rather if it shows an account of the extent to 
which the emerging meanings are ideologically configured and constructed in 
discourse.  Essentially then, the fact that the emerging meanings may or may not 
reflect contemporary notions and discourses of childhood is immaterial.  Rather, the 
concern is to reveal the ideological constituents of the discourses.  The question to 
ask changes from “are the meanings emerging from the discourses valid?” to, “to 
what extent are the ideological configurations of the emerging meanings 
elucidated?” 
 
A further point of note is that the ideological meanings of one discourse can be used 
to exert influence over, exclude or marginalise others.  Referring to 
scientific/medical discourses, Cheek and Rudge for example state that certain 
medical understandings gain prominence over others based on certain socio-
historical influences over them (as cited in Cheek, 2004).  As Cheek explains: 
In contemporary health care, the truth status of medical/scientific 
discursive frames has shaped dominant taken-for-granted understandings 
of what is appropriate and authoritative practice…the claimed right of 
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certain groups of health professions rather than others to speak 
authoritatively about health and illness is premised on the authority of the 
scientific/medical discourse from which their expertise is both derived 
and, in turn, legitimated. (2004, p. 1143)    
 
The outcome of this is a prominent truth status where truth is a product of the rules 
of discourse (Cheek & Rudge, as cited in Cheek, 2004).  Cheek (2004) and Turner 
(1987) further point to the way that power is imbued within scientific and 
professional knowledge.  It is this power that has the exclusionary potential and the 
capacity to marginalise alternate understandings.  In the current study, this translates 
into adult discourse being the authoritative discourse of childhood.  Cheek (2004) 
also argues that if this dominant effect of a certain discursive frame is recognised, 
then opportunities inevitably arise for alternate conceptions or discourses.  In this 
study this contention is also explicitly demonstrated by the range of alternate 
conceptions and contestations within the discourses of the participants.  While 
Cheek (2004) correctly argues that the aim should not be “to replace one discourse 
with another or of using one to exclude the other” (p. 1143), the current study shows 
that these alternate discourses along with the dominant discourse, become imbued 
within the consciousness of participants.  This is the nature of ideology.  In other 
words, ideology is not only about the dominance and hegemonic tendencies of one 
understanding over the other but rather how alternate meanings exist and operate 
within consciousness. 
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8.4 Concerning Discourse Analysis 
Commentators (see e.g. Cheek, 2004, Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1992) note that 
discourse analysis is not a unitary single body of knowledge, and that because of its 
multidisciplinary inflection can potentially be used in various different ways.  Potter 
and Wetherell famously claim that: 
perhaps the only thing that all commentators are agreed on in this area is 
that terminological confusions abound… it is a field were it is possible to 
have two books on discourse analysis with no overlap in content at all. 
(1987, p. 6) 
 
Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter (2003) similarly note that, over the years, 
discourse analysis had transformed from a marginal approach to a widely accepted 
approach and has been represented in an ever increasing body of scholarly work 
such as conference presentations, PhDs as well as empirical and theoretical journals.  
This transformation has made the terrain of discourse more complex and spawned a 
proliferation of ‘methods’ of doing discourse analysis.  Antaki et al. (2003), 
however, argue that regardless of the disparate nature of discourse analysis, there are 
a number of methodological hurdles that are common across the various approaches.  
So while I was vigilant in following the guidelines outlined in the Potter and 
Wetherell style of discourse analysis and understood what discourse analysis 
entailed, I still needed to be acutely aware of what was ‘not’ discourse analysis.  To 
this end, I employed the typology put forward by Antaki et al. (2003).  Based on 
their argument that normative approaches fail to make explicit what is not analysis, 
they put forward a six point typology of analyses shortcomings and errors often 
made during discourse analysis.  During my analyses it was important to be 
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cognisant of these shortcomings, and to ensure that I was not effecting these 
analyses errors.   
 
The first, under-analysis through summary, is a common error often made by 
inexperienced analysts, which refers to the mere summarising of participants’ 
responses and emerging themes which does not proffer an analysis of the discourses 
being used.   
 
The second, under-analysis through taking sides, refers to additional analysis 
provided by the analyst which puts forward their own personal, political or moral 
stance towards the responses.  This subjective positioning, according to Antaki et al. 
(2003) can result in the corruption of the meaning of the participants’ discourses as 
the analyst is involved in quote selection to substantiate his or her own and not the 
participants position.   
 
Under-analysis through over-quotation, the third error, refers to the overwhelming 
provision of direct quotes from the analyst without providing an analysis of the 
discourse being used.  This error is conspicuously elucidated by the high ratio of 
data extracts to analysts’ comments.  The fourth shortcoming, the circular discovery 
of discourses and mental constructs, refers to when discourse which have been 
appropriately identified are left unsubstantiated and the analyst merely refers back to 
the identified entities without further analysis.   
 
The fifth, false survey, refers to the tendency of some analysts to implicitly 
extrapolate findings from study to the broader society.  Whilst this concern is typical 
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of quantitative studies, especially in experimental studies and designs that have not 
followed rigorous sampling procedures, in discourse analysis this error is often 
committed when the findings of a certain group of respondents are implicitly 
reported as representing or being true for all members of a certain category.  Antaki 
et al. (2003) warn that analysts should exercise great care that this impression is not 
carried across in the report.  At this point I would then like to point out that any 
generalising of findings of the this study to the broader population or to the broader 
members of the categories participating in the discussion is not intended and that 
any impression should be attributed to semantic error rather than methodological 
intent or design. 
 
The sixth and final shortcoming, under-analysis through spotting refers to the mere 
identification of rhetorical features and discursive procedures.  The identification 
and recognition of these features does in itself, not constitute analysis.  Rather the 
analysis must be used to elucidate how these devices are used intersubjectively to 
manage the speakers’ business and achieve certain goals. 
 
It would be too simplistic to suggest that the success of the discourse analysis 
depends on the extent to which I departed from these shortcomings.  Being 
cognisant of the shortcomings and consistently aware of not making these errors is 
strangely more concerned with validity of method rather than method itself, so that 
consumers of this manuscript can note that discourse analysis is not an ‘anything 
goes’ procedure.  I am aware that there is a certain amount of irony in presenting 
what discourse analysis is ‘not’ and not what actually counts as discourse analysis.  
Perhaps it is safe to say that analysis means a close engagement with one’s texts or 
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transcripts, and the illumination of their meaning and significance through insightful 
and technically sophisticated work.   
 
8.5 Ensuring Validity: Can this study be trusted? 
The concept of validity is highly contested in qualitative research.  As discussed in 
Chapter Four, commentators differ regarding the nature and extent that the concept 
should be employed in qualitative research.  The point of most discontent is the 
growing voice that validity in qualitative research is not about method 
(Chamberlain, 1999; Smith, 1990).  If I employed this line of argument, this study 
would undoubtedly be regarded as unscientific and discarded, and I would probably 
not receive a pass grade.  I will not do this.  The world of academia still depends on 
method as the key determinant of validity.  My other option is to hide behind the 
epistemology, a tactic employed strategically and successfully by many.  I could 
then argue that from a social constructionist perspective, “validity is a rhetorical 
construction…a feat of persuasion…a social construction…as such it must be 
interrogated for its discursive function within the social science enterprise” 
(Aguinaldo, 2004).  I did not follow this approach either, but yielded to the 
common-sense notion of validity and method. 
 
I religiously developed memos and to a large extent focused on producing detailed 
accounts in the write-up.  I used a reference group extensively to assist in the 
development and validation of the research instrument.  Member checking or 
respondent validation was employed in an attempt to validate the essence of the 
findings.  I embraced the concept of reflexivity, but stopped short of using 
reflexivity as an instrument to create an objective distance between myself and the 
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research.  I heeded Gadamer’s (1994) warning that reflexivity is not aimed at 
creating an objective distance, but rather as Angen (2000) argues, an 
acknowledgement of the intersubjective creation of meaning and understanding.   
 
In the final analysis I would acknowledge that I have, to some extent, committed 
methodolatry (Chamberlain, 1999), which refers to a preoccupation and privileging 
of method, a concept which is in opposition to the validity notions of contemporary 
qualitative research.  However, the focus on method points towards my 
preoccupation with adhering to ethical guidelines rather than positivist assumptions 
of a recipe style process.  Indeed it became increasingly clear that adhering to these 
apparent methodological regulations was to a large extent an endorsement of ethical 
principles of conducting research with children.  The adoption of the participatory 
method is, for example, a quintessential technique used to enhance ethical research 
with children.  In other words, conducting ethical research with children suggests, 
amongst others, the use of an appropriate method.  This essentially means that my 
use of detailed memos, critical reference groups, member checking and participant 
validation was not so much about securing validity but more about conducting 
ethically appropriate research with children and youth.  In the final analysis, I can to 
a reasonable extent, claim consistency between ontology (acknowledgement of 
children discourses and meanings as valid), method (child participation), 
epistemology (constructionism) as well as validity and ethical procedures, which 
comprise the minimum standard for academically acceptable and rigorous 
qualitative inquiry. 
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8.6 Epistemologically Speaking: Social Constructionism and its Ideological 
Discontents 
As I noted in Chapter Three, it was always going to be difficult to marry the 
inherently relativist social constructionism with the inherently contested concept of 
ideology. 
 
In its most general form, ideology, especially the false consciousness thesis, is 
epistemologically inconsistent with the general social constructionist thesis of 
multiple realities, where no one understanding has a higher status than the other.  
False consciousness, in fact, implies that there is one real truth that is being masked 
by ideology.  The fact that ideology, in this study is conceptualised as the way 
meaning is mobilised through language to maintain relations of domination, does 
inspire a sense of hope that it could be reconciled with social constructionism.  
However, this sense of hope was diminished with the realisation that social 
constructionism itself has become a highly contested concept as the recent debates 
between the key meta-theorists of social constructionism show (see e.g. Cromby & 
Nightingale, 1999; Gergen, 2001b; Hibberd, 2001a, 2001b, 2005; Lubricks, 2001; 
Stam, 2001; Willig, 1999).  Whilst other versions and strands of social 
constructionism exist that gravitate away from the problematic relativistism, the 
‘nothing outside text’ position still seems to haunt social constructionism in general 
and the notion of childhood as a socially constructed phenomenon in particular.  The 
key concern raised by those arguing against a relativist position is that it corrupts the 
moral grounding of action, choices and politics.  On the question of this moral 
conundrum, Burr asks: 
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How can we justify our political preferences if there is no way of asserting 
that some groups of people really are oppressed by others, or even that we 
can justifiably argue that people belong to certain groups anyway. (2003, 
p. 81) 
 
For the current study this means that children and their dominated position in society 
is just one way among many potential ways of constructing the world.  This means 
that issues such as child abuse, neglect, poverty, etc are not real issues that need 
special concern but merely one of many discursive constructions. 
 
Hibberd (2005) maintains that social constructionism need not be inconsistent with 
realism.  Within the social constructionist stable, proponents (see e.g. Parker, 1992; 
Willig, 1999) who argue against the relativism, proffer the position of critical 
realism.  Critical realism, according to Willig (1999) sees the world and our 
knowledge, observations and experiences as “generated by underlying, relatively 
enduring structures”  which essentially means that “meanings are afforded by 
discourse, accommodated by social structures and changed by human actors” (p. 44-
45).  The overall point is that there is a reality that exists outside of the discursive 
world which influences our constructions of discourse.  In this study I argued that 
ideology is this reality. 
 
The current study, in fact, largely followed a discursive psychology approach to 
social constructionism.  I argued, following Edwards and Potter (2001), that 
discourse is situated and action orientated, and very importantly that discourse both 
constructs versions of the world, and is itself constructed.  Essentially then, I was 
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more concerned about the role of language and discourse in the construction of 
meaning and less concerned about the ontological debates about the nature and the 
existence of reality.  So, while I would agree that social constructions are relative, 
they are not arbitrary constructions, but rather constructions informed and shaped by 
ideologically configured social relationships, that may or may not be imbued with 
issues of power and relations of domination.  
 
To that extent, there is more than a tinge of realism in the way I conceptualised 
social constructionism in the study.  Similar to Parker (1992) I followed 
epistemological relativism, in so far as accepting the fact that objective knowledge is 
an impossibility, and ontological realism, in so far as acknowledging that knowledge 
is produced by relatively enduring social structures (see e.g. Willig 1999) and that 
our social constructions are based on a structured reality (Parker, 1992)45
 
.  This is 
essentially the point made by Edley (2001) who suggests that social constructionism 
can be used in both the ontological and epistemological sense.  It is in the 
ontological sense that they concur that a reality exists.   
I insist that the reality that provides significant impact is that of ideology, where 
ideology is defined as meaning in the service of power.  My brand of 
constructionism is then one wherein social constructionism, discourses and 
meanings cannot be independent from the ideologically configured social, historical 
and material structures.  This conceptualisation further reduced the dissonance 
between experiences, discourses and meaning making.  The experiences of 
childhood were ontologically real, both constructing and being constructed by 
                                                 
45 See also Burr (2003). 
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discourses.  While the ideology emerged during this discursive activity, it is during 
the process of meaning making that the ideological constituents are most vividly 
located.  Further developing the above contentions is the key indication for future 
research.  At a minimum, I hope that these suggestions of how I reconciled social 
constructionism with studies of childhood provide a ‘real’ epistemological option for 
future studies of childhood as a social construction.  Critical realism offers, for the 
time being, a starting point to develop a more robust social constructionism for 
childhood studies.  What I believe is most important is that it offers ways of 
theorising the world that is aligned to practical actions, e.g. around policy, 
legislation and services for children.  It has in fact made the social construction of 
childhood more real.   
 
For future endeavours, given my perspective that consciousness is the site of 
ideological contestation, I also invite investigations into exploring, from 
Mannheim’s perspective, whether the child’s entire consciousness is ideological, i.e. 
a total conception (see Chapter Three) or is it only some part of its content, i.e. a 
particular conception.   
 
Furthermore, I heed Prout and James’s (1997) concern that child research should not 
be seen as external to the relationships with adults.  Similarly, for future ideological 
studies of childhood, I would endorse notions of how adult society contributes to the 
conceptualisation of childhood as an ideological construction.  A discursive analysis 
of adults’ discourse would reveal telling accounts of how ideological meanings are 
constructed in discourse.  In fact, a critical discourse analysis in the mould of 
Fairclough (see e.g. Fairclough, 1995, 2001) may produce enticing outcomes.  
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Critical discourse analysis is concerned with “how language and/or semiosis 
interconnect with other elements of social life, and… figure in unequal relations of 
power, in processes of exploitation and domination of some people by others” 
(Fairclough, 2001, p. 25).    
 
Finally, no study in ideology is complete without a thorough investigation of the 
legislation and the legal frameworks that pervades the concept.  With childhood, an 
analysis of current national legislation, the historical process of that legislation, 
along with the array of international Children’s Rights’ instruments that form part of 
the Bill of Rights and the Constitution will provide a more complete ideological 
analysis.  This study was simply concerned with revealing how meanings of 
childhood, intersubjectively constructed by discourses, elucidated an ideological 
conceptualisation of childhood.  It is a step along the road of an ideological analysis 
of childhood. 
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APPENDIX I: Information letter and consent form for learner 
 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Community and Health Sciences 
University of the Western Cape 
Private Bag X 17 
Bellville 
7535 
 
 
Dear Learner        
You have been selected to participate in a research project, based at the University 
of the Western Cape.  The project aims to explore your experiences and thoughts of 
childhood. 
 
If you agree to participate you will be asked to participate in two focus groups that 
will be conducted at your school.  Your participation will in no way hinder your 
school activities. 
 
Please note that the project ensures the strictest privacy and no names or any form of 
identification will be used.  You have the option to withdraw from the study at any 
point.   A comprehensive statement of the ethical procedures to be followed can be 
viewed overleaf. 
 
Should you agree to participate, please indicate in the box provided.   Please note 
that you can withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
I agree to participate in the project and 
acknowledge that I can withdraw at any 
point without any consequences.  
I do not wish to participate in the project 
  
 
Mark with an X 
 
Name _______________ 
 
 
Signature______________ 
 
 
If you have any questions please contact Shazly Savahl on either of the 
following numbers: 
 
Office: 021 959 2826 
Cell: 082 4696 291 
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APPENDIX II: Information letter and consent form for parent 
 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Community and Health Sciences 
University of the Western Cape 
Private Bag X 17 
Bellville 
7535 
 
 
Dear Parent/Guardian      
Your child has been selected to participate in a research project that aims to explore 
children’s experiences, and the meanings they attach to childhood. 
 
Should you consent your child will be asked to participate in two focus groups that 
will be conducted at the school.  Their participation will in no way hinder their 
school activities. 
 
The project, based at the University of the Western Cape, has been endorsed as 
adhering to ethical guidelines of the University as well as the Western Cape 
Education Department.  Please note that the project ensures the strictest 
confidentiality.  It will be conducted without prejudice and you or your child has the 
option to terminate participation at any point of the process.   A comprehensive 
statement of the ethical procedures to be followed can be viewed overleaf. 
 
Should you agree to your child’s participation please indicate in the box provided.    
I agree to my child participating in the 
above-mentioned project.   
I do not give permission for my child to 
participate in the above mentioned 
project 
  
 
Mark with an X 
 
Name of Parent/Guardian 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Signature 
 
_________________________ 
If you have any questions please contact Shazly Savahl on either of the 
following numbers: 
 
Office: 021 959 2826 
Cell: 082 4696 291 
 
 
 
 
